Althaus (2003) Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics
This book examines the quality of political representation provided by surveys; thus conceptualizing public opinion research in the “classic tradition” (Lazarsfeld 1957), using empirical methods to pursue and refine the foundational questions about popular sovereignty raised by political theorists. “It does so through a statistically analysis of representation in surveys where quality is analyzed from the standpoint of two foundational concepts in democratic theory: the degree to which surveys regard and promote the political equality of all individuals in a population and the likelihood that surveys represent the political interests of all individuals in a population” (9).
Introduction
What is public opinion? In what form ought it be recognized?
What is its nature? What characteristics should it possess?
What kind of political power does it have? What kind of power should it be given?
These should/ought questions are more normative, than empirical, but still very important to ask.
Opinion surveys:
Relevant? Since the 1930s there has been a growing acceptance to use polls as proxy for peoples’ voice. Sample surveys allow scholars to look beyond one’s vote as a signal of needs and wants—its more a more expansive and comprehensive measure of preferences than a vote.
Advocates: Useful for mass democracies because they can reveal what the people are thinking (Verba 1996) (2). Page & Shapiro (1992) and Converse (1990) also find surveys to be laudable, and “conclude that the traditional understanding of public opinion as volatile and capricious is incorrect” (2). –this idea of a RATIONAL public. Also supported by Jacobs & Shapiro (2000). Yet these authors are all empiricists. (not all empiricists applaud polling results; many recognize that what individuals say in polls is shallow, vacillating, illogical, and coarse) (7). In contrast to these scholars, few political philosophers would aver that polling/samples offer a justification for democratic rule. Scholars are suspicious of aggregate preference to reveal the common good (Arendt 1958; Barber 1984; Habermas 1989, 1996).
Polling criticisms:
sampling error
question wording
draw attention away from “real” concerns (Ginsberg 1986)
construe a fictitious public mind (Bourdieu 1979)
Thus we still have to call into question “whether opinion surveys can tell us reliably what the people really want” (3).
This book calls into question two (2) major concerns:
(1) Do citizens have enough knowledge about the political world to regularly formulate policy preference that are consistent with their needs, wants, and values?
(2) Is the quality of political representation provided by opinion surveys adequate for the uses to which they are put in democratic politics?
Overall, political knowledge among citizens is low and thus not to be trusted (Almond 1950; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Patterson 1980).
I. But some scholars contend that aggregation of the informed and uninformed balance each other out (Converse 1990; Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 1992; Miller 1996; Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). “When aggregated, the argument goes, the more or less random responses from ill-informed or unopinionated respondents should tend to cancel each other out” (12). Page and Shapiro say that informed opinions persist because uninformed opinion cancel out (why would they err in the same direction?)
Althaus argues there is NOT a balance/canceling out. Uninformed people do not give randomly balanced responses. They are influenced by the information environment… the uninformed are making the decisions, because the INFORMED are canceling one another out. And that uniformed opinions drive the collective choice. Althaus says the uninformed GROUP on the same answers (framing effects). Informed people group around the poles, and thus cancel each other out. The uninformed choose the middle, the more accessible frame, and… etc. etc. especially try in a 2 party system. Especially true in surveys that give a 7 point scale (uniformed choose 3—the middle).
** (informed, canceled out)
XXXXXXXXXXX (uniformed, mean)
** (informed, canceled out)
II. Others argue citizens—though low on political ken —use heuristic shortcuts “interpretive schema or cues from political elites” (13)—in place of factual knowledge (Popkin 1991, 1993; Kuklinski & Quirk 2000; Iyengar 1990).
But, Althaus finds both to lack adequate empirical support (14) and states: “both revisionist perspectives tend to overlook an important fact: low information levels are only half the problem. Just as important is the observation that some kinds of people tend to be better informed than others” (14).
What other way could we measure the “skewed noise.”
Political Knowledge:
Low levels and uneven social distribution of political knowledge affect the quality of representation afforded by collective preferences. Much of the variation in knowledge levels is due to individual differences in (1) motivation, (2) ability and (3) opportunity.
(1) Motivation: influenced by a person’s interest in politics, civic duty, and anxiety about the future (I would also argue social acceptance, given one’s social circle—in some, albeit small, pockets, its cool to know this stuff).
(2) Ability: influenced by education. It is the ability to process the info.
(3) Opportunity: mobilization efforts; exposure to media markets, thus geographical component here, as well.
Who are the politically savvy? They share characteristics (other than information advantages)
- groups with distinctive and competitive interests
- white, middle class, male, middle-aged, married
- college grads
- affluent
Consequences?
(1) people who are knowledgeable tend to give opinions more often
(2) people who are well informed are better able to form opinions consistent with political predispositions (Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996).
Consequences of the consequences?
Information effects: “a bias in the shape of collective opinion caused by the low levels and uneven social distribution of political knowledge in a population.”
Collective opinion: any aggregation of individual preferences.
Bias: a distortion away from what collective opinion might look like if all relevant groups in a population were equally and optimally well informed about politics.
Thus majority opinions are driven by a SMALL NUMBER of respondents who have an intense and unified view. People from higher SES groups tend to dominate the public opinion channels—contacting officials, volunteering for campaigns, contributing money.
Thus, conventional wisdom might lead one to recognize that the special value of a sample survey is that it is more representative. Yet Althus argues it may not be as representative as commonly thought, and we need to reconsider how we use opinion surveys in the political process.
Chapter 2
Putting the power of aggregation to the test; an assessment of the information-pooling properties of collective opinion (aggregation and Philip Converse).
Althus argues that collective rationality models (Converse 1990; Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 1992; Miller 1996; Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996) suffer from several conceptual problems; using a computer simulation of 28,000 opinion distributions, Althus finds…
Chapter 3
Examines whether the opinions expressed in sample surveys possess the critical characteristics necessary for collective rationality to work.
Less-informed are more likely to respond “don’t know” or “no opinion.” This hints at a political knowledge issue, which I cover in detail, above. But indeed, opinions expressed in sample surveys are not expressive of the collective rationality—overresponse rate by well-informed; ill-informed are all like-minded in responses (whether purposively or not).
Chapter 4
Tests the impact of information effects (see definition above) on collective preferences.
Data: 1988, 1992, 1996 ANES survey.
Model: what collective prefs might look like if all respondents were as well informed about politics as most knowledgeable ones.
The model shows what Althus predicts in chapter 3—the mass public’s low levels of pol info cause surveys to misrepresent views. Other findings: collective opinions appear more progressive on some issues and more conservative on others than they would if fully informed; “After controlling for info effects, collective opinion tends to become less approving of presidents and Congress, more dovish and interventionist on foreign policy, less conservative of social, enviro, and equal rights issues, and more conservative on morality issues and questions about the proper limits of gov activity.”
Chapter 5
This chapter looks at when and why information effects are highest.
When questions are more cognitively demanding there are greater disparities in informed responses between the well and ill-informed. Differences also arise from the social and psychological factors that “influence how people establish and update their political prefs.”
Chapter 6
This chapter assesses information effects, over time (time series data from 1980-1998). Findings: “information effects tend to grow smaller when the political environment motivates citizens to process information systematically, although many of these changes turn out to be short-lived.”
This chapter also talks about the “simulated measures of fully informed opinion.” I am still confused as to how they “simulate” such a measure, but when it is done it is accurate in predicting collective policy prefs. But the author does note that although statistical simulations are spot-on they don’t represent the latent interests of the population (is this bc the latent interests are not expressed? Im still a bit confused, and REALLY am not motivated to answer my own question. Although im confuse, I am not interested )
Chapter 7
This chapter looks at how information effects complicate the use of opinion surveys in political decision making. Ive already touched upon many of the problems (misrep, overrep etc). This chapter addresses these problems in more depth, but also suggests two conditions that would help overcome representation issues (information effects):
(1) ensure the sample has the same demographic characteristics of the population they are suppose to represent.
(2) When the number of well-informed give the same number of mixed opinions as the less informed
But concludes “the absence of info effects should not be taken as a sign of enlightened prefs. Instead, the absence of info effects confirms only that a collective pref provides good info about what the people want, rightly or wrongly.”
Chapter 8
Information effects can influence the usefulness of survey results; surveys can be problematic, but also have potential. If the suggestions in chapter 7 are met then public opinion surveys have a place in directing democratic politics.
Conclusion:
The primary culprit is not any inherent shortcoming in the methods of survey research. Rather, it is the limited degree of knowledge held by ordinary citizens about public affairs and the tendency for some kinds of people to be better informed than others” (10).
Class notes:
Collective choice with more information doesn’t change at the aggregate.
General knowledge vs. specific issue
ISSUE KNOWLEDGE inconsistent with schematic network?
Aggregation on a particular point (i.e. blacks and affirmative action) even though in general, might be characterized as uninformed. Thus familiarity with an issue makes a BIG difference. The question being asked matters.
When people are not “activated” they can still make the policy decision? (not if public opinion doesn’t drive policy!).
Even without an authentic opinion, you can drive a policy.
Dispersion v. Consistency of opinions
Convergence hypothesis:
Althaus finds that it holds
If this is the case then info effects in the collective… there is not a converging in the middle. Increasing information effects. More people are not settled in the middle, but off to the sides, creating a divergence in expectation and what results.
Depletion hypothesis: information effect (the difference between opinion that you get at time one from simulated opinion—fully informed). people who give the DK answers have less knowledge, but demographically the same (151). The DKs are female; men guess (Luskin).
Not much of an impact. (is it because white men v. women is trying to explain the difference?)
If its not the depletion effect, what is it?
(1) Survey method (framing—is the way we are asking the question forcing people to answer questions a way in which they otherwise would not).
(2) 2
(3) social distribution of policy specific knowledge. Are you able to tap into policy specific ken instead of general?
(4) Relative salience of political ken; do we see that the info effects decreases in presidential elections because the information matters (socially/self-monitoring).
The purpose of these test and setting up infor effects:
Are we using polls to set up policy? Is policy not reflecting the people bc of information effects? If yes, we need to improve surveys; limit the availability of a middle answer, framing, etc. By knowing the general ways frames etc. influence info effects we can distinguish between good surveys and bad surveys (straw polls). Concludes: surveys are problematic. Duh.
Take home effects:
Value issues more vulnerable to change? Value issues that we thinking we know, and we more info we change them! Collective value opinion is more vulnerable to change than policy info; policy info is actually more authentic. (127)
THERE ARE INFORMATION EFFECTS—there are consistent differences. And they are LARGE. (1/5 TO 1/3 of collective prefs will change with more information. Milner links to institutions.
Tuesday, January 1, 2008
Milner, H. (2002) Civic Literac
Why do PR systems have distributive income systems? Looks at as a function of Civic Literacy.
Theme: the causes and consequences of differences in political knowledge and what makes social-democratic welfare states sustainable
I. Civic Engagement and Social Capital develop skills that matter (Putnam says we get these from group associations; the no. leads to our S.C. stock).
Social Capital (as conceptualized by Putnam) measured as:
1. Trust (horizontal= interpersonal trust; vertical = trust in government)
2. associational density
definition of social capital: a public good; public trust, interpersonal and in government; community organization; voluntary associations.
Findings: Democratic institutions that equally distribute intellectial resources also more equally distribute material resources (high C.L. societies). AND Democratic institutions that more equally distribute intellectual resources attain higher levels of political parties.
Civic Engagement:
Organizational membership > ^trust in government > Civic engagement (voting)
II. Civic Literacy
Measured as:
1. willingness (the vote; @ the local level)
2. ability (knowledge-supply (media) and demand (people need)+ factual and cognitive)
- supply: “The nature and intensity of such efforts are seen to be a function of institutionalized incentives; in other words, political institutions matter when it comes to the accessibility and intelligibility of political information” (6).
III. Political ken
1. Individual Factors: education, age, income
2. Institutional Factors: electoral system; electoral system influences access, usefulness, and intelligibility.
IV. Sources of Civic Literacy
Measuring C.L.:
Civil: turning out to vote in local elections—more valid measure because they require more information; anyone can vote for a president. It takes more effort to vote in a local election.
Literacy: knowledge of U.N.
V. Political Parties and Political Institutions
-“The extent to which voters are informed on matters relevant to the decision to vote is in fact closely linked to the political institutions in which elections take place” (66).
Political Institutions > Political Ken > Political Participation
Electoral systems and Turnout
PR 71%
Maj 50%
VI. Political Institutions (78)
“each system has its own district long-term representational logic and it is via this logic that the citizens makes sense of the political choices available. Candidates in majoritarian systems are primarily oriented toward the median voter in the electorate, while those under PR systems are more oriented toward the median voter of their party (Wessels 1996)” (80). In FPTP political actors tend to misrepresent.
Consensus democracy: PR > ^ C.L. > ^ Voter Turnout
FPTP (first past the post) PR (proportional representation)
Ambiguity of leaders Less ambiguity
Zero Sum Better at supply side of ken
Mandates Visible compromises
SM cater to narrow interests Coalitions
Clear political map and more political information***
VII. C.L. and the Media
VIII. C.L. and Institutions
IX. Adult Education
Formal education and creating habits of civic literacy; as assessment of more deliberative democracy. Are people prone to change their minds when they have more information?
X. Case Study: New Zealand
Economy driven by a strong public sector; classic Westminster model. Milner has a negative evaluation of changes in New Zealand. Participation gone down following changes made by the state
XI. Economic Outcomes
XII. Case: Sweden
Universalism; decommodify labor (Epsing-Anderson conception). Excellent public health care, public transportation and education levels.
High levels of civic literacy; potential to also be economically successful (even though socialist). Taxation in Sweden is regressive (not redistributive). Is Milner making incorrect assumptions about Sweden?
What has been the impact of the war (immigrants/refuges) on the state of Sweden? They are taking in the most downtrodden and hopeless. The Swedish population is having a hard time adjusting to the influx; immigrants are having trouble assimilating. Milner is an institutionalist; he argues that the Scandinavian egalitarian culture was created by their institutions. But is the egalitarian culture changing? Outside of the immigrant communities you have a very knowledgeable, articulate population. Yet because immigrants are not acclimating, are the Sweds’ egalitarian virtues going the way of the buffalo? Taxes in Sweden are really high; immigrants are not contributing equally. This also upsets the more educated, homogenous native Sweds.
XIII. The Welfare State
Milner finds that economic performance is not connected to the welfare state; Asian tigers vs socialist democrats.
XIV. Conclusions on the Welfare State
How/why does Civic Literacy matter? What do high levels of civic literacy mean? Policy? Economy? Highly levels of DL make better decision and institute better institutions. Reinforcing, then. Since institutions make a difference toward the fostering of CL.
Milner class notes: Nordic countries vs market media
In PR systems, people vote more: vote is not wasted.
Milner argues that PR makes every single race competitive—and provide more information to the public in the pursuit of the seat; here are no safe seats, so parties compete in all districts.
2nd argument: if you are more informed you will vote for more welfare-oriented parties (leans to the left). 75% of the governments in PR system are left, or center left. 74% of majoritarian districts are right or center-right (personalized campaigns = lean right).
This is why information matters; people CHOOSE DIFFERENTLY when they have more information. What is the minimum level? Making accurate choices. At some point you will come to an equalibrium (no more impact on the collective decision). Once that is the same, we can compare apples to apples. According to Milner, there is more sophistication in Sweden.
There is a larger middle class in more equal societies, than in industrialized countries.
Now must look at where the rubber hits the road: What is the impact on POLICY?
I.e. If we were COMPLETELY informed about what led up to 9/11 (i.e. if we knew there were no WMDs or Iraqis on the plane, initially.
The dots start with the electoral system.
Theme: the causes and consequences of differences in political knowledge and what makes social-democratic welfare states sustainable
I. Civic Engagement and Social Capital develop skills that matter (Putnam says we get these from group associations; the no. leads to our S.C. stock).
Social Capital (as conceptualized by Putnam) measured as:
1. Trust (horizontal= interpersonal trust; vertical = trust in government)
2. associational density
definition of social capital: a public good; public trust, interpersonal and in government; community organization; voluntary associations.
Findings: Democratic institutions that equally distribute intellectial resources also more equally distribute material resources (high C.L. societies). AND Democratic institutions that more equally distribute intellectual resources attain higher levels of political parties.
Civic Engagement:
Organizational membership > ^trust in government > Civic engagement (voting)
II. Civic Literacy
Measured as:
1. willingness (the vote; @ the local level)
2. ability (knowledge-supply (media) and demand (people need)+ factual and cognitive)
- supply: “The nature and intensity of such efforts are seen to be a function of institutionalized incentives; in other words, political institutions matter when it comes to the accessibility and intelligibility of political information” (6).
III. Political ken
1. Individual Factors: education, age, income
2. Institutional Factors: electoral system; electoral system influences access, usefulness, and intelligibility.
IV. Sources of Civic Literacy
Measuring C.L.:
Civil: turning out to vote in local elections—more valid measure because they require more information; anyone can vote for a president. It takes more effort to vote in a local election.
Literacy: knowledge of U.N.
V. Political Parties and Political Institutions
-“The extent to which voters are informed on matters relevant to the decision to vote is in fact closely linked to the political institutions in which elections take place” (66).
Political Institutions > Political Ken > Political Participation
Electoral systems and Turnout
PR 71%
Maj 50%
VI. Political Institutions (78)
“each system has its own district long-term representational logic and it is via this logic that the citizens makes sense of the political choices available. Candidates in majoritarian systems are primarily oriented toward the median voter in the electorate, while those under PR systems are more oriented toward the median voter of their party (Wessels 1996)” (80). In FPTP political actors tend to misrepresent.
Consensus democracy: PR > ^ C.L. > ^ Voter Turnout
FPTP (first past the post) PR (proportional representation)
Ambiguity of leaders Less ambiguity
Zero Sum Better at supply side of ken
Mandates Visible compromises
SM cater to narrow interests Coalitions
Clear political map and more political information***
VII. C.L. and the Media
VIII. C.L. and Institutions
IX. Adult Education
Formal education and creating habits of civic literacy; as assessment of more deliberative democracy. Are people prone to change their minds when they have more information?
X. Case Study: New Zealand
Economy driven by a strong public sector; classic Westminster model. Milner has a negative evaluation of changes in New Zealand. Participation gone down following changes made by the state
XI. Economic Outcomes
XII. Case: Sweden
Universalism; decommodify labor (Epsing-Anderson conception). Excellent public health care, public transportation and education levels.
High levels of civic literacy; potential to also be economically successful (even though socialist). Taxation in Sweden is regressive (not redistributive). Is Milner making incorrect assumptions about Sweden?
What has been the impact of the war (immigrants/refuges) on the state of Sweden? They are taking in the most downtrodden and hopeless. The Swedish population is having a hard time adjusting to the influx; immigrants are having trouble assimilating. Milner is an institutionalist; he argues that the Scandinavian egalitarian culture was created by their institutions. But is the egalitarian culture changing? Outside of the immigrant communities you have a very knowledgeable, articulate population. Yet because immigrants are not acclimating, are the Sweds’ egalitarian virtues going the way of the buffalo? Taxes in Sweden are really high; immigrants are not contributing equally. This also upsets the more educated, homogenous native Sweds.
XIII. The Welfare State
Milner finds that economic performance is not connected to the welfare state; Asian tigers vs socialist democrats.
XIV. Conclusions on the Welfare State
How/why does Civic Literacy matter? What do high levels of civic literacy mean? Policy? Economy? Highly levels of DL make better decision and institute better institutions. Reinforcing, then. Since institutions make a difference toward the fostering of CL.
Milner class notes: Nordic countries vs market media
In PR systems, people vote more: vote is not wasted.
Milner argues that PR makes every single race competitive—and provide more information to the public in the pursuit of the seat; here are no safe seats, so parties compete in all districts.
2nd argument: if you are more informed you will vote for more welfare-oriented parties (leans to the left). 75% of the governments in PR system are left, or center left. 74% of majoritarian districts are right or center-right (personalized campaigns = lean right).
This is why information matters; people CHOOSE DIFFERENTLY when they have more information. What is the minimum level? Making accurate choices. At some point you will come to an equalibrium (no more impact on the collective decision). Once that is the same, we can compare apples to apples. According to Milner, there is more sophistication in Sweden.
There is a larger middle class in more equal societies, than in industrialized countries.
Now must look at where the rubber hits the road: What is the impact on POLICY?
I.e. If we were COMPLETELY informed about what led up to 9/11 (i.e. if we knew there were no WMDs or Iraqis on the plane, initially.
The dots start with the electoral system.
Norris. (2000) Virtuous Circle.
Part I News Media and Civic Malaise
Media potential role: (1) Watch Dog (2) Civic Forum (3) Mobilizing Agent
Part II Trends in PolComm
Newspapers: sales are still relatively high; the concentration of news ownership does not effect the coverage or freedom of the press; whether or not there has been a ‘tabloidization’ of newspapers is still understudied.
TV: There has been an increase in entertainment coverage
Internet: Mobilization Theory vs. Reinforcement Theory (does the Internet bring more people into the political discussion, or merely reinforce the digital gap theory. Is Norris’s analysis dated? She does not consider the recent boom in Internet use, especially among younger people and people of lower socioeconomic status. When she wrote her book about 20% of the population was connected.
Part III The Impact on Democracy
In conclusion, Norris associates high levels of news consumption with higher levels of efficacy, higher levels of political participation and low levels of government cynicism.
Chapter 10 Knows Little? Information and Choice
Three perspectives are common in the literature to establish political knowledge benchmarks:
(1) Civics approach assumes narrow type of ideal info about gov and public policy that all citizens need to know
(2) Relativist stances acknowledges that people have a limited reservoir of political information but suggests that it is sufficient to cast a vote.
(3) Practical Knowledge: citizens need enough knowledge to help them connect their political and social prefs to the available options.
Pg 214: 5 questions that measure political knowledge.
General class discussion: What is the difference between civic and practical knowledge, and which is more important for informing citizens?
-Civic knowledge would be knowledge of Supreme Court Justices, etc.
-Practical knowledge would be a knowledge of which political party is likely to support privatized health care, etc. Which type of knowledge is more important to measures of sophistication? Which type of knowledge does Norris capture in her surveys?
Media potential role: (1) Watch Dog (2) Civic Forum (3) Mobilizing Agent
Part II Trends in PolComm
Newspapers: sales are still relatively high; the concentration of news ownership does not effect the coverage or freedom of the press; whether or not there has been a ‘tabloidization’ of newspapers is still understudied.
TV: There has been an increase in entertainment coverage
Internet: Mobilization Theory vs. Reinforcement Theory (does the Internet bring more people into the political discussion, or merely reinforce the digital gap theory. Is Norris’s analysis dated? She does not consider the recent boom in Internet use, especially among younger people and people of lower socioeconomic status. When she wrote her book about 20% of the population was connected.
Part III The Impact on Democracy
In conclusion, Norris associates high levels of news consumption with higher levels of efficacy, higher levels of political participation and low levels of government cynicism.
Chapter 10 Knows Little? Information and Choice
Three perspectives are common in the literature to establish political knowledge benchmarks:
(1) Civics approach assumes narrow type of ideal info about gov and public policy that all citizens need to know
(2) Relativist stances acknowledges that people have a limited reservoir of political information but suggests that it is sufficient to cast a vote.
(3) Practical Knowledge: citizens need enough knowledge to help them connect their political and social prefs to the available options.
Pg 214: 5 questions that measure political knowledge.
General class discussion: What is the difference between civic and practical knowledge, and which is more important for informing citizens?
-Civic knowledge would be knowledge of Supreme Court Justices, etc.
-Practical knowledge would be a knowledge of which political party is likely to support privatized health care, etc. Which type of knowledge is more important to measures of sophistication? Which type of knowledge does Norris capture in her surveys?
Dalton, RJ. (2002) Citizens Politics.
Chapter 5 Values in Change
Values define the essence of our lives. “We study values because they provide the standards that guide the attitudes and behavior of the public” (82). “People develop a general framework for making these decisions by arranging values in terms of their importance of their importance to the individual” (82).
Inglehart (1977): describes value change as due to a combination of the scarcity hypotheses (we value that which are relatively short in supply), and the socialization hypotheses (our values reflect conditions that prevailed during our preadult years). “once value priorities develop, they tend to endure…” (83). [formative conditions]
Clarke & Nitish (1991) link our values to the ebb and flow of economic conditions. [present circumstances]
Potential values:
Economic growth
A stable economy
More say in work/community
Fight against crime
Protect free speech
Strong defense
Measuring values (86)
“Public values are changing” (96). And there are a diversity. “the mix of values makes it difficult for journalists to discern the public’s priorities” (96).
Chapter 6 Issues and Ideological Orientations
“Issues are the everyday currency of politics. Issue opinions identify the public’s preferences for government action and their expectations for the political process. Political parties are largely defined by their issue positions, and elections provide a means for the public to select between the competing issue programs they offer” (100).
“Issue opinions also represent the translation of broad value orientations into specific political concerns. Issues are partially determined by the values examined in the last chapter, as well as by other factors: cues from political elites, the flow of political events, and the contexts of specific situations. For example a persn may favor the principle of equal rights for all citizens; but attitudes towards voting rights, job discrimination, school busing, and open housing, and other civil rights legislation represents different mixes of values and practical concerns. Consequently, issue opinions are more changeable and valued than broad value orientations” (100).
“Issue opinions are a dynamic aspect of politics, and the theme of changing popular values can be carried over to the study of issues” (100).
“People are changing their opinions on many issues. Attitudes on equality issues display a dramatic shift over the past generation…” toward a more liberal orientation. (119).
Public Opinion and Political Change (121)
Issue interest has expanded (environmental issues. Etc). “The expansion of the boundaries of politics to include these new issues has several implications for the nature of contemporary politics. Governments have increased the scope of their activity: now they must worry not only about economic policy but also whether the environment is clean and whether personal life choices are tolerated… The proliferation of issue publics also changes the structure of political representation and decision making. Issue publics focus their effort to maximize representation on their issue, but the proliferation of such interests probably increases the complexity of the governing process…Policymakers thus see conflicting signals emanating from the public, without a method (or perhaps motivation) to resolve these conflicts systematically…One of the challenges facing contemporary government is how to adapt the democratic process to this different pattern of interest representation” (122).
VOTING
“The new style of citizen politics therefore should include a more fluid and volatile pattern of party alignments. Political coalitions and voting patterns will lack the permanence of past class and religious cleavages. Whithou clear social cues, voting decisions will become a more demanding task for voters—more dependent on the individual beliefs and values and citizens” (175).
PARTISANSHIP
“Each election presents voters with a choices over polici proposals and candidates for office. While social characteristics and group cues may be a basis for making decisions, citizens also hold a variety of political beliefs and values that affect their electoral calculus. Often, these considerations go beyond group ties or the perceptions derived from group cues. Consequently, contemporary electoral research emphasizes the attitudes and values of voters as key factors in understanding electoral choice…Citizens make judgments about which party best represents their interests, and these perceptions guide voting behavior. Attitudes toward the issues and candidates of an election are thus a necessary outcome in any realistic model of voting. Attitudes are also changeable, and their incorporation into a voting model helps explain variation in arty results across elections” (177).
The sociopsychological model of voting (178-ish)
Partisan attachments + specific issue opinions
Partisan attitudes:
Partisan loyalties serve as a cue (179). …a low cost cue (187). They make politics “user-friendly” (185). “The cue-giving function of partisanship is clearly sees for voting behavior. Partisanship means that voters enter an election with a predisposition to support their preferred party. Philip Converse (1966) described partisanship as the basis for a “normal vote”—the vote expected when other factors in the election are evenly balanced. If other factors come into play, such as issue positions or candidate images, their influence can be measured by their ability to cause defections from standing partisan commitments” (187).
But in the US there are a vast collection of partisan candidates to choose from. “Thus the separation between attitudes and behavior is most noticeable in American elections…” (187)… “In highly visible and politicized presidential elections, candidate images and issue appeals have the potential to counteract partisan preferences, and thus party defections are common in these elections” (187).
Party bonds are strongest among older voters. Partisans tend to be more politically active (186).
Party dealignment (188)
Consequences (191)
-weakening partisan-centered voting choice
-increase in fluidity of voting patterns
-decline in participation
-rise in issue concerns and candidates (their party-cue is GONE)
Structural Causes (193-194)
Cognitive Mobilization Theory Typology (195)
Some voters remain oriented to politics based on their partisan attachments (cognitive partisans, ritual partisans) whereas other voters remain oriented to politics on their own (apartisans, cognitive partisans).
TWO MOBILIZING DIMENSIONS: PARTISANSHIP, COGNITIVE
1.Apoliticals-unmobilized
2.Ritual Partisans-PARTISAN mobilized
3.Cognitive Partisans-highly ranked on both mobilizing dimensions.
4.Apartisans-cognitively mobilized
chapter 10; ATTITUDES AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR (201)
“Issues and candidates give political meaning to the partisan attachements and social divisions we have discussed in earler chapters” (201)….issue beliefs and candidate images explan the ebbs and flows of voting outcomes over time” (201).
ISSUE VOTING (202):
Framework: performance (candidates’effectiveness) and position (defines the conflict).
CANDIDATE IMAGES (215):
Prototype literature
We are more politically sophisticated, today (220). Consequences (220); i.e. what about people who are not (221).
Chapter 11; political representation (223)
“In the broadest sense of the term, the representativeness of elite attitude is measured by their similarity to the overall attitudes of the public” (224).
Domestic policy options
Socioeconomic issues and the state
Big vs small government: “In comparison to most EUs, America are more reserved in their acceptance of government action” (103).
Race and Equality
Gender Issues (110)
Environmental Protection
Social and Moral Issues (114) “…Americans are more conservative than EUs on social and moral issues. This pattern is likely the result of national differences in religious feelings… The US is among the most religious of Western societies. American chruch attendance and religious feelings are among the highest in the work. A full 96 percent of America considered say they believe in God, compared to 60-70 percent among EUs.
Values define the essence of our lives. “We study values because they provide the standards that guide the attitudes and behavior of the public” (82). “People develop a general framework for making these decisions by arranging values in terms of their importance of their importance to the individual” (82).
Inglehart (1977): describes value change as due to a combination of the scarcity hypotheses (we value that which are relatively short in supply), and the socialization hypotheses (our values reflect conditions that prevailed during our preadult years). “once value priorities develop, they tend to endure…” (83). [formative conditions]
Clarke & Nitish (1991) link our values to the ebb and flow of economic conditions. [present circumstances]
Potential values:
Economic growth
A stable economy
More say in work/community
Fight against crime
Protect free speech
Strong defense
Measuring values (86)
“Public values are changing” (96). And there are a diversity. “the mix of values makes it difficult for journalists to discern the public’s priorities” (96).
Chapter 6 Issues and Ideological Orientations
“Issues are the everyday currency of politics. Issue opinions identify the public’s preferences for government action and their expectations for the political process. Political parties are largely defined by their issue positions, and elections provide a means for the public to select between the competing issue programs they offer” (100).
“Issue opinions also represent the translation of broad value orientations into specific political concerns. Issues are partially determined by the values examined in the last chapter, as well as by other factors: cues from political elites, the flow of political events, and the contexts of specific situations. For example a persn may favor the principle of equal rights for all citizens; but attitudes towards voting rights, job discrimination, school busing, and open housing, and other civil rights legislation represents different mixes of values and practical concerns. Consequently, issue opinions are more changeable and valued than broad value orientations” (100).
“Issue opinions are a dynamic aspect of politics, and the theme of changing popular values can be carried over to the study of issues” (100).
“People are changing their opinions on many issues. Attitudes on equality issues display a dramatic shift over the past generation…” toward a more liberal orientation. (119).
Public Opinion and Political Change (121)
Issue interest has expanded (environmental issues. Etc). “The expansion of the boundaries of politics to include these new issues has several implications for the nature of contemporary politics. Governments have increased the scope of their activity: now they must worry not only about economic policy but also whether the environment is clean and whether personal life choices are tolerated… The proliferation of issue publics also changes the structure of political representation and decision making. Issue publics focus their effort to maximize representation on their issue, but the proliferation of such interests probably increases the complexity of the governing process…Policymakers thus see conflicting signals emanating from the public, without a method (or perhaps motivation) to resolve these conflicts systematically…One of the challenges facing contemporary government is how to adapt the democratic process to this different pattern of interest representation” (122).
VOTING
“The new style of citizen politics therefore should include a more fluid and volatile pattern of party alignments. Political coalitions and voting patterns will lack the permanence of past class and religious cleavages. Whithou clear social cues, voting decisions will become a more demanding task for voters—more dependent on the individual beliefs and values and citizens” (175).
PARTISANSHIP
“Each election presents voters with a choices over polici proposals and candidates for office. While social characteristics and group cues may be a basis for making decisions, citizens also hold a variety of political beliefs and values that affect their electoral calculus. Often, these considerations go beyond group ties or the perceptions derived from group cues. Consequently, contemporary electoral research emphasizes the attitudes and values of voters as key factors in understanding electoral choice…Citizens make judgments about which party best represents their interests, and these perceptions guide voting behavior. Attitudes toward the issues and candidates of an election are thus a necessary outcome in any realistic model of voting. Attitudes are also changeable, and their incorporation into a voting model helps explain variation in arty results across elections” (177).
The sociopsychological model of voting (178-ish)
Partisan attachments + specific issue opinions
Partisan attitudes:
Partisan loyalties serve as a cue (179). …a low cost cue (187). They make politics “user-friendly” (185). “The cue-giving function of partisanship is clearly sees for voting behavior. Partisanship means that voters enter an election with a predisposition to support their preferred party. Philip Converse (1966) described partisanship as the basis for a “normal vote”—the vote expected when other factors in the election are evenly balanced. If other factors come into play, such as issue positions or candidate images, their influence can be measured by their ability to cause defections from standing partisan commitments” (187).
But in the US there are a vast collection of partisan candidates to choose from. “Thus the separation between attitudes and behavior is most noticeable in American elections…” (187)… “In highly visible and politicized presidential elections, candidate images and issue appeals have the potential to counteract partisan preferences, and thus party defections are common in these elections” (187).
Party bonds are strongest among older voters. Partisans tend to be more politically active (186).
Party dealignment (188)
Consequences (191)
-weakening partisan-centered voting choice
-increase in fluidity of voting patterns
-decline in participation
-rise in issue concerns and candidates (their party-cue is GONE)
Structural Causes (193-194)
Cognitive Mobilization Theory Typology (195)
Some voters remain oriented to politics based on their partisan attachments (cognitive partisans, ritual partisans) whereas other voters remain oriented to politics on their own (apartisans, cognitive partisans).
TWO MOBILIZING DIMENSIONS: PARTISANSHIP, COGNITIVE
1.Apoliticals-unmobilized
2.Ritual Partisans-PARTISAN mobilized
3.Cognitive Partisans-highly ranked on both mobilizing dimensions.
4.Apartisans-cognitively mobilized
chapter 10; ATTITUDES AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR (201)
“Issues and candidates give political meaning to the partisan attachements and social divisions we have discussed in earler chapters” (201)….issue beliefs and candidate images explan the ebbs and flows of voting outcomes over time” (201).
ISSUE VOTING (202):
Framework: performance (candidates’effectiveness) and position (defines the conflict).
CANDIDATE IMAGES (215):
Prototype literature
We are more politically sophisticated, today (220). Consequences (220); i.e. what about people who are not (221).
Chapter 11; political representation (223)
“In the broadest sense of the term, the representativeness of elite attitude is measured by their similarity to the overall attitudes of the public” (224).
Domestic policy options
Socioeconomic issues and the state
Big vs small government: “In comparison to most EUs, America are more reserved in their acceptance of government action” (103).
Race and Equality
Gender Issues (110)
Environmental Protection
Social and Moral Issues (114) “…Americans are more conservative than EUs on social and moral issues. This pattern is likely the result of national differences in religious feelings… The US is among the most religious of Western societies. American chruch attendance and religious feelings are among the highest in the work. A full 96 percent of America considered say they believe in God, compared to 60-70 percent among EUs.
Kuklinski et al. (2001) The Political Environment and Citizen Competence.
Key Terms: the Political Environment: Motivation + Available Information
How do the value of information and induced motivation work together to influence the quality of citizens decision-making?
What is the “political environment?” “The totality of politically relevant communication to which citizens are exposed. It includes all the statements and information that the media, public officials, interest groups and other relevant actors provide with respect to a iven issue or policy debate” (footnote 411). When the environment invokes MOTIVATION decision making is improved (Sanbonmatsu & Fazio 1990). “The most relevant motivation in the context of evaluating policy, then, is simply the inclination to evaluate policies thoughtfully and seriously, then just as political environments can vary in the quality of the information they provide, so can they vary in the extent to which they encourage thoughtful evaluation” (413).
Data: Survey of 1160 random adults in Illinois.
Issue: Health Care Tradeoffs
Condition 1: environment devoid of information and incentive; will respondents make tradeoffs when they don’t have to? (questionnaire with 7 goals, rate from 1-10/ p. 416)
Findings: most people rated each of the 7 goals as a 10 importance completion; when we control for education, those highly educated are likely to demand less.
Condition 2: respondent received general information item about tradeoffs. Not a significant change—“Simply stating that decision about governmental programs require giving up one thing to get something else does not redice the overall demand to achieve all of the goals” (419).
Condition 3: a randomly selected 25% were told that people do best on these types of questions when they take time to think…” another 25% were told to act as if they were a public official. Both conditions were meant to increase cognitive processing and induce a greater willingness to overcome the unpleasantness with compromising some desired goals. (motivational instruction). Insignificant findings. Asking people to think doesn’t change their responses.
Condition 4: general information + motivational instruction = significance. (reduce demand, invoke tradeoffs).
Also, respondents are more likely to make tradeoffs in high information environments (57% of respondents choice tradeoff option).
How do the value of information and induced motivation work together to influence the quality of citizens decision-making?
What is the “political environment?” “The totality of politically relevant communication to which citizens are exposed. It includes all the statements and information that the media, public officials, interest groups and other relevant actors provide with respect to a iven issue or policy debate” (footnote 411). When the environment invokes MOTIVATION decision making is improved (Sanbonmatsu & Fazio 1990). “The most relevant motivation in the context of evaluating policy, then, is simply the inclination to evaluate policies thoughtfully and seriously, then just as political environments can vary in the quality of the information they provide, so can they vary in the extent to which they encourage thoughtful evaluation” (413).
Data: Survey of 1160 random adults in Illinois.
Issue: Health Care Tradeoffs
Condition 1: environment devoid of information and incentive; will respondents make tradeoffs when they don’t have to? (questionnaire with 7 goals, rate from 1-10/ p. 416)
Findings: most people rated each of the 7 goals as a 10 importance completion; when we control for education, those highly educated are likely to demand less.
Condition 2: respondent received general information item about tradeoffs. Not a significant change—“Simply stating that decision about governmental programs require giving up one thing to get something else does not redice the overall demand to achieve all of the goals” (419).
Condition 3: a randomly selected 25% were told that people do best on these types of questions when they take time to think…” another 25% were told to act as if they were a public official. Both conditions were meant to increase cognitive processing and induce a greater willingness to overcome the unpleasantness with compromising some desired goals. (motivational instruction). Insignificant findings. Asking people to think doesn’t change their responses.
Condition 4: general information + motivational instruction = significance. (reduce demand, invoke tradeoffs).
Also, respondents are more likely to make tradeoffs in high information environments (57% of respondents choice tradeoff option).
Gilens, M. (2001) Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences.
Not measuring policy preferences; merely political information levels.
raw policy facts have a significant influence on the public’s political judgments.
I show that:
(1) ignorance of policy-specific information leads many Americans to hold different views from those they would hold otherwise
(2) the effect of policy specific information is not adequately captured by the measures of general political knowledge used in previous research
(3) the effect of policy-specific ignorance is greatest for Americans with the highest levels of political knowledge. Rather than serve to dilute the influence of new information, general knowledge (and the cognitive capacities it reflects) appears to facilitate the incorporation of new policy-specific information into political judgments (379). The more political informed have somewhere to couch the information.
Methods: impute the hypothetical “fully informed” electorate (Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter).
Data—3 kinds:
(1) measure of general political knowledge
(2) measure of policy specific information
(3) measure of policy prefs plausible
expanding the literature:
(1) assess the effect of “policy-specific ignorance” on the policy preferences of those who are deemed fully informed by the criteria of prior research.
(2) compare policy preferences expressed by respondents who were randomly chosen to receive specific political information to the preferences of a control group.
(3) ask how the effects of policy-specific information differs for respondents with different levels of political information. TWO ALTERNATIVES have been suggested. On the one hand, general political knowledge, and its correlates such as political interest and cognitive sophisticntion, may enhance individuals’ ability and motivation to respond to new policy-specific information (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). On the other hand, heneral political knowledge may provide a resource to resist the influence of new policy-specific information (Zaller 1992). And if both forces are at work we many find a curvilinear relationship between general political knowledge and the effect of policy specific information or not apparent relationship at all” (380).
Expected findings: much of what separates actual political preferences from hypothetical “enlightened preferences” is due to ignorance of specific policy-relevant facts, not a lack of general political knowledge or the cognitive skills or orientations that measures of general political information reflect” (380). And policy-specific information has a stronger influence on respondents who display higher levels of general political knowledge. (what does Bartels say about the effect of information on the vote choice of highly sophisticated?).
Policy specific information:
Crime & Foreign Aid (merely true false questions; not an issue of preferences—but do they influence policy preferences? What are the effects of policy specific information on policy preferences).
sarah's notes:
Policy specific information => opinion change
Method: surveys and survey-based experiments
Would political judgments change if people were more/fully informed?
Previous research:
-Give a representative group more information and see if their judgements change
-Impute preferences based on demographics and vary level of information, see if opinions differ
This research uses the second method, but with policy-specific knowledge as the variable instead of broad, general knowledge, with all respondents at high general knowledge level
Also use experiment that randomly gives some people policy information and others none, and test for differences in opinion.
Also, include general knowledge as a variable, and test effect of policy knowledge on those with high and low general knowledge
Conclusions:
1. general knowledge is an incomplete measure of knowledge neccesarry to form preferences
2. policy-specific ignorance has a greater effect on preferences than general knowledge
3. policy-specific knowledge has a greater effect on more knowledgeable ppl.
Survey: People who have high general knowledge are more likely to have policy-specific knowledge, but policy-specific knowledge is still widespread, especially for certain issues (crime rate, environmental policy under Reagan, budget to foreign aid).
Survey: Imputed preferences under full policy-specific and general knowledge produced different preferences than those observed. Fully informed opinion has a liberal tendency (when study is done during republican presidency)
Experiment: People who are given policy-specific information have different policy preferences matching predictions and changes in the survey situation.
Both methods have issues, but consistency between them gives validity to both.
In theory, more knowledgeable people may react more or less to policy-specific information. Less because they already probably know more and so each new piece of information has less effect. More because thy are better at incorporating new information and their preferences are more ideologically consistent, hence more apt to change in consistent ways.
People who had high general knowledge were more affected by policy-specific knowledge. Lowest knowledge category mostly unaffected by specific information.
raw policy facts have a significant influence on the public’s political judgments.
I show that:
(1) ignorance of policy-specific information leads many Americans to hold different views from those they would hold otherwise
(2) the effect of policy specific information is not adequately captured by the measures of general political knowledge used in previous research
(3) the effect of policy-specific ignorance is greatest for Americans with the highest levels of political knowledge. Rather than serve to dilute the influence of new information, general knowledge (and the cognitive capacities it reflects) appears to facilitate the incorporation of new policy-specific information into political judgments (379). The more political informed have somewhere to couch the information.
Methods: impute the hypothetical “fully informed” electorate (Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter).
Data—3 kinds:
(1) measure of general political knowledge
(2) measure of policy specific information
(3) measure of policy prefs plausible
expanding the literature:
(1) assess the effect of “policy-specific ignorance” on the policy preferences of those who are deemed fully informed by the criteria of prior research.
(2) compare policy preferences expressed by respondents who were randomly chosen to receive specific political information to the preferences of a control group.
(3) ask how the effects of policy-specific information differs for respondents with different levels of political information. TWO ALTERNATIVES have been suggested. On the one hand, general political knowledge, and its correlates such as political interest and cognitive sophisticntion, may enhance individuals’ ability and motivation to respond to new policy-specific information (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). On the other hand, heneral political knowledge may provide a resource to resist the influence of new policy-specific information (Zaller 1992). And if both forces are at work we many find a curvilinear relationship between general political knowledge and the effect of policy specific information or not apparent relationship at all” (380).
Expected findings: much of what separates actual political preferences from hypothetical “enlightened preferences” is due to ignorance of specific policy-relevant facts, not a lack of general political knowledge or the cognitive skills or orientations that measures of general political information reflect” (380). And policy-specific information has a stronger influence on respondents who display higher levels of general political knowledge. (what does Bartels say about the effect of information on the vote choice of highly sophisticated?).
Policy specific information:
Crime & Foreign Aid (merely true false questions; not an issue of preferences—but do they influence policy preferences? What are the effects of policy specific information on policy preferences).
sarah's notes:
Policy specific information => opinion change
Method: surveys and survey-based experiments
Would political judgments change if people were more/fully informed?
Previous research:
-Give a representative group more information and see if their judgements change
-Impute preferences based on demographics and vary level of information, see if opinions differ
This research uses the second method, but with policy-specific knowledge as the variable instead of broad, general knowledge, with all respondents at high general knowledge level
Also use experiment that randomly gives some people policy information and others none, and test for differences in opinion.
Also, include general knowledge as a variable, and test effect of policy knowledge on those with high and low general knowledge
Conclusions:
1. general knowledge is an incomplete measure of knowledge neccesarry to form preferences
2. policy-specific ignorance has a greater effect on preferences than general knowledge
3. policy-specific knowledge has a greater effect on more knowledgeable ppl.
Survey: People who have high general knowledge are more likely to have policy-specific knowledge, but policy-specific knowledge is still widespread, especially for certain issues (crime rate, environmental policy under Reagan, budget to foreign aid).
Survey: Imputed preferences under full policy-specific and general knowledge produced different preferences than those observed. Fully informed opinion has a liberal tendency (when study is done during republican presidency)
Experiment: People who are given policy-specific information have different policy preferences matching predictions and changes in the survey situation.
Both methods have issues, but consistency between them gives validity to both.
In theory, more knowledgeable people may react more or less to policy-specific information. Less because they already probably know more and so each new piece of information has less effect. More because thy are better at incorporating new information and their preferences are more ideologically consistent, hence more apt to change in consistent ways.
People who had high general knowledge were more affected by policy-specific knowledge. Lowest knowledge category mostly unaffected by specific information.
Gastil & Dillard. (1999). Increasing Political Sophistication Through Public...
Does information make individuals move left or right? Framing effects?
Face-to-face deliberation will result in (1) more coherent and certain political judgments and (2) more integrated and differentiated political judgments, and reduced attitudinal uncertainly.
Deliberative Democratic Theory: deliberation aids in the development of political sophistication. (discussion and reflection) (Barber 1984, Fishkin 1991,1995; Gastil & Adam 1995).
Test this claim: authors studied associations between face-to-face political deliberation and subsequent changes in the coherence, integration, differentiation, and detail of participants’ political beliefs (dep. var). authors administered questionnaire pre and post deliberative discussions of political issues.
Clarification
Schema: a cognitive structure that represents one’s general knowledge about a given concept (Fiske & Taylor 1984, 12; also Eagly and Chaiken 1993). I.e. liberal and conservative schemas; liberalism: individual freedom, egalitarianism, tolerance, social change, secular rationality, and constitutional participatory democracy that protects minority interests. Conservatism: religion, morality, status quo, natural inequality, competition, personal liberty, initiative, and property emphasis.
(1) Schematic coherence: an issue is clearly and CONSISTENTLY defined.
(2) Integrated and differentiated beliefs: ideologically (liberalism/conservatism) consistent
Schematic cohernce and certainty will come from modeling and experiential learning.
Schematic integration a nd differentiation will develop through other educational processes—instruction and inference. Persuasion.
First set of hypotheses test the effects of deliberation on political sophistical:
H1: part. With more formal education will express perform attitudes that reflect:
a. greater internal coherence (inter-item correlations with attitude scale)
b. greater schematic integration (positive correlation of ideologically similar scales)
c. greater schematic differentiation (negative correlation of dissimilar scales) and
d. lower attitudinal uncertainty (fewer DK responses).
Second set of hypotheses test the effect of deliberation on participants pre-forum opinions, regardless of initial sophistication level.
H2 In comparison with pre-forums opinions, participants post-forum political views will show:
a. greater schematic coherence
b. more schematic integration
c. more schematic differentiation
d. reduced attitudinal uncertainty
Data:
7 issue books—pre and postforum data;
participants completed NIF ballots between 1991 and 1993; 88% white; 58% female
To test the 2 sets of hypotheses an educ attainment ballot was trichotomized: (1) some high school or diploma, (2) some college or 4 year degree and (3) some grad schoool/grd degree.
Set 1:
Schematic integration: 2 liberal scales or 2 conservative scales
Schematic differentiation: negative correlation between ideologically dissimilar scales.
Attitudinal uncertainty = DKs.
Set 2:
Analysis of change scores (subtracting pre attitude score and post).
Findings:
H1a: few stat sig diffs among schem coherence for all three educ groups.
H2a: same
H1b: supported
H2b: supported
H1c: supported
H2c: supported
H1d: supported
H2d: supported
Conclusion: NIF deliberation had a short-term effect on the sophistication of participants’ schematic networks. After forums, they had more diff and integrated views and exhibited less attit uncertainty. Well, if DK is also associated with people who don’t vote, we can assume its not ambivalence but low information-levels.
Class notes:
How do we recognize when someone is “open” instead of “uncertain?”
Questions posed and criticisms made:
Also, why is consistency associated with informed?
Are we talking about “change” of opinion or “reinforcement” of opinion? Which is bad, if the original opinion was inconsistent with the persons interests?
Plus, NIF forces one to have an opinion—what if this opinion is merely held for the duration of the discussion.
Druckman (2004)
Framing effects: your preferences are changed by the “frame.” This is why we are concerned about the media’s role; how much power do they have?
After deliberation, people are less affected by the frames. W00t.
Hetero discussion—most change.
Homo discussion—still change from condition form when there was no discussion.
No discussion-least amount of change.
Counter-frame: CNN and Fox
What happens when you are exposed to both frames? i.e. CNN and Fox. Decrease framing effects. And you end up with “authentic” opinion, which is consistent with your values (liberalism/conservatism).
Neutrality = no counter-frame. What happens here?
Barabas (2004)
How does deliberation work? Why do we always assume deliberative effects are good?
Where is deliberation working?
Barabas measures enlightenment, normal conversation (as opposed to just be exposed to arguments).
Moderated.
Key var: need to be open-minded. People had to be reminded to be open-minded.
Must have a diversity of opinion and open-mindedness to have deliberation.
Hypotheses (690)
Ideal, achieve consensus?
Expects deliberation will have a positive effect on enlightenment.
Effects on softening ones view?
What is about the information environment that fosters authentic opinions?
Framing leads to increased polarization?
To decrease polarization we need more moderated frames?
Issue 1: Free Speech: How Free is Too Free
Choice 1: The case for legal sanctions (Conservative 1a)
Choice 2: The private-sector solutions (Conservative 1b)
Choice 3: More speech, not enforced silence (Liberal 3)
Issue 2: America’s Role in the World: New Risks, New Realities
Choice 1: support for a superpower strategy (Conservative 1)
Choice 2:support for a multilateral approach (Liberal 3)
Issue 3: Energy Options: Finding a Solution to the Power Predicament
Choice 1: support for alternatives such as wind and solar (Liberal 2)
Choice 2: support for nucmear power (Conservative 3)
Choice 3: reduce use of energy and oil (Liberal 4a)
Choice 4: we are in an energy crisis (Liberal 4b)
Issue 4: Prescription for Prosperity: Four Paths to Economic Renewel
Choice 1: support free market (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: support for public investment (Liberal 2)
Choice 3: interventionist industrial policy (Liberal 4)
Issue 5: Criminal Violence: What Direction Now for the War on Crime
Choice 1: support for tough laws (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: social reform approach (Liberal 3)
Choice 3: Strict sentences (Conservative 3)
Issue 6: The Health Care Crisis: Containing Costs, Expanding Coverage
Choice 1: support of status quo (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: support of universal health care (Liberal 2)
Choice 3: cost-cutting approach (Liberal 4)
Issue 7: People and Politics: Who Should Govern?
Choice 1: All liberal
Results:
Schematic Integration H1b and H2b (positively associated with formal education)
Educ scale (1 hs, 2 college, 3 grad)
Conservative s.i. preforum statistically significant for free speech
1 .57
2 .61
3 .71
also statistic sig. preforum: (study numbers 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) Environment on all liberal scales, economy for liberal scales, crime for conservative scales, healthcare for liberal scales, and all of item 7 (liberal scales).
Schmematic Differentiation H1c H2c (differentiation of liberals from conservatives)
Significant in 5 of the 7 studies) im not sure how they measured this
Attitude Certainty H1d H2d (comparison of “not sure/DK” answers
H2d was supported in all 7 studies—thus fewer DKs after deliberation
Conclusions (15)
Face-to-face deliberation will result in (1) more coherent and certain political judgments and (2) more integrated and differentiated political judgments, and reduced attitudinal uncertainly.
Deliberative Democratic Theory: deliberation aids in the development of political sophistication. (discussion and reflection) (Barber 1984, Fishkin 1991,1995; Gastil & Adam 1995).
Test this claim: authors studied associations between face-to-face political deliberation and subsequent changes in the coherence, integration, differentiation, and detail of participants’ political beliefs (dep. var). authors administered questionnaire pre and post deliberative discussions of political issues.
Clarification
Schema: a cognitive structure that represents one’s general knowledge about a given concept (Fiske & Taylor 1984, 12; also Eagly and Chaiken 1993). I.e. liberal and conservative schemas; liberalism: individual freedom, egalitarianism, tolerance, social change, secular rationality, and constitutional participatory democracy that protects minority interests. Conservatism: religion, morality, status quo, natural inequality, competition, personal liberty, initiative, and property emphasis.
(1) Schematic coherence: an issue is clearly and CONSISTENTLY defined.
(2) Integrated and differentiated beliefs: ideologically (liberalism/conservatism) consistent
Schematic cohernce and certainty will come from modeling and experiential learning.
Schematic integration a nd differentiation will develop through other educational processes—instruction and inference. Persuasion.
First set of hypotheses test the effects of deliberation on political sophistical:
H1: part. With more formal education will express perform attitudes that reflect:
a. greater internal coherence (inter-item correlations with attitude scale)
b. greater schematic integration (positive correlation of ideologically similar scales)
c. greater schematic differentiation (negative correlation of dissimilar scales) and
d. lower attitudinal uncertainty (fewer DK responses).
Second set of hypotheses test the effect of deliberation on participants pre-forum opinions, regardless of initial sophistication level.
H2 In comparison with pre-forums opinions, participants post-forum political views will show:
a. greater schematic coherence
b. more schematic integration
c. more schematic differentiation
d. reduced attitudinal uncertainty
Data:
7 issue books—pre and postforum data;
participants completed NIF ballots between 1991 and 1993; 88% white; 58% female
To test the 2 sets of hypotheses an educ attainment ballot was trichotomized: (1) some high school or diploma, (2) some college or 4 year degree and (3) some grad schoool/grd degree.
Set 1:
Schematic integration: 2 liberal scales or 2 conservative scales
Schematic differentiation: negative correlation between ideologically dissimilar scales.
Attitudinal uncertainty = DKs.
Set 2:
Analysis of change scores (subtracting pre attitude score and post).
Findings:
H1a: few stat sig diffs among schem coherence for all three educ groups.
H2a: same
H1b: supported
H2b: supported
H1c: supported
H2c: supported
H1d: supported
H2d: supported
Conclusion: NIF deliberation had a short-term effect on the sophistication of participants’ schematic networks. After forums, they had more diff and integrated views and exhibited less attit uncertainty. Well, if DK is also associated with people who don’t vote, we can assume its not ambivalence but low information-levels.
Class notes:
How do we recognize when someone is “open” instead of “uncertain?”
Questions posed and criticisms made:
Also, why is consistency associated with informed?
Are we talking about “change” of opinion or “reinforcement” of opinion? Which is bad, if the original opinion was inconsistent with the persons interests?
Plus, NIF forces one to have an opinion—what if this opinion is merely held for the duration of the discussion.
Druckman (2004)
Framing effects: your preferences are changed by the “frame.” This is why we are concerned about the media’s role; how much power do they have?
After deliberation, people are less affected by the frames. W00t.
Hetero discussion—most change.
Homo discussion—still change from condition form when there was no discussion.
No discussion-least amount of change.
Counter-frame: CNN and Fox
What happens when you are exposed to both frames? i.e. CNN and Fox. Decrease framing effects. And you end up with “authentic” opinion, which is consistent with your values (liberalism/conservatism).
Neutrality = no counter-frame. What happens here?
Barabas (2004)
How does deliberation work? Why do we always assume deliberative effects are good?
Where is deliberation working?
Barabas measures enlightenment, normal conversation (as opposed to just be exposed to arguments).
Moderated.
Key var: need to be open-minded. People had to be reminded to be open-minded.
Must have a diversity of opinion and open-mindedness to have deliberation.
Hypotheses (690)
Ideal, achieve consensus?
Expects deliberation will have a positive effect on enlightenment.
Effects on softening ones view?
What is about the information environment that fosters authentic opinions?
Framing leads to increased polarization?
To decrease polarization we need more moderated frames?
Issue 1: Free Speech: How Free is Too Free
Choice 1: The case for legal sanctions (Conservative 1a)
Choice 2: The private-sector solutions (Conservative 1b)
Choice 3: More speech, not enforced silence (Liberal 3)
Issue 2: America’s Role in the World: New Risks, New Realities
Choice 1: support for a superpower strategy (Conservative 1)
Choice 2:support for a multilateral approach (Liberal 3)
Issue 3: Energy Options: Finding a Solution to the Power Predicament
Choice 1: support for alternatives such as wind and solar (Liberal 2)
Choice 2: support for nucmear power (Conservative 3)
Choice 3: reduce use of energy and oil (Liberal 4a)
Choice 4: we are in an energy crisis (Liberal 4b)
Issue 4: Prescription for Prosperity: Four Paths to Economic Renewel
Choice 1: support free market (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: support for public investment (Liberal 2)
Choice 3: interventionist industrial policy (Liberal 4)
Issue 5: Criminal Violence: What Direction Now for the War on Crime
Choice 1: support for tough laws (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: social reform approach (Liberal 3)
Choice 3: Strict sentences (Conservative 3)
Issue 6: The Health Care Crisis: Containing Costs, Expanding Coverage
Choice 1: support of status quo (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: support of universal health care (Liberal 2)
Choice 3: cost-cutting approach (Liberal 4)
Issue 7: People and Politics: Who Should Govern?
Choice 1: All liberal
Results:
Schematic Integration H1b and H2b (positively associated with formal education)
Educ scale (1 hs, 2 college, 3 grad)
Conservative s.i. preforum statistically significant for free speech
1 .57
2 .61
3 .71
also statistic sig. preforum: (study numbers 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) Environment on all liberal scales, economy for liberal scales, crime for conservative scales, healthcare for liberal scales, and all of item 7 (liberal scales).
Schmematic Differentiation H1c H2c (differentiation of liberals from conservatives)
Significant in 5 of the 7 studies) im not sure how they measured this
Attitude Certainty H1d H2d (comparison of “not sure/DK” answers
H2d was supported in all 7 studies—thus fewer DKs after deliberation
Conclusions (15)
Barabas, J. (2004). “How Deliberation Affects Policy Opinions,” APSR 98:4, 687-701.
A theory of opinion updating where citizens who deliberate revise their prior beliefs, particularly why they encourney consensual messages. A key aspect of this model is that opinion strength modetertes the deliberative opinion change process.
Deliberation must meet two criteria:
(1) diversity of messages
(2) participants have an open mind
Prior→new information→Posterior (can become more certain or can change entirely)
To start we must know discussants predeliberative opinions and how strongly they are held. then given clear information; then, do they come to a verbal agreement?
“Significant opinion change is probable only for individuals who do not hold strong opinions…Opinion shift in the aggregate only when diverse deliberators with weak views come to an agreement” (690).
H1 Citizens who deliberate will significantly increase number of correct responses
H2 Aggregate opinions will move significantly in the direction of consensual deliberation
H3 opinion strength will moderate opinion change.
“Overall, then, before the forum the two groups were indistinguishable, afterward, the citizens who attended the deliberation forum were much more likely to know the correct answers to six specific pieces of factual information in the social security program less likely to offer incorrect or don’t know responses” (693).
Further, “the opinions of forum participants coalesced on the issues where they found common ground during deliberation” (694) –consensus effects.
Additionally, those with the weakest initial opinions saw the most change (this speaks to idea that stable opinion are the most informed. For example, as explained by Chong and Druckman (2007):
…stable opinions are a misguided criterion for evaluating the quality of political evaluations…(120). Stable attitudes can reflect sophisticated reasoning or dogmatism and inflexibility. Hence, both excessive instability and excessive stability of public opinion can be liabilities in a democracy. At one extreme we have citizens without sufficiently developed attitudes, who can be routinely manipulated by alternative frames of a problem; at the other extreme, we have citizens whose attitudes are held so tightly that they seek only to reinforce existing views, and every frame elicits the same close-minded response. It is not apparent which portrait of the public is less desirable (121 emphasis added).
Deliberation must meet two criteria:
(1) diversity of messages
(2) participants have an open mind
Prior→new information→Posterior (can become more certain or can change entirely)
To start we must know discussants predeliberative opinions and how strongly they are held. then given clear information; then, do they come to a verbal agreement?
“Significant opinion change is probable only for individuals who do not hold strong opinions…Opinion shift in the aggregate only when diverse deliberators with weak views come to an agreement” (690).
H1 Citizens who deliberate will significantly increase number of correct responses
H2 Aggregate opinions will move significantly in the direction of consensual deliberation
H3 opinion strength will moderate opinion change.
“Overall, then, before the forum the two groups were indistinguishable, afterward, the citizens who attended the deliberation forum were much more likely to know the correct answers to six specific pieces of factual information in the social security program less likely to offer incorrect or don’t know responses” (693).
Further, “the opinions of forum participants coalesced on the issues where they found common ground during deliberation” (694) –consensus effects.
Additionally, those with the weakest initial opinions saw the most change (this speaks to idea that stable opinion are the most informed. For example, as explained by Chong and Druckman (2007):
…stable opinions are a misguided criterion for evaluating the quality of political evaluations…(120). Stable attitudes can reflect sophisticated reasoning or dogmatism and inflexibility. Hence, both excessive instability and excessive stability of public opinion can be liabilities in a democracy. At one extreme we have citizens without sufficiently developed attitudes, who can be routinely manipulated by alternative frames of a problem; at the other extreme, we have citizens whose attitudes are held so tightly that they seek only to reinforce existing views, and every frame elicits the same close-minded response. It is not apparent which portrait of the public is less desirable (121 emphasis added).
Iyengar (1987) “Television News and Citizens’ Explanations of National Affairs”
Abstract: Causal beliefs are important ingredients of public opinion. Citizens are able to identify the causes of complex national issues and do so spontaneously. Evidence is presented that individuals; explanations of political issues are significantly influenced by the manner in which television news presentations “frame” these issues. These results are politically consequential, for individual explanations of national issues independently affect their assessments of presidential performance.
Causal beliefs:
Why is explanatory knowledge important?
Answers to causal questions abound in popular culture, making the task of explanation relatively inexpensive (consider information costs in this regard to be low)
Its usable! More important, explanatory knowledge is connotative knowledge. To “know” that unemployment occurs because of motivational deficiencies on the party of the unemployed is relevant to our attitudes toward the unemployed and our policy prefs regarding unemployment.
Iyengar conducted experiments
People watched 7 stories, 1 was manipulated.
Then answered open-ended questions.
Poverty question:
Iyengar found that there were corresponding responses to the frame and to some extent on the type of person depicted in the story (ie. Race).
Unemployment question:
High unemployment (structural frame)
Focus on unemployed person (individual frame)
Individual frame: more supportive of Reagan—problem is seen as individual, not governmental. (are both actually “correct?” doesn’t get at this. just
For the least informed, framing effects can drive the changes.
It appears to be that institutions have this effect
Causal beliefs:
Why is explanatory knowledge important?
Answers to causal questions abound in popular culture, making the task of explanation relatively inexpensive (consider information costs in this regard to be low)
Its usable! More important, explanatory knowledge is connotative knowledge. To “know” that unemployment occurs because of motivational deficiencies on the party of the unemployed is relevant to our attitudes toward the unemployed and our policy prefs regarding unemployment.
Iyengar conducted experiments
People watched 7 stories, 1 was manipulated.
Then answered open-ended questions.
Poverty question:
Iyengar found that there were corresponding responses to the frame and to some extent on the type of person depicted in the story (ie. Race).
Unemployment question:
High unemployment (structural frame)
Focus on unemployed person (individual frame)
Individual frame: more supportive of Reagan—problem is seen as individual, not governmental. (are both actually “correct?” doesn’t get at this. just
For the least informed, framing effects can drive the changes.
It appears to be that institutions have this effect
Amy (2002) Real Choices, Real Voices
What is most useful?
What is it that the PR system brings to the table that alter political sophistication?
Chapter 1 Fair Representation For All
John Stuart Mill: “It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented. No real democtacy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it.”
“The essential purpose of democratic elections is to allow as many people as possible to gain representation and to produce a legislature that faithfully reflects the various political views of the electorate” (25). SMDs fail to do so. A large number of Americans come away from elections without any representation, and thus go without any say in government. SMP elections represent only the majority or plurality of voters in a district. “Thus only the voters who are actually represented are those who vote for the winning candidate” (26). The rest “wasted” their vote.
Non-Rep contributes to:
-Voter apathy (low turnout, chapter 7).
-Legitimacy of our elections
Why does it continue?
-our reps claim to represent “all of us”
How does PR fix this?
Chapter 3 Improving Election Campaigns
State in the US: Mudslinging, slogan-ridden. 99% incumbency rate; SMPs encourage politicians to:
(1) neglect a serious discussion of issues and
(2) give candidates incentive to pursue negative campaigns (69).
(1) Neglecting the issues
“Ideally election campaigns should be opportunities for the voters to learn about the candidates’ policy positions and the social and economic theories that underlie them…But these are hardly the campaigns we get today, when issues and policies rarely play a central role in political campaigns” (70). All style, no content advertisements.
Benjamin Page:
“The most striking feature of candidates’ rhetoric about policy is its extreme vagueness. The typical campaign speech says virtually nothing specific about policy alternatives; discussions of the issues are hidden away in little-publicized statemesnts and position papers…In short, policy stands are infrequent, inconspicuous, and unspecific…Candidates are silled at appearing to say much while actually saying very little” (60, 1993).
*The usual suspects: the press, the public the politician.
**Why it’s the Voting system:
-Plurality makes issues risky because in order to capture a majority, candidates have to please as many of their constituents as possible; they cannot do this if they take strong positions that alienate a large proportion of the voters. “offend as few people as possible” (64, 1993). “Voter alienation multiples as the candidates broadcast more and more…eventually threatening their ability to put together a majority coalition” (65, 1993). “Instead of emphasizing issue stands—which is risky—it is much safer to campaign on character and personality” (65, 1993).
(2) Negative campaigns
designed to make it more difficult to capture majority..
Why PR is different:
-candidates are not obsessed with pleasing most of the people most of the time to get elected. Thus, they are more honest about their policy positions and can run issue-oriented campaigns.
-candidates run on a party label. Thus the character and personality of the candidates is not in the limelight, and even is inconsequential (68 1993).
-the character if multiple parties encourages a discussion of policy prefs. Candidates and parties have to distinguish themselves from opponents (1993, 70).
Chapter 4: Toward a Multi-Party System
Probs with a 2-party system:
-feelings of dissatisfaction
-the two parties are tweedle dee and tweedle dum (77, 1993).
HOW IS THIS CAUSED BY THE SMDs?
-Lowi: the “effect of a plurality system is that over time it contributes to the development not only of a two-party system, but on two moderate parties, that generally differ only slightly in their programs and policies” (80 1993). The candidates migrate to the middle.
Duverger’s Law: explains the supportive relationship between plurality rules and 2-party systems; voting rules work against multi-party governance in 2 ways: 1. The mechanical effect: the tendency of the plurality system to give the largest party more seats than it deserves and to give smaller parties fewer seats than they deserve (83). 2. The psychological effect: potential supporters will hesitate to vote for a minor-party candidate if they believe the candidate has little chance.
Chapter 7: Encouraging Voter Turnout
The poor abstain from voting because they see few politicians from either party as offering policies that would significantly address their problems (142, 1993). (attitudinal explanation); but mostly, institutional barriers such as voter registration guidelines (non-compulsory voting).
Amy (2002) recognizes eight problems with plurality elections: (1) Low voter turnout, (2) Tweedledum and Tweedledee candidates, (3) the two-party monopoly, (4) wasted votes, (5) issueless campaigns, (6) underrepresentation of women, (7) lack of minority representation, and (8) gerrymandering. These eight conditions work together to discourage motivation for being political knowledgeable.
Plurality rules encourage a two-party system. Duverger’s Law attributes the plurality systems as working against multi-party governance in two ways: (1) The mechanical effect which is the tendency of the plurality system to give the largest party more seats than it deserves and to give smaller parties fewer seats than they deserve And (2) the psychological effect which holds that potential supporters will hesitate to vote for a minor-party candidate if they believe the candidate has little chance. (Amy 1993, 83). Amy (2002) uses a grocery store shopping analogy to simplify the negative impact of the plurality system on our choices: when we go to the cereal isle at a grocery store we expect to be able to choose from more than just two kinds of cereal, yet we do not get to choose from more than two viable candidates, in our elections. Amy (2002) and numerous other scholars are fundamentally at odds with a system that encourages limited selection.
Further, candidates from the two major parties conglomerate around the middle. “The effect of a plurality system is that over time it contributes to the development not only of a two-party system, but on two moderate parties, that generally differ only slightly in their programs and policies” (Chase, Holt & Turner 1980, 115); in other words, the candidates migrate to the middle. When candidates migrate to the middle, citizens do not feel that there is a dimes-worth-of difference between the candidates, and they are less motivated to gather political information.
Another way in which plurality voting systems discourage the gathering of political information is by rejecting substantive, issue-oriented campaigns:
Ideally election campaigns should be opportunities for the voters to learn about the candidates’ policy positions and the social and economic theories that underlie them…But these are hardly the campaigns we get today, when issues and policies rarely play a central role in political campaigns (Amy 1993, 70).
Instead of campaigning on issues and substance, candidates invoke all style and no content advertisements. Benjamin Page (1978) describes the campaigning of modern candidates as “vague.” “The typical campaign speech says virtually nothing specific about policy alternatives; discussions of the issues are hidden away in little-publicized statements and position papers…In short, policy stands are infrequent, inconspicuous, and unspecific…Candidates are skilled at appearing to say much while actually saying very little” (153).
The vagueness described by Page is due to the risks that invoking “issue” speech conjures. Under plurality voting rules, initiating issue talk is potentially dangerous because in order to capture a majority, candidates have to please as many of their constituents as possible; they cannot do this if they take strong positions that alienate a large proportion of the voters (Amy 1993, 64). By focusing on his or her character and relying on his or her personality, candidates are able to avoid issue-talk.
The negative affects of candidates emphasizing their character and personality is that it makes issue-education almost unnecessary. If the candidates focus on their days as a football player, voters judge the candidates based on athleticism. In this way candidates “frame” the debate to highlight their personal appeal, at the expense of addressing the real issues. In contrast to the plurality system, a proportional representation system motivates individuals to be more political informed. The PR system elects multiple parties to government, enlists candidates with very different policy positions to run for office, and invokes issue-substantive campaigns, peaking citizen interest in a way that is unattainable in the U.S. (Amy 2002).
In a PR system, seats are awarded proportionally—in other words, the number of seats a party is issued corresponds with the percentage of the votes they received. If a party wins 40% of the vote in a district with 10 seats, that party is awarded 4 seats. In a plurality system, that same party would have been awarded zero seats if another party won more than 40% of the vote. By awarding seats in this matter, minority parties become more viable and increasingly likely to be represented in government. In such a situation, citizens become more engaged and excited.
In addition to awarding numerous parties seats in government, PR systems encourage descriptively different candidates to run for office. Amy (2002) notes: “Evidence clearly shows that countries with proportional representation consistently nominate and elect much higher numbers of women candidates.” The same is true for racial minorities. With higher numbers of women and racial minorities as candidates and representatives, previously marginalized groups now have a louder voice. What more, when citizens feel represented they are more inclined to be political informed.
Also, candidates running for office in a PR system do not have to shy away from the issues. Because they are less concerned with capturing a majority of the votes, candidates can take “principled stands,” enlivening the political debate, without fear of losing any chance of election. With an enlivened debate on the issues in the public discourse, citizens are motivated to gather information, engage in deliberation with friends, family and co-workers, and develop personal opinions and positions on specific issues. Characteristics such as these are largely unheard of in the U.S. The PR system can return such an electoral shift.
Heuristic and systematic processing models almost conclusively find that when given the option of processing a message heuristically or systematically, heuristic processing wins out (Torodov, Chaiken & Henderson 2002). This is due to the ease of processing messages heuristically. Yet I have shown that reliance on heuristics is problematic for two reasons: it encourages irrelevant evaluations and allows politicians to use “crafted talk.” Thus, in order to move away from heuristics an environment that encourages systematic processing needs to be cultivated. This analysis has shined light on the ways in which a proportional representation electoral system heightens individuals’ motivation to gather political information, and encourages scenarios and situations that invoke systematic processing of messages.
What is it that the PR system brings to the table that alter political sophistication?
Chapter 1 Fair Representation For All
John Stuart Mill: “It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented. No real democtacy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it.”
“The essential purpose of democratic elections is to allow as many people as possible to gain representation and to produce a legislature that faithfully reflects the various political views of the electorate” (25). SMDs fail to do so. A large number of Americans come away from elections without any representation, and thus go without any say in government. SMP elections represent only the majority or plurality of voters in a district. “Thus only the voters who are actually represented are those who vote for the winning candidate” (26). The rest “wasted” their vote.
Non-Rep contributes to:
-Voter apathy (low turnout, chapter 7).
-Legitimacy of our elections
Why does it continue?
-our reps claim to represent “all of us”
How does PR fix this?
Chapter 3 Improving Election Campaigns
State in the US: Mudslinging, slogan-ridden. 99% incumbency rate; SMPs encourage politicians to:
(1) neglect a serious discussion of issues and
(2) give candidates incentive to pursue negative campaigns (69).
(1) Neglecting the issues
“Ideally election campaigns should be opportunities for the voters to learn about the candidates’ policy positions and the social and economic theories that underlie them…But these are hardly the campaigns we get today, when issues and policies rarely play a central role in political campaigns” (70). All style, no content advertisements.
Benjamin Page:
“The most striking feature of candidates’ rhetoric about policy is its extreme vagueness. The typical campaign speech says virtually nothing specific about policy alternatives; discussions of the issues are hidden away in little-publicized statemesnts and position papers…In short, policy stands are infrequent, inconspicuous, and unspecific…Candidates are silled at appearing to say much while actually saying very little” (60, 1993).
*The usual suspects: the press, the public the politician.
**Why it’s the Voting system:
-Plurality makes issues risky because in order to capture a majority, candidates have to please as many of their constituents as possible; they cannot do this if they take strong positions that alienate a large proportion of the voters. “offend as few people as possible” (64, 1993). “Voter alienation multiples as the candidates broadcast more and more…eventually threatening their ability to put together a majority coalition” (65, 1993). “Instead of emphasizing issue stands—which is risky—it is much safer to campaign on character and personality” (65, 1993).
(2) Negative campaigns
designed to make it more difficult to capture majority..
Why PR is different:
-candidates are not obsessed with pleasing most of the people most of the time to get elected. Thus, they are more honest about their policy positions and can run issue-oriented campaigns.
-candidates run on a party label. Thus the character and personality of the candidates is not in the limelight, and even is inconsequential (68 1993).
-the character if multiple parties encourages a discussion of policy prefs. Candidates and parties have to distinguish themselves from opponents (1993, 70).
Chapter 4: Toward a Multi-Party System
Probs with a 2-party system:
-feelings of dissatisfaction
-the two parties are tweedle dee and tweedle dum (77, 1993).
HOW IS THIS CAUSED BY THE SMDs?
-Lowi: the “effect of a plurality system is that over time it contributes to the development not only of a two-party system, but on two moderate parties, that generally differ only slightly in their programs and policies” (80 1993). The candidates migrate to the middle.
Duverger’s Law: explains the supportive relationship between plurality rules and 2-party systems; voting rules work against multi-party governance in 2 ways: 1. The mechanical effect: the tendency of the plurality system to give the largest party more seats than it deserves and to give smaller parties fewer seats than they deserve (83). 2. The psychological effect: potential supporters will hesitate to vote for a minor-party candidate if they believe the candidate has little chance.
Chapter 7: Encouraging Voter Turnout
The poor abstain from voting because they see few politicians from either party as offering policies that would significantly address their problems (142, 1993). (attitudinal explanation); but mostly, institutional barriers such as voter registration guidelines (non-compulsory voting).
Amy (2002) recognizes eight problems with plurality elections: (1) Low voter turnout, (2) Tweedledum and Tweedledee candidates, (3) the two-party monopoly, (4) wasted votes, (5) issueless campaigns, (6) underrepresentation of women, (7) lack of minority representation, and (8) gerrymandering. These eight conditions work together to discourage motivation for being political knowledgeable.
Plurality rules encourage a two-party system. Duverger’s Law attributes the plurality systems as working against multi-party governance in two ways: (1) The mechanical effect which is the tendency of the plurality system to give the largest party more seats than it deserves and to give smaller parties fewer seats than they deserve And (2) the psychological effect which holds that potential supporters will hesitate to vote for a minor-party candidate if they believe the candidate has little chance. (Amy 1993, 83). Amy (2002) uses a grocery store shopping analogy to simplify the negative impact of the plurality system on our choices: when we go to the cereal isle at a grocery store we expect to be able to choose from more than just two kinds of cereal, yet we do not get to choose from more than two viable candidates, in our elections. Amy (2002) and numerous other scholars are fundamentally at odds with a system that encourages limited selection.
Further, candidates from the two major parties conglomerate around the middle. “The effect of a plurality system is that over time it contributes to the development not only of a two-party system, but on two moderate parties, that generally differ only slightly in their programs and policies” (Chase, Holt & Turner 1980, 115); in other words, the candidates migrate to the middle. When candidates migrate to the middle, citizens do not feel that there is a dimes-worth-of difference between the candidates, and they are less motivated to gather political information.
Another way in which plurality voting systems discourage the gathering of political information is by rejecting substantive, issue-oriented campaigns:
Ideally election campaigns should be opportunities for the voters to learn about the candidates’ policy positions and the social and economic theories that underlie them…But these are hardly the campaigns we get today, when issues and policies rarely play a central role in political campaigns (Amy 1993, 70).
Instead of campaigning on issues and substance, candidates invoke all style and no content advertisements. Benjamin Page (1978) describes the campaigning of modern candidates as “vague.” “The typical campaign speech says virtually nothing specific about policy alternatives; discussions of the issues are hidden away in little-publicized statements and position papers…In short, policy stands are infrequent, inconspicuous, and unspecific…Candidates are skilled at appearing to say much while actually saying very little” (153).
The vagueness described by Page is due to the risks that invoking “issue” speech conjures. Under plurality voting rules, initiating issue talk is potentially dangerous because in order to capture a majority, candidates have to please as many of their constituents as possible; they cannot do this if they take strong positions that alienate a large proportion of the voters (Amy 1993, 64). By focusing on his or her character and relying on his or her personality, candidates are able to avoid issue-talk.
The negative affects of candidates emphasizing their character and personality is that it makes issue-education almost unnecessary. If the candidates focus on their days as a football player, voters judge the candidates based on athleticism. In this way candidates “frame” the debate to highlight their personal appeal, at the expense of addressing the real issues. In contrast to the plurality system, a proportional representation system motivates individuals to be more political informed. The PR system elects multiple parties to government, enlists candidates with very different policy positions to run for office, and invokes issue-substantive campaigns, peaking citizen interest in a way that is unattainable in the U.S. (Amy 2002).
In a PR system, seats are awarded proportionally—in other words, the number of seats a party is issued corresponds with the percentage of the votes they received. If a party wins 40% of the vote in a district with 10 seats, that party is awarded 4 seats. In a plurality system, that same party would have been awarded zero seats if another party won more than 40% of the vote. By awarding seats in this matter, minority parties become more viable and increasingly likely to be represented in government. In such a situation, citizens become more engaged and excited.
In addition to awarding numerous parties seats in government, PR systems encourage descriptively different candidates to run for office. Amy (2002) notes: “Evidence clearly shows that countries with proportional representation consistently nominate and elect much higher numbers of women candidates.” The same is true for racial minorities. With higher numbers of women and racial minorities as candidates and representatives, previously marginalized groups now have a louder voice. What more, when citizens feel represented they are more inclined to be political informed.
Also, candidates running for office in a PR system do not have to shy away from the issues. Because they are less concerned with capturing a majority of the votes, candidates can take “principled stands,” enlivening the political debate, without fear of losing any chance of election. With an enlivened debate on the issues in the public discourse, citizens are motivated to gather information, engage in deliberation with friends, family and co-workers, and develop personal opinions and positions on specific issues. Characteristics such as these are largely unheard of in the U.S. The PR system can return such an electoral shift.
Heuristic and systematic processing models almost conclusively find that when given the option of processing a message heuristically or systematically, heuristic processing wins out (Torodov, Chaiken & Henderson 2002). This is due to the ease of processing messages heuristically. Yet I have shown that reliance on heuristics is problematic for two reasons: it encourages irrelevant evaluations and allows politicians to use “crafted talk.” Thus, in order to move away from heuristics an environment that encourages systematic processing needs to be cultivated. This analysis has shined light on the ways in which a proportional representation electoral system heightens individuals’ motivation to gather political information, and encourages scenarios and situations that invoke systematic processing of messages.
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