Crafted Talk
1. Use polls to track public opinion
2. Manage press coverage—control the message!
3. Priming
Systematic conditions that enable an increase in “orchestrated presentations”
1. Partisan polarization—number of moderates???
2. Institutional individuation
3. Incumbency bias
4. Interest group proliferation
5. Interbranch relations
6. Proximity of elections
Monday, March 24, 2008
Bartles (1996) Uninformed Votes: Inofrmation Effects in Presidential Elections
This study rejects the theory that cues are an appropriate replacement of actual political knowledge.
Bartels creates a hypothetical “fully informed” electorate. “How might the preferences of this hypothetical “fully informed” electorate differ from the preferences of the actual electorate? One possibility is to assume that increasing information reduces the variability of voters’ choice without altering the central tendency of their underlying preferences. Alternatively, we might suppose that more informed voters are more likely across the board to prefer Republicans (or Democrats), controlling for other relevant factors. Both of these assumptions seems unduly restrictive, however, in that they require information to have essentially similar effects on all voters regardless of their circumstances. In seems much more plausible to suppose that increasing information—by giving voters a better sense of their credibility and likely consequences of some voters systematically more Republican in their preferences but at the same time make others systematically more Democratic” (205).
H: Uninformed voters successfully use cues and information shortcuts to behave as if they were fully informed. Failing that, individual deviations from fully informed voting cancels out in a mass electorate, producing the same aggregate election outcomes as if voters were fully informed.
Results: hypothesis is disconfirmed; at the individual level, the average deviation of actual vote probabilies from hypothetical “fully informed” vote probabilities was about ten percentage points. In the electorate as a whole, these deviations were significantly deluted by aggregation, but by no means eliminated: incumbent presidents did almost five percentage points btter, and democratic candidates did almost two percentage points better, than they would have if voters had in fact been “fully informed.
“Given the variety of demonstrable differences between well-informed and less well-informed citiens in sensitivity to external stimuli, diversity and precision of political perceptions, information-processing strategies, access to shared understandings of politics, and integrative ability, it hardly seems outlandish to entertain the possibility that disparities in political information lead to systematically different vote choices by citizens in otherwise similar political circumstances, despite—or perhaps even, in part because of—the availability of cues and information short-cuts…” (202).
Methods: generate “fully informed” electorate (204).
Measurement; level of political sophistication:
Interviewer assessed: .95, .8, .5, .2, .05. corresponding to very high…very low.
Findings: “relatively uninformed voters are more likely, other things being equal, to support incumbents and democrats” (218). …suggesting that political ignorance has systematic and significant political consequences (220).
See Lau & Redlawsk 1999 for a really good summary of this article
Bartels creates a hypothetical “fully informed” electorate. “How might the preferences of this hypothetical “fully informed” electorate differ from the preferences of the actual electorate? One possibility is to assume that increasing information reduces the variability of voters’ choice without altering the central tendency of their underlying preferences. Alternatively, we might suppose that more informed voters are more likely across the board to prefer Republicans (or Democrats), controlling for other relevant factors. Both of these assumptions seems unduly restrictive, however, in that they require information to have essentially similar effects on all voters regardless of their circumstances. In seems much more plausible to suppose that increasing information—by giving voters a better sense of their credibility and likely consequences of some voters systematically more Republican in their preferences but at the same time make others systematically more Democratic” (205).
H: Uninformed voters successfully use cues and information shortcuts to behave as if they were fully informed. Failing that, individual deviations from fully informed voting cancels out in a mass electorate, producing the same aggregate election outcomes as if voters were fully informed.
Results: hypothesis is disconfirmed; at the individual level, the average deviation of actual vote probabilies from hypothetical “fully informed” vote probabilities was about ten percentage points. In the electorate as a whole, these deviations were significantly deluted by aggregation, but by no means eliminated: incumbent presidents did almost five percentage points btter, and democratic candidates did almost two percentage points better, than they would have if voters had in fact been “fully informed.
“Given the variety of demonstrable differences between well-informed and less well-informed citiens in sensitivity to external stimuli, diversity and precision of political perceptions, information-processing strategies, access to shared understandings of politics, and integrative ability, it hardly seems outlandish to entertain the possibility that disparities in political information lead to systematically different vote choices by citizens in otherwise similar political circumstances, despite—or perhaps even, in part because of—the availability of cues and information short-cuts…” (202).
Methods: generate “fully informed” electorate (204).
Measurement; level of political sophistication:
Interviewer assessed: .95, .8, .5, .2, .05. corresponding to very high…very low.
Findings: “relatively uninformed voters are more likely, other things being equal, to support incumbents and democrats” (218). …suggesting that political ignorance has systematic and significant political consequences (220).
See Lau & Redlawsk 1999 for a really good summary of this article
Bennett (1995) Comparing Americans' Political Information in 1988 and 1992
Measuring political awareness in 1989 and 1992
H1: voters in 1992 would demonstrate higher levels of political sophistication due to more quality coverage in the 1992 election (1992 saw more issue coverage and more coverage, in general)
Fndings: same level of politically informed in both elections.
What did Bennett leave out?
-Perot! People were more interested…perhaps not more informed. Need open ended questions?
Did Bennett use correct measures? i.e. back to the practical vs. civic knowledge debate.
Perot captured 19% of the popular vote. Obviously those who had previously felt disenfranchised now felt included—different demographic?
H1: voters in 1992 would demonstrate higher levels of political sophistication due to more quality coverage in the 1992 election (1992 saw more issue coverage and more coverage, in general)
Fndings: same level of politically informed in both elections.
What did Bennett leave out?
-Perot! People were more interested…perhaps not more informed. Need open ended questions?
Did Bennett use correct measures? i.e. back to the practical vs. civic knowledge debate.
Perot captured 19% of the popular vote. Obviously those who had previously felt disenfranchised now felt included—different demographic?
Druckman & Holmes (2004) Does Presidential Rhetoric Matter? Priming and Presidential Approval
“The public’s approval of the president plays a critical role in determining the president’s power and policy-making success.” And what the president says has much to do with his approval.
“In this article we examine the direct impact of presidential rhetoric on approval…We show that the president can have a substantial effect on his own approval by priming the criteria on which citizens base their approval evaluations” (755). [Controlling the message].
The media primes its audience, yes. But so do presidents!
Presidents can use rhetoric to shape their own approval. (TROUBLESOME).
By “priming” their audience (presenting the issues by which one will use as evaluative criteria), presidents are able to determine the criteria by which they will be judge. For example if Bush wants to detract attention from the Kyoto Protocol, he can focus on the economy. “Priming occurs when an individual changes the criteria on which he or she bases an overall evaluation, whereas persuasion involves altering what an individual thinks of the president on a given dimension (e.g., does the president do a good job or a poor jo on defense policy?) Priming does not involve changing perceptions of how well the presidenti is doing on an issue—it simply alters the issues on which individuals base their overall evaluations” (757).
“Our focus on priming follows a growing literature that shos how presidents strategically emphasize advantageous issues with the hope of making those issues salient un the mindes of votesr (e.g. Jacobs & Shapiro 1994; Druckman et al. 2004). The president many also influence his approval by persuading voters that they should support his policies, or by convincing them that he is performing well on specific issues…” (757).
Druckman et al (2004) suggests that the success of priming depends on the particular context [the war in Iraq-ideological plugs of patriotism!!], source, and audience.
Source credibility matters (Miller & Krosnick 2000; Druckman 2001). [thus the president’s approval???]
In terms of audience variables, political knowledge matters. [need a place to put it thus need SOME political knowledge—MB]. “Recall that McGraw & Ling (2003) argue with a relativel new issue, more knowledgable people will be more susceptible to priming. Thisis the case because “the more knowledge one has about politics, the more quickly and easily one can make sense of…[a new issue] and the more efficiuently one can srore it in…and retrieve it from, an elabotatie and organized mental filing system” (Krosnick & Brannon 1993, 966; Miller & Krosnick 2000).
Whether or not the issue is personally relevant also matters (Iyengar 1991; Miller & Krosnick 1996, 82).
This role of image is important (Druckman & Holmes 2004, 759; Erich et al. 2001)
METHODS:
Data: use of the State of the Union addresses to study how presidents set the agenda. (following Cohen 1995).
Expected findings: Given that Bush in 2002 overwhelmingly focused on terrorism and homeland security, speech watchers will place more weight on these issues when contructing theirt overll approval evals. Bush primed his audience to evaluate him based on terrorism/homeland security criteria. (Druckman & Holmes 2004, 762).
RESULTS:
The results support our expectations about both issue and image priming. The non-watchers based their overall approval evals on teir issue-specific approval evals of the war in Afgahnistan, the economy, and education, but not terrorism. The image variables and demographics had no effect…In contrast, the watchers based their overall approval opinions on their issue-specific evals of terrorisms and the economy, but not the war or education. This is consistent with the issue piming hypothesis—watching the address led to a significantly greater reliance on terrorism (i.e. the issue most emphasized in the address)…We find that the terrorism coefficient is indeed significantly greater for the watrchers than for the non-watchers. The speech also primed watchers awa froma reliance on the war and education as evaluative croteria; this is not surpormisng, given the lack of attention these issues received” (767).
“Regardless of the impact on overall approval, successfully altering evaluative criteria has substantial implications for what the public expects of the president, how the public holds his accountable, what policies the president addresses, and the presidents role in each of these domains (see Jamieson 2000, 17). In short, presidential rhetoric can play an important role in affecting presidential approval…” (768).
Knowledge results:
These results imply that the speech primed leadership perceptions only for low-knowledge participants, that it primed terrorism approval only for high-knowledlge participants, and that it primed away from war approval only for high-knowledge participants, This is an intruiging result—it suggests that issue priming works o the most knowledgeable, but image priming works on the least knowledgeable…The image priming results suggests that, as mentioned, in contrast to issues, political knowledge may not be necessary for infividuals to connect their image perceptions with the broader picture of presidential approval (see also Miller & Krosnick 2000)” (770).
“In this article we examine the direct impact of presidential rhetoric on approval…We show that the president can have a substantial effect on his own approval by priming the criteria on which citizens base their approval evaluations” (755). [Controlling the message].
The media primes its audience, yes. But so do presidents!
Presidents can use rhetoric to shape their own approval. (TROUBLESOME).
By “priming” their audience (presenting the issues by which one will use as evaluative criteria), presidents are able to determine the criteria by which they will be judge. For example if Bush wants to detract attention from the Kyoto Protocol, he can focus on the economy. “Priming occurs when an individual changes the criteria on which he or she bases an overall evaluation, whereas persuasion involves altering what an individual thinks of the president on a given dimension (e.g., does the president do a good job or a poor jo on defense policy?) Priming does not involve changing perceptions of how well the presidenti is doing on an issue—it simply alters the issues on which individuals base their overall evaluations” (757).
“Our focus on priming follows a growing literature that shos how presidents strategically emphasize advantageous issues with the hope of making those issues salient un the mindes of votesr (e.g. Jacobs & Shapiro 1994; Druckman et al. 2004). The president many also influence his approval by persuading voters that they should support his policies, or by convincing them that he is performing well on specific issues…” (757).
Druckman et al (2004) suggests that the success of priming depends on the particular context [the war in Iraq-ideological plugs of patriotism!!], source, and audience.
Source credibility matters (Miller & Krosnick 2000; Druckman 2001). [thus the president’s approval???]
In terms of audience variables, political knowledge matters. [need a place to put it thus need SOME political knowledge—MB]. “Recall that McGraw & Ling (2003) argue with a relativel new issue, more knowledgable people will be more susceptible to priming. Thisis the case because “the more knowledge one has about politics, the more quickly and easily one can make sense of…[a new issue] and the more efficiuently one can srore it in…and retrieve it from, an elabotatie and organized mental filing system” (Krosnick & Brannon 1993, 966; Miller & Krosnick 2000).
Whether or not the issue is personally relevant also matters (Iyengar 1991; Miller & Krosnick 1996, 82).
This role of image is important (Druckman & Holmes 2004, 759; Erich et al. 2001)
METHODS:
Data: use of the State of the Union addresses to study how presidents set the agenda. (following Cohen 1995).
Expected findings: Given that Bush in 2002 overwhelmingly focused on terrorism and homeland security, speech watchers will place more weight on these issues when contructing theirt overll approval evals. Bush primed his audience to evaluate him based on terrorism/homeland security criteria. (Druckman & Holmes 2004, 762).
RESULTS:
The results support our expectations about both issue and image priming. The non-watchers based their overall approval evals on teir issue-specific approval evals of the war in Afgahnistan, the economy, and education, but not terrorism. The image variables and demographics had no effect…In contrast, the watchers based their overall approval opinions on their issue-specific evals of terrorisms and the economy, but not the war or education. This is consistent with the issue piming hypothesis—watching the address led to a significantly greater reliance on terrorism (i.e. the issue most emphasized in the address)…We find that the terrorism coefficient is indeed significantly greater for the watrchers than for the non-watchers. The speech also primed watchers awa froma reliance on the war and education as evaluative croteria; this is not surpormisng, given the lack of attention these issues received” (767).
“Regardless of the impact on overall approval, successfully altering evaluative criteria has substantial implications for what the public expects of the president, how the public holds his accountable, what policies the president addresses, and the presidents role in each of these domains (see Jamieson 2000, 17). In short, presidential rhetoric can play an important role in affecting presidential approval…” (768).
Knowledge results:
These results imply that the speech primed leadership perceptions only for low-knowledge participants, that it primed terrorism approval only for high-knowledlge participants, and that it primed away from war approval only for high-knowledge participants, This is an intruiging result—it suggests that issue priming works o the most knowledgeable, but image priming works on the least knowledgeable…The image priming results suggests that, as mentioned, in contrast to issues, political knowledge may not be necessary for infividuals to connect their image perceptions with the broader picture of presidential approval (see also Miller & Krosnick 2000)” (770).
Nelson (2004). “Policy Goals, Public Rhetoric and Political Attitudes,” Journal of Politics, 66(2). 581-605.
Identification: Nelson, T. (2004). “Policy Goals, Public Rhetoric and Political Attitudes,” Journal of Politics, 66(2). 581-605.
Independent variables: In the laboratory experiment perspectives on three controversial policy matters were manipulated in the form of a newspaper article. Adoption law, affirmative actions and school voucher text was manipulated to represent either a “pro” frame or a “con” frame.
In the survey-based experiment manipulation took the form of changed question wording addressing doctor assisted suicide and school vouchers.
Dependent variables: There were three dependent variables: 1.) Policy opinions, 2.) Personal goal priorities and 3.) (objective) beliefs about the consequences of policy change.
Theories, rationales, and predictions: Nelson expected positive and negative frames to have a corresponding impact on participants’ “sense of the relative importance of competing policy goals” as well as participants’ policy opinions (591), and that the differences in policy opinions are explained by differences in goal priorities (586); Nelson did not expect the frames to have an impact on the participants’ beliefs about the consequences of policy change.
Subjects: Laboratory subjects were college undergraduates. The total number included in each of the experiments varied for each policy topic. There were around 20-60 participants for each condition.
Survey-based experiment subjects were residents of Ohio, contacted via telephone; over 800 people responded. Demographic details about those interviewed over the telephone are available upon request, by the author.
Procedure: two procedures were executed by the author: 1.) a laboratory experiment which “created stimuli that mimicked three types of framing rhetoric”, to examine if frames that target POLICY GOALS influence POLITICAL OPINIONS)
…and 2.) a survey-based experiment to test whether the framing effect found in the laboratory was replicable and could be “generalized beyond the sample, setting and issues of the laboratory studies” (596).
For each experiment participants were asked for their opinion about a policy issue that embodied a conflict between two meaningful socio-political goals or values. All participants were randomly assigned to either a “pro” frame or a “con” frame for each issue; both frames presented the same basic factual information about the issue. After reading the “pro” frame article or the “con” framed article which manipulated policy priorities in the form of persuasive argument using one of the three kinds of framing rhetoric (see Key Terms below), participants reported: 1.) their issue priorities 2.) their opinions on the issue and 3.) their beliefs about the consequences of a policy change (the three dependent variables).
Major results: A difference of means test found that frames do, indeed, affect participants’ sense of issue priorities which in turn influence their policy opinions.
Discussion: Whereas other approaches portray citizens as cognitive misers who do not think deeply about particular issues, especially in the realm of politics, this study anticipates that participants are aware on the conflicting values implicit in the policy topics. Yet even when existing beliefs are present, opinions can be shifted by means of policy/goal prioritizing. Thus the significance of this study is to introduce avenues for goal manipulation when conflicting opinions are already available, accessible and applicable; these avenues are GOAL RANKING, ISSUE CATEGORIZATION AND LABELING, AND INSTITUTIONAL ROLE ASSIGNMENT.
Question to consider: How do Nelson’s findings contribute to the discussion of media effects models, i.e. the minimal effects model, the not-so-minimal effects model?
Key Terms:
Framing: alternative descriptions or interpretations of the same information, problem or solution.
Three types of framing rhetoric: 1.) GOAL RANKING: trivializing the goal represented by the opponent.2.) ISSUE CATEGORIZATION AND LABELING: refute applicability of the categorization of the opposing information, “thereby denying the relevance of a rival goal or value” (585). 3.) INSTITUTIONAL ROLE ASSIGNMENT: arguing a goal or value is the responsibility of a particular institution and that goal or value should take precedence over any rivaling goals or values when determining the institutions policies.
Independent variables: In the laboratory experiment perspectives on three controversial policy matters were manipulated in the form of a newspaper article. Adoption law, affirmative actions and school voucher text was manipulated to represent either a “pro” frame or a “con” frame.
In the survey-based experiment manipulation took the form of changed question wording addressing doctor assisted suicide and school vouchers.
Dependent variables: There were three dependent variables: 1.) Policy opinions, 2.) Personal goal priorities and 3.) (objective) beliefs about the consequences of policy change.
Theories, rationales, and predictions: Nelson expected positive and negative frames to have a corresponding impact on participants’ “sense of the relative importance of competing policy goals” as well as participants’ policy opinions (591), and that the differences in policy opinions are explained by differences in goal priorities (586); Nelson did not expect the frames to have an impact on the participants’ beliefs about the consequences of policy change.
Subjects: Laboratory subjects were college undergraduates. The total number included in each of the experiments varied for each policy topic. There were around 20-60 participants for each condition.
Survey-based experiment subjects were residents of Ohio, contacted via telephone; over 800 people responded. Demographic details about those interviewed over the telephone are available upon request, by the author.
Procedure: two procedures were executed by the author: 1.) a laboratory experiment which “created stimuli that mimicked three types of framing rhetoric”, to examine if frames that target POLICY GOALS influence POLITICAL OPINIONS)
…and 2.) a survey-based experiment to test whether the framing effect found in the laboratory was replicable and could be “generalized beyond the sample, setting and issues of the laboratory studies” (596).
For each experiment participants were asked for their opinion about a policy issue that embodied a conflict between two meaningful socio-political goals or values. All participants were randomly assigned to either a “pro” frame or a “con” frame for each issue; both frames presented the same basic factual information about the issue. After reading the “pro” frame article or the “con” framed article which manipulated policy priorities in the form of persuasive argument using one of the three kinds of framing rhetoric (see Key Terms below), participants reported: 1.) their issue priorities 2.) their opinions on the issue and 3.) their beliefs about the consequences of a policy change (the three dependent variables).
Major results: A difference of means test found that frames do, indeed, affect participants’ sense of issue priorities which in turn influence their policy opinions.
Discussion: Whereas other approaches portray citizens as cognitive misers who do not think deeply about particular issues, especially in the realm of politics, this study anticipates that participants are aware on the conflicting values implicit in the policy topics. Yet even when existing beliefs are present, opinions can be shifted by means of policy/goal prioritizing. Thus the significance of this study is to introduce avenues for goal manipulation when conflicting opinions are already available, accessible and applicable; these avenues are GOAL RANKING, ISSUE CATEGORIZATION AND LABELING, AND INSTITUTIONAL ROLE ASSIGNMENT.
Question to consider: How do Nelson’s findings contribute to the discussion of media effects models, i.e. the minimal effects model, the not-so-minimal effects model?
Key Terms:
Framing: alternative descriptions or interpretations of the same information, problem or solution.
Three types of framing rhetoric: 1.) GOAL RANKING: trivializing the goal represented by the opponent.2.) ISSUE CATEGORIZATION AND LABELING: refute applicability of the categorization of the opposing information, “thereby denying the relevance of a rival goal or value” (585). 3.) INSTITUTIONAL ROLE ASSIGNMENT: arguing a goal or value is the responsibility of a particular institution and that goal or value should take precedence over any rivaling goals or values when determining the institutions policies.
Druckman (2004) Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation,
sarah's notes:
How contextual forces (elite competition and deliberation) and individual attributes affect success of framing. When do rationality assumptions apply?
(equivalency) Framing: “different but logically equivalent phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences.” Ie positive or negative framing of an issue. Not in reference to issue framing where issues are framed in the context of different values, these are not logically equivalent.
Rat choice: people have preferences that are used to base decisions on
-violated with equivalency framing effects, but not issue framing effects
framing manipulates the salience of diff. aspects of the information (gains versus losses) and triggers diff mental associations (good v. bad)
-with internal deliberation of possible alternate frames, the effect is washed out.
-competing frames reduce the effect of each singularly
H1: people exposed to counter-framing will be less susceptible to framing effects
H2: people who participate in a heterogeneous (w/people with different frames) discussion will be less susceptible to framing effects than those without conversation (no prediction about homogeneous conversation)
H3: “experts” less susceptible than “non-experts”
-expert defined as a combination of need for cognition and training
method
experiment: random assignment to 8 groups on two dimensions (see table 1 for more details)
1. positive or negative framing
2. context: control, counterframing, heterogeneous discussion, homogeneous discussion
Results
Frames (without taking account of conditions) had a significant effect on preference.
Context variables had a significant moderating effect of framing
Control had significant framing effects
Counterframe groups (given both positive and negative frames, altering which came first) had no effect of framing
Group conditions reduced, but did not eliminate framing effect. Heterogeneous discussion reduced effect more
Individual variables had no effect (expert or student/not student)
In homogeneous discussion groups, non-experts more affected by framing—effect of expertise depends on context
Confidence: those who express preference in the direction of the frame did so with greater confidence (evidence for incoherent preferences). Homogeneous discussion increases this confidence. – overconfidence bias of framing
Conclusion: more research needs to focus on context. Previous research that does not take context into account should be questioned for problems of external validity and generalizability.
My notes:
Framing effects: your preferences are changed by the “frame.” This is why we are concerned about the media’s role; how much power do they have?
After deliberation, people are less effected by the frames. W00t.
Hetero discussion—most change.
Homo discussion—still change from condition form when there was no discussion.
No discussion-least amount of change.
Counter-frame: CNN and Fox
What happens when you are exposed to both frames? i.e. CNN and Fox. Decrease framing effects. And you end up with “authentic” opinion, which is consistent with your values (liberalism/conservatism).
Neutrality = no counter-frame. What happens here?
How contextual forces (elite competition and deliberation) and individual attributes affect success of framing. When do rationality assumptions apply?
(equivalency) Framing: “different but logically equivalent phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences.” Ie positive or negative framing of an issue. Not in reference to issue framing where issues are framed in the context of different values, these are not logically equivalent.
Rat choice: people have preferences that are used to base decisions on
-violated with equivalency framing effects, but not issue framing effects
framing manipulates the salience of diff. aspects of the information (gains versus losses) and triggers diff mental associations (good v. bad)
-with internal deliberation of possible alternate frames, the effect is washed out.
-competing frames reduce the effect of each singularly
H1: people exposed to counter-framing will be less susceptible to framing effects
H2: people who participate in a heterogeneous (w/people with different frames) discussion will be less susceptible to framing effects than those without conversation (no prediction about homogeneous conversation)
H3: “experts” less susceptible than “non-experts”
-expert defined as a combination of need for cognition and training
method
experiment: random assignment to 8 groups on two dimensions (see table 1 for more details)
1. positive or negative framing
2. context: control, counterframing, heterogeneous discussion, homogeneous discussion
Results
Frames (without taking account of conditions) had a significant effect on preference.
Context variables had a significant moderating effect of framing
Control had significant framing effects
Counterframe groups (given both positive and negative frames, altering which came first) had no effect of framing
Group conditions reduced, but did not eliminate framing effect. Heterogeneous discussion reduced effect more
Individual variables had no effect (expert or student/not student)
In homogeneous discussion groups, non-experts more affected by framing—effect of expertise depends on context
Confidence: those who express preference in the direction of the frame did so with greater confidence (evidence for incoherent preferences). Homogeneous discussion increases this confidence. – overconfidence bias of framing
Conclusion: more research needs to focus on context. Previous research that does not take context into account should be questioned for problems of external validity and generalizability.
My notes:
Framing effects: your preferences are changed by the “frame.” This is why we are concerned about the media’s role; how much power do they have?
After deliberation, people are less effected by the frames. W00t.
Hetero discussion—most change.
Homo discussion—still change from condition form when there was no discussion.
No discussion-least amount of change.
Counter-frame: CNN and Fox
What happens when you are exposed to both frames? i.e. CNN and Fox. Decrease framing effects. And you end up with “authentic” opinion, which is consistent with your values (liberalism/conservatism).
Neutrality = no counter-frame. What happens here?
Jacoby (2000) Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending
Effect of issue framing on opinion of government spending. Different frames evoke different influences on attitudes.
Republican and democrat appeals about spending differ in level of specificity (rep.s more broad, restrictive view vs. dem.s specific appeals for certain important programs.) relative framing changes opinion of issue
Issue framing as a political tool: framing effects are used to shift support in the favor of the one putting out the frame “one of the most important “tools” political elites have at their disposal”
General issue frames: general statements about issue areas “government should protect the environment” focus on feeling toward the government, which is more negative, leading to negative opinions of the statements
Specific issue frame: gives specific targets for policy, beneficiaries and costs of policy “government should protect environment to reduce pollution and protect people threatened by toxic waste dumps.” Emphasis on who benefits (the needy or me) leading to positive opinion of issue
1992 election: Bush used general frame for (reduced) govt. spending, Clinton used specific framing for increases
-issue is central to politics, ideological positions,
Data/Methods
Based on 1992 NES survey questions
-continuum of general cut spending vs. increase spending
-additive scale of seven questions about various welfare spending programs (specific framing, mentioning group that benefits)
responses to the two types of framing are highly correlated, evidence that they are about the same issue.
Results
Distribution of responses
- for general spending is unimodal and symmetrical.
- for specific spending is unimodal but skewed toward greater spending
-greater average support for specific spending
-reactions to general questions reflect feelings about government, specific frames reflect feelings about subject of spending
-individual and aggregate level effects of framing
Part 2 Individual level correlates to spending opinions
IVs:
a. Thermometer feeling about government, evaluation of the economy,
b. Feelings about recipients: symbolic racism, feelings about welfare and toward the poor,
c. demos: income, race, gender, age, employment status
d. party id, liberal-conservative rating
DV: reaction to general and specific spending questions
Results
IVs in sections a and b (feelings about government and recipients) had predicted effects on attitudes about spending.
Democrats favored increased spending in both cases- ideology mediates framing effects
People are reacting in ways consistent with the feelings that are evoked with different frames. People act in ways that support their general feelings about the government when that is the only cue, but use other cues also when given the prompting to do so. Issue framing effects are actually not inconsistent, irrational.
Framing can be used by elites that can control the frame to convince people to support their preferred side of an issue. Framing, nonetheless, is inevitable.
Republican and democrat appeals about spending differ in level of specificity (rep.s more broad, restrictive view vs. dem.s specific appeals for certain important programs.) relative framing changes opinion of issue
Issue framing as a political tool: framing effects are used to shift support in the favor of the one putting out the frame “one of the most important “tools” political elites have at their disposal”
General issue frames: general statements about issue areas “government should protect the environment” focus on feeling toward the government, which is more negative, leading to negative opinions of the statements
Specific issue frame: gives specific targets for policy, beneficiaries and costs of policy “government should protect environment to reduce pollution and protect people threatened by toxic waste dumps.” Emphasis on who benefits (the needy or me) leading to positive opinion of issue
1992 election: Bush used general frame for (reduced) govt. spending, Clinton used specific framing for increases
-issue is central to politics, ideological positions,
Data/Methods
Based on 1992 NES survey questions
-continuum of general cut spending vs. increase spending
-additive scale of seven questions about various welfare spending programs (specific framing, mentioning group that benefits)
responses to the two types of framing are highly correlated, evidence that they are about the same issue.
Results
Distribution of responses
- for general spending is unimodal and symmetrical.
- for specific spending is unimodal but skewed toward greater spending
-greater average support for specific spending
-reactions to general questions reflect feelings about government, specific frames reflect feelings about subject of spending
-individual and aggregate level effects of framing
Part 2 Individual level correlates to spending opinions
IVs:
a. Thermometer feeling about government, evaluation of the economy,
b. Feelings about recipients: symbolic racism, feelings about welfare and toward the poor,
c. demos: income, race, gender, age, employment status
d. party id, liberal-conservative rating
DV: reaction to general and specific spending questions
Results
IVs in sections a and b (feelings about government and recipients) had predicted effects on attitudes about spending.
Democrats favored increased spending in both cases- ideology mediates framing effects
People are reacting in ways consistent with the feelings that are evoked with different frames. People act in ways that support their general feelings about the government when that is the only cue, but use other cues also when given the prompting to do so. Issue framing effects are actually not inconsistent, irrational.
Framing can be used by elites that can control the frame to convince people to support their preferred side of an issue. Framing, nonetheless, is inevitable.
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