Immergut (1992) “Institutions, Veto Points, and Policy Results: A Comparative Analysis of Health Care.”
Veto points/gate:
The executive—more likely to get legislation passed when the veto point is the EXEC.
Case and point:
Sweden: executive rested in secure parliament majority. Majority + arty discipline = executive wins; Sweden lacked veto points.
France: Executive did not enjoy stable parliamentary majority. Veto point = parliament! IGs influence went up.
Swiss: Referenda; IGs had major electoral influence.
Unitary. Not federal.
Parliamentary. Not Presidential (presidential system = reps more vulnerable)
Parliamentary system: the cabinet is the single veto point. When there is a parliamentary majority, government can impose their will, i.e. NHI.
Reduced interest power with executive decision making.
The best ability to impose costs is a dictatorship (best outcomes, i.e. NHI); most difficult to impose costs is in a deliberative democracy.
Thus in order to get a very publc good yo hve to remove the public from the decision making, and allow government to make decisions against the IGs.
Where do politicians become vulnerable to interest groups? The specific example used is the AMA. In each case the government wanted NHI.
Sweden: impose most costs; gove cant do anything.
France: After a major change gov was able to do something.
Switzerland: EUs California (votes in referenda). Women got the vote in 1971, because men didn’t want women to vote. IGs influence the public (Much like fear appeals used in 1992 (harry and louis) against H.Clinton’s plan).
Monday, November 10, 2008
Tsebelis (1995) “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parlimentarianism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism.”
Tsebelis (1995) “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parlimentarianism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism.”
Distiguishes between two types of coalitions.
Veto Gates—federal/unitary distinction
Veto Players—executive parties dimension
Distiguishes between two types of coalitions.
Veto Gates—federal/unitary distinction
Veto Players—executive parties dimension
Samuels. 2002. "Pork Barreling is Not Credit Claiming."
Samuels (2002)
“…the relationship they establish w/the owners of private firms ultimately may be more important to their career success than the actual amount of pork that they deliver to voters because this relationship brings campaign contributions, and the contributions provide the resources that candidates need to advance campaigns” (852).
Argument refuting: Congressman get votes, via pork. Case study: Brazil.
Pork is really important in Brazil;
What is the electoral system?
Use pork to get attention (Ames)
But Samuels says its not the pork that brings in the votes; its money.
Because competition makes it difficult for congressmen to get credit for their pork; thus pork projects offer fewer “returns.”
Regression 1: Pork and Money
Pork does not directly influence votes, but money does.
Regression 2: the more Pork you bring in, the more money you have.
Conclusion: relationships with private firms are more important; pork is for the private interests, and not for constituents.
Mayhew says—serving constituents, bring home the particularized benefits, so you can claim credit, which brings the voters. But Samuels (2002) separates pork barreling from credit claiming—we just think that is what is going on. But in Brazil that is not what is going on. Pork, in Brazil, is for the rich (concrete companies, etc). infividual firms are benefiting. The bridge to nowhere in AK does not benefit AK; it benefits people building the bridge. In the American discipline we WANT to link constituency service with victory; but in reality, those congressmen that bring the most constituency service are actually the ones of the bubble. Why? Because those representatives with insecure positions need to attract more votes. Hasn’t been an empirical connection.
Further research: “my results suggest that research on pork barreling should not be isolated from research on campaign finance” (847).
“…the relationship they establish w/the owners of private firms ultimately may be more important to their career success than the actual amount of pork that they deliver to voters because this relationship brings campaign contributions, and the contributions provide the resources that candidates need to advance campaigns” (852).
Argument refuting: Congressman get votes, via pork. Case study: Brazil.
Pork is really important in Brazil;
What is the electoral system?
Use pork to get attention (Ames)
But Samuels says its not the pork that brings in the votes; its money.
Because competition makes it difficult for congressmen to get credit for their pork; thus pork projects offer fewer “returns.”
Regression 1: Pork and Money
Pork does not directly influence votes, but money does.
Regression 2: the more Pork you bring in, the more money you have.
Conclusion: relationships with private firms are more important; pork is for the private interests, and not for constituents.
Mayhew says—serving constituents, bring home the particularized benefits, so you can claim credit, which brings the voters. But Samuels (2002) separates pork barreling from credit claiming—we just think that is what is going on. But in Brazil that is not what is going on. Pork, in Brazil, is for the rich (concrete companies, etc). infividual firms are benefiting. The bridge to nowhere in AK does not benefit AK; it benefits people building the bridge. In the American discipline we WANT to link constituency service with victory; but in reality, those congressmen that bring the most constituency service are actually the ones of the bubble. Why? Because those representatives with insecure positions need to attract more votes. Hasn’t been an empirical connection.
Further research: “my results suggest that research on pork barreling should not be isolated from research on campaign finance” (847).
Monday, November 3, 2008
Katz (1986)
“Intra-party Preference Voting”
Barack Obama supporters are more median voters. Uniting. We are purple. Not as concerned with the means.
Participation costs:
Rallies (faithful, or not? Social acceptance, or not? Politics is trendy, now).
Watching a debate (whether or not you will watch. What is the independent variable? debate format? Divisiveness? Candidates similarity?).
Wearing a sticker.
(who are invested).
Depends on rewards:
1. material: Tangible rewards that can easily be converted into money.
2. solidarity: Intangible rewards that stem from social interaction.
3. purposive: intrinsic rewards that derive from the act of participation itself.
Preference voting; where does it happen?
Where pref. voting occurs:
A candidate cannot rely solely on his or her party for election. “Rather at some point he must distinguish himself from the other candidates of the same party in order to compete for preference votes. This requires the development of an independent base of support within, or in addition to, the regular party apparatus” (101). (In the primaries, in the US, candidates Distinguish themselves by picking different policies!!! Once the general election rolls around, they move to characteristic centered talk/campaigning).
Why do we focus on personal characteristics? The middle is where we need to sway. Not goin to sway swing voters with policy. They are paying attention, now, but not to specifics. Strictly character difference. Dumbed down, etc. because they understand the more personal things.
What is preference voting? Making a list. 2nd vote getting can get a seat, as party captures more vote. (3 seat district??). quotas. Take all votes for least popular candidate and move them up. The votes from the bottom do not come up until quotas are full.
Intraparty turnover
Do incumbents lose on account of intra or inter?
Look at party cohesion, form the inside. Which part. Members actually get elected will determine policy production.
STV (single transferable vote)
SNTV (single nontransferable vote): Japan; candidates run for more than one party; you have only one vote. You as a party may lose some seats if the candidate is too popular (how?). LDP powers in government distributed benefits (so you definitely voted for LDP in your district), and one person campaigned in one district, and another person in another district, and then the LDP gave away cash and the district voted for their particular representative.
SMD (single member district)
Plurality: through use of direct primary, allows for pref. voting. Candidate reputations are really important in the US.
What is the role of ideology?
Two candidates of the same party to compete for a vote (list PR), generates intraparty pref. voting. Which creates a focus on candidates reps. Not parties.
Intraparty preference voting is important in Ireland’s system, as well as Malta’s primary.
The primary is important. Who would lead if there were no primary (if party leaders chose who was going to run on the ticket). But it has made personalities more important.
Barack Obama supporters are more median voters. Uniting. We are purple. Not as concerned with the means.
Participation costs:
Rallies (faithful, or not? Social acceptance, or not? Politics is trendy, now).
Watching a debate (whether or not you will watch. What is the independent variable? debate format? Divisiveness? Candidates similarity?).
Wearing a sticker.
(who are invested).
Depends on rewards:
1. material: Tangible rewards that can easily be converted into money.
2. solidarity: Intangible rewards that stem from social interaction.
3. purposive: intrinsic rewards that derive from the act of participation itself.
Preference voting; where does it happen?
Where pref. voting occurs:
A candidate cannot rely solely on his or her party for election. “Rather at some point he must distinguish himself from the other candidates of the same party in order to compete for preference votes. This requires the development of an independent base of support within, or in addition to, the regular party apparatus” (101). (In the primaries, in the US, candidates Distinguish themselves by picking different policies!!! Once the general election rolls around, they move to characteristic centered talk/campaigning).
Why do we focus on personal characteristics? The middle is where we need to sway. Not goin to sway swing voters with policy. They are paying attention, now, but not to specifics. Strictly character difference. Dumbed down, etc. because they understand the more personal things.
What is preference voting? Making a list. 2nd vote getting can get a seat, as party captures more vote. (3 seat district??). quotas. Take all votes for least popular candidate and move them up. The votes from the bottom do not come up until quotas are full.
Intraparty turnover
Do incumbents lose on account of intra or inter?
Look at party cohesion, form the inside. Which part. Members actually get elected will determine policy production.
STV (single transferable vote)
SNTV (single nontransferable vote): Japan; candidates run for more than one party; you have only one vote. You as a party may lose some seats if the candidate is too popular (how?). LDP powers in government distributed benefits (so you definitely voted for LDP in your district), and one person campaigned in one district, and another person in another district, and then the LDP gave away cash and the district voted for their particular representative.
SMD (single member district)
Plurality: through use of direct primary, allows for pref. voting. Candidate reputations are really important in the US.
What is the role of ideology?
Two candidates of the same party to compete for a vote (list PR), generates intraparty pref. voting. Which creates a focus on candidates reps. Not parties.
Intraparty preference voting is important in Ireland’s system, as well as Malta’s primary.
The primary is important. Who would lead if there were no primary (if party leaders chose who was going to run on the ticket). But it has made personalities more important.
Carey & Shugart (1994)
Carey & Shugart. 1994. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas,” Electoral Studies 14(4): 417-439.
Campaigning on personal, rather than party reputation.
Abstract.
In this article, we present a method for estimating the relative value to legislators (and candidates for legislative seats) of personal reputations vs. party reputations for advancing political careers.
Variables:
(1) ballot control (2) vote pooling (3) types of votes (4) district magnitude
Electoral system makes a difference (418).
“…it is widely accepted that in open list systems, personal reputation is more valuable to legislative candidates than in close list systems” (418).
Operationalization:
Rank ordering of systems
Representation focus:
People’s political knowledge is going to vary; we expect this. At a certain level we do not vote our personal interests. Tragic. A coherent ideology is a necessary precondition to be political sophistication. And thus competition that is framed around ideologies matter.
In both PR and SMD systems there are some candidate focused elections and some party focused elections.
Candidate centered: Focus on individuals where personalities matter.
The casual mechanism might be institutionalized incentives to cultivate a personal vote; not party affiliation or policy positions.
Campaigning on personal, rather than party reputation.
Abstract.
In this article, we present a method for estimating the relative value to legislators (and candidates for legislative seats) of personal reputations vs. party reputations for advancing political careers.
Variables:
(1) ballot control (2) vote pooling (3) types of votes (4) district magnitude
Electoral system makes a difference (418).
“…it is widely accepted that in open list systems, personal reputation is more valuable to legislative candidates than in close list systems” (418).
Operationalization:
Rank ordering of systems
Representation focus:
People’s political knowledge is going to vary; we expect this. At a certain level we do not vote our personal interests. Tragic. A coherent ideology is a necessary precondition to be political sophistication. And thus competition that is framed around ideologies matter.
In both PR and SMD systems there are some candidate focused elections and some party focused elections.
Candidate centered: Focus on individuals where personalities matter.
The casual mechanism might be institutionalized incentives to cultivate a personal vote; not party affiliation or policy positions.
Monday, October 20, 2008
Cox, G. 1987. The Efficient Secret.
In Brief
What makes Britain's government so efficient? The "efficient secret" is "a Cabinet with not only executive but also legislative predominance." Thus, elections to the legislature are, in effect, mere elections to an electoral college which then selects a Cabinet--and this Cabinet runs the country. When Britain moved toward this system, its elections became party-centric, no longer candidate-centered.
Delegation to the Cabinet occurred in response to a "tragedy of the commons" within the House of Commons: All the MPs (Members of Parliament) were trying to use a limited (common) amount of Commons time for private electoral benefit. MPs gained an increased interest in active participation for two reasons. First, redistricting made programmatic (i.e. legislative) work more electorally beneficial than patronage and bribery, which formerly monopolized MPs' attention; second, the increased attention of newspapers to the Commons meant that MPs needed to look busy if they wanted to persuade constituents that they were, in fact, working toward programmatic ends.
Origins of the Efficient Secret: How and Why the Cabinet Became Predominant (chapter 6)
Pre-Reform: 18th Century
In 18th century Britain (before the changes discussed in this chapter occurred), the Cabinet was almost purely an executive body. It administered the royal government. Its main legislative duties were to pass measures (mainly financial) necessary to run the government. Otherwise, public policy was left up to the MPs (Members of Parliament).
At this time, parliamentary rules of procedure strengthened individual members, who
Could raise a debate;
Could filibuster;
Could motion for indefinite adjournment;
Could introduce a motion "on the sudden."
These procedures did not "facilitate the passage of a legislative programme by the government [Cabinet]."
What Changed: Early 19th Century
Rules changed in the 19th century. There arose an increasing distinction between the "government's [Cabinet's] business and private members' business." For example, "Order Days" were created: The Cabinet's business was given priority on Mondays and Fridays, but MPs had to put their business into the Order Book and wait for it to come up on the agenda (page 48).
"Erosion of individual parliamentary rights" began "in earnest in the 1830s." MPs would try to turn Order Days (Mondays and Fridays, later Wednesdays as well) towards topics of interest to them, thus raiding the government's time on its priority days. So the government started attaching stipulations that no amendments could be introduced (sort of; bear in mind that this is a condensed version of Cox's argument). As a result, the docket got very large for other days, and private MPs had a hard time getting their issues discussed or, especially, voted on. Soon, MPs found they could pass bills only with the help of Cabinet ministers.
By 1848, the Cabinet both ruled and legislated; few if any measures could pass without the ministry's support. By the 1860s, the Cabinet's dominance was widely recognized. Quoting Bagehot, 1865: the "efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers."
Over a few decades, the, the British House of Commons had evolved from one run by individual members of parliament to one dominated by the partisan leaders in the Cabinet. And as a result, elections to the Commons became more a matter of party than of individual candidates; voters selected a ruling party, not a delegate.
Cox's Theory: The Causes of Procedural Change
What changed is widely accepted; why it changed is disputed. A common explanation that Cox challenges: England's increasing population and industrialization required more active governmental regulation. Thus, the Parliament's limited time came under heavier demand, necessitating the sort of rationing (e.g. Order Days) that later occurred. But Cox criticizes this explanation: Why did scarcity of time lead to this particular outcome? Why/how did demand for legislative time increase? In particular, if this were really the whole story, why didn't the Parliament's business vary with the GDP (it didn't)?
Thus, Cox presents his own theory, which has already been hinted at above: MPs were becoming more active, for two closely related reasons (pgs 53-54). First, there was an increasing attention paid to the Commons by the press at this time (and an increasing number of newspapers). MPs wanted their constituents to see them in the news. But this matters only if constituents would change their voting behavior in response to news coverage--and this leads to Cox's second (and more important) point:
Second, redistricting made such press visibility important. Previously, many MPs had small constituencies that could be easily managed by patronage and bribery--and patronage and bribery do not require any action on the Commons floor. But redistricting brought representation to large northern cities and created much larger constituencies overall. And large constituencies are difficult to buy off with bribery and patronage; instead, programmatic (i.e. policy) appeals are far more effective. (The logic here is similar to selectorate theory.) But unlike patronage, passing programmatic policies does require activity on the Commons floor. Thus, redistricting created an incentive for MPs to participate more actively in the Commons--especially since there were so many newspapers covering this activity.
A problem emerged: All MPs wanted to be seen doing more, but they couldn't all introduce new laws at the same time. Thus, a "tragedy of the commons" (p 60) emerged in the Commons: All the MPs were trying to use a limited (common) amount of Commons time for private electoral benefit, with each MP trying to use his parliamentary rights (listed above) to involve himself in debates. The House soon resolved this problem by curtailing individual MPs' rights (against resistance from backbenchers), and the Cabinet was the "more or less unwitting beneficiary of this series of procedural crises."
Why the Cabinet Benefited
Why was it the Cabinet that benefited from these changes? Why, for example, wasn't a committee system developed, as in the U.S. and France? Cox proposes three possible explanations. First, the Cabinet was already in place, so it may have seemed logical to build on it rather than create a new institution (such as committees). Second, many of those with expertise who might chair committees were already in the cabinet. Third, many of the changes were incremental and procedural--and may have produced greater results in the end than was foreseen at the time.
Consequences of Procedural Change
As the Cabinet became more important, more MPs wanted to be in it; Ministers could use this carrot to enforce party discipline.
The threat of resignation (of the Cabinet) or dissolution (of the Commons) had "more authority since ... [it] might affect not just the administration of [the] government but also the whole course of legislation."
Voters' attitudes changed: they saw their vote as determining control of the ministry, not the identity of their MP.
-------
Class notes:
You do not need to know the crap about the individual members in PR systems; you merely need to know.
conflicting preferences = you know more things. More likely to vote issues.
What makes Britain's government so efficient? The "efficient secret" is "a Cabinet with not only executive but also legislative predominance." Thus, elections to the legislature are, in effect, mere elections to an electoral college which then selects a Cabinet--and this Cabinet runs the country. When Britain moved toward this system, its elections became party-centric, no longer candidate-centered.
Delegation to the Cabinet occurred in response to a "tragedy of the commons" within the House of Commons: All the MPs (Members of Parliament) were trying to use a limited (common) amount of Commons time for private electoral benefit. MPs gained an increased interest in active participation for two reasons. First, redistricting made programmatic (i.e. legislative) work more electorally beneficial than patronage and bribery, which formerly monopolized MPs' attention; second, the increased attention of newspapers to the Commons meant that MPs needed to look busy if they wanted to persuade constituents that they were, in fact, working toward programmatic ends.
Origins of the Efficient Secret: How and Why the Cabinet Became Predominant (chapter 6)
Pre-Reform: 18th Century
In 18th century Britain (before the changes discussed in this chapter occurred), the Cabinet was almost purely an executive body. It administered the royal government. Its main legislative duties were to pass measures (mainly financial) necessary to run the government. Otherwise, public policy was left up to the MPs (Members of Parliament).
At this time, parliamentary rules of procedure strengthened individual members, who
Could raise a debate;
Could filibuster;
Could motion for indefinite adjournment;
Could introduce a motion "on the sudden."
These procedures did not "facilitate the passage of a legislative programme by the government [Cabinet]."
What Changed: Early 19th Century
Rules changed in the 19th century. There arose an increasing distinction between the "government's [Cabinet's] business and private members' business." For example, "Order Days" were created: The Cabinet's business was given priority on Mondays and Fridays, but MPs had to put their business into the Order Book and wait for it to come up on the agenda (page 48).
"Erosion of individual parliamentary rights" began "in earnest in the 1830s." MPs would try to turn Order Days (Mondays and Fridays, later Wednesdays as well) towards topics of interest to them, thus raiding the government's time on its priority days. So the government started attaching stipulations that no amendments could be introduced (sort of; bear in mind that this is a condensed version of Cox's argument). As a result, the docket got very large for other days, and private MPs had a hard time getting their issues discussed or, especially, voted on. Soon, MPs found they could pass bills only with the help of Cabinet ministers.
By 1848, the Cabinet both ruled and legislated; few if any measures could pass without the ministry's support. By the 1860s, the Cabinet's dominance was widely recognized. Quoting Bagehot, 1865: the "efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers."
Over a few decades, the, the British House of Commons had evolved from one run by individual members of parliament to one dominated by the partisan leaders in the Cabinet. And as a result, elections to the Commons became more a matter of party than of individual candidates; voters selected a ruling party, not a delegate.
Cox's Theory: The Causes of Procedural Change
What changed is widely accepted; why it changed is disputed. A common explanation that Cox challenges: England's increasing population and industrialization required more active governmental regulation. Thus, the Parliament's limited time came under heavier demand, necessitating the sort of rationing (e.g. Order Days) that later occurred. But Cox criticizes this explanation: Why did scarcity of time lead to this particular outcome? Why/how did demand for legislative time increase? In particular, if this were really the whole story, why didn't the Parliament's business vary with the GDP (it didn't)?
Thus, Cox presents his own theory, which has already been hinted at above: MPs were becoming more active, for two closely related reasons (pgs 53-54). First, there was an increasing attention paid to the Commons by the press at this time (and an increasing number of newspapers). MPs wanted their constituents to see them in the news. But this matters only if constituents would change their voting behavior in response to news coverage--and this leads to Cox's second (and more important) point:
Second, redistricting made such press visibility important. Previously, many MPs had small constituencies that could be easily managed by patronage and bribery--and patronage and bribery do not require any action on the Commons floor. But redistricting brought representation to large northern cities and created much larger constituencies overall. And large constituencies are difficult to buy off with bribery and patronage; instead, programmatic (i.e. policy) appeals are far more effective. (The logic here is similar to selectorate theory.) But unlike patronage, passing programmatic policies does require activity on the Commons floor. Thus, redistricting created an incentive for MPs to participate more actively in the Commons--especially since there were so many newspapers covering this activity.
A problem emerged: All MPs wanted to be seen doing more, but they couldn't all introduce new laws at the same time. Thus, a "tragedy of the commons" (p 60) emerged in the Commons: All the MPs were trying to use a limited (common) amount of Commons time for private electoral benefit, with each MP trying to use his parliamentary rights (listed above) to involve himself in debates. The House soon resolved this problem by curtailing individual MPs' rights (against resistance from backbenchers), and the Cabinet was the "more or less unwitting beneficiary of this series of procedural crises."
Why the Cabinet Benefited
Why was it the Cabinet that benefited from these changes? Why, for example, wasn't a committee system developed, as in the U.S. and France? Cox proposes three possible explanations. First, the Cabinet was already in place, so it may have seemed logical to build on it rather than create a new institution (such as committees). Second, many of those with expertise who might chair committees were already in the cabinet. Third, many of the changes were incremental and procedural--and may have produced greater results in the end than was foreseen at the time.
Consequences of Procedural Change
As the Cabinet became more important, more MPs wanted to be in it; Ministers could use this carrot to enforce party discipline.
The threat of resignation (of the Cabinet) or dissolution (of the Commons) had "more authority since ... [it] might affect not just the administration of [the] government but also the whole course of legislation."
Voters' attitudes changed: they saw their vote as determining control of the ministry, not the identity of their MP.
-------
Class notes:
You do not need to know the crap about the individual members in PR systems; you merely need to know.
conflicting preferences = you know more things. More likely to vote issues.
Lipjphart. 1999. Patterns of Democracy.
Arend asks, where is power concentrated? Majoritarian/Westminter Models of Democracy vs. Consensus democracy
The main differencein these two forms of democracy is between minority and majority right:
he second type of democracy, consensus democracy, involves far greater compromise and significant minority rights.
Another difference is between the concentration of power and the diffusion of power.
----
General Overview and Main Conclusions
Chapters 1-4 call our attention to two competing types of democracy. The first, majoritarian or Westminster democracy, is what most people immediate think of when they think of democracy: A legislature elected by a simple majority of the voters governs, and voters throw the ruling party out if it governs poorly. Great Britian presents the best example of this type of democracy, hence the term "Westminster." The second type of democracy, consensus democracy, involves far greater compromise and significant minority rights. Westminster and consensus democracies differ along two dimensions, each of which has five elements; read on for details. Lijphart argues that consensus democracy is better (see below).
Place in Literature
Lijphart is the primary advocate of the consensus/consociational approach. See his other works to appreciate the development of this theme. In particular, consider his 1977 book, Democracy in Plural Societies. In this earlier book, he emphasized "consociational" democracy as a solution for states where traditional majoritarian democracy might not work due to deep ethnic, linguistic, or religious cleavages. But in the present book, Patterns of Democracy, Lijphart advocates "consensus democracy" (a modified version of consociational demoracy) as the ideal governance type for any state, not just deeply divided states.
As Lijphart has developed his arguments over the past few decades, he has attracted numerous critics. See Andeweg (2000) for an excellent review of consociationalism and its critics, as well as a discussion of the differences between consociationalism and consensus democracy. Note that the present book studies consensus democracy, not consociationalism.
Lijphart's Main Argument: Consensus Democracy is Better
General Advantages
Chapters 14-17 present statistical evidence to determine whether Westminster democracies produce consistently different policy outcomes than consensus democracies. Lijphart's main conclusion in this book: Contrary to the popular wisdom that decisive, effective, majoritarian leadership leads to better policy outcomes, Westminster democracies do not outperform consensus democracies. On some indicators (e.g. inflation), consensus democracies actually do significantly better than Westminster democracies; on most others, they do insignificantly better--which at the very least means that consensus democracies do no worse. Consensus democracies also have "kinder, gentler" traits: lower incarceration rates, less use of the death penalty, better care for the environment, more foreign aid work, and more welfare spending.
Special Advantages in Divided Societies
Consensus democracy has particular advantages for deeply divided societies. Majoritarian democracy might be criticized for excluding almost half the population from the governmental process, since it can leave 49.9% of the population out of the policy process. In the literature, we read that this criticism is void under two conditions. First, if today's minority has a realistic chance of becoming tomorrow's majority, then exclusion probably isn't a major problem, since each half of the country takes its turn being in charge (which will tend to moderate abuse of the minority by the majority). Second, if society is sufficiently homogeneous, then exclusion might not be a major problem, since the excluded minority's interests don't differ much from the majority's.
Lijphart contests these two arguments by pointing out that in many societies, especially in societies with deep ethnic, linguistic, religious, or ideological cleavages, neither condition holds. These deep divisions can prevent crossover ("swing") voting, preventing today's minority from ever having a realistic chance of being tomorrow's majority. Moreover, there is unlikely to be much overlap between the minority's and the majority's interests in such a society. Thus, the minority's permanent exclusion might lead to unrest or violence. Consensus democracy is Lijphart's institutional solution to this problem, allowing democracy to function by incorporating minority rights and allowing minority groups to influence policies. Though there might be less turnover in the legislature (see p 7), governments will represent a broader swath of interests (see pgs 31-33).
The Two Dimensions of Democracy
Consensus and Westminster democracies differ along two dimensions, each of which has five criteria. (Lijphart's earlier book, 'Democracies,' used factor analysis to show that these ten variables do actually load onto two distinct dimensions.) In the list below, I write the majoritarian characteristic first, followed by the consensus characteristic. Each bullet is discussed in greater detail below.
Executive-parties dimension
In effect: how easy is it for a single party to take complete control of the government?
"concentration of executive power in single-party majority [MWC] cabinets versus executive power-sharing in broad [not MWC] multiparty coalitions." (MWC means "minimal winning coalition"; is the cabinet just barely large enough to control a parliamentary majority (51%), or does the cabinet include more parties than it has to?)
the executive (president or cabinet/prime minister) is dominant over the legislature vs. a legislative-executive balance of power
two-party vs. multiparty system. (This is partly a function of electoral rules; see Cox 1997.)
pluralistic first-past-the-post electoral rules (which lead to disproportionate results) vs. proportional representation (PR)
pluralist (i.e. atomistic) interest groups vs. "'corporatist' interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation"
Federal-unitary dimension
In effect: once your party controls the government, how much can you change policy? Are there mechanisms to preserve the minority's voice/rights?
unitary vs. federal/decentralized structure
unicameral vs. bicameral legislature (with two "equally strong but differently constituted houses")
flexible, easily amended (or non-existent) constitutions vs. rigid, supermajority-amended constitutions
legislatures determine constitutionality of own legislation vs. judicial review of constitutionality by an independent court
executive control of central bank vs. central bank independence
Examples of Each Type
Lijphart presents Britain as the archetypical majoritarian democracy. Despite some caveats, it was almost purely majoritarian on most of the ten indicators (from 1945-1996). New Zealand was also almost purely majoritarian, at least until the recent adoption of PR. (See chapter 2.)
Lijphart illustrates the concept of consensus democracy by presenting Switzerland, Belgium, and even the EU as cases. (See chapter 3.)
The Executive-Parties Dimension: Details
Chapter 5: Party Systems (Two-party vs Multiparty)
Discusses measurement of political parties. Uses the "effective number of parties." Also discusses measurement of issue dimensions. Shows a strong correlation between the number of parties and the number of issue dimensions. Comment: I suspect that both are caused by something prior: per Cox (1997), institutional constraints impose an upper bound on the viable number of candidates. Since you can't have many more salient issue dimensions than there are parties, the strong correlation may be an artifact not only of social cleavages, but also of institutions. In other words, I think Lijphart has a correlation here, but not causation.
Chapter 6: Cabinets and Grand Coalitions
There are two key factors to examine when classifying governing coalitions: The number of parties in the cabinet, and the breadth of the cabinet's support base in parliament (i.e. how many seats the cabinet controls). The most majoritarian variant is a single party cabinet controlling a bare majority of seats (often called a "minimal winning coalition," or MWC). The consensus variant is a multiparty cabinet controlling more seats than it has to (an "oversized" cabinet, or a "grand coalition").
Lijphart gives an excellent summary of the six main theories of cabinet selection (p 92-96). Unfortunately, the literature's six theories have a problem (per Lijphart): They tend to predict some kind of MWC. Why is this a problem? If we ignore countries where a single party is large enough to control the cabinet without forming a coalition, only 39% of the remaining cabinets are actually MWCs; the rest are either oversized coalitions or minority cabinets. Why? Lijphart lists several possible factors.
Why form an oversized cabinet?
Information effect: you aren't sure that one of your coalition partners won't defect, so you include extra partners. Since no one partner is necessary to maintaining a majority, you have insurance against any particular partner that acts unexpectedly.
Size principle: You want your party to contain the median coalition member so that you can have bargaining strength. If your party forms a coalition with only one other party, then the median coalition member might be in the other party or in the fringe of your own. By including another party that is on the other side (ideologically) of you (relative to the first partner), you ensure that the median coalition member will be near the median of your own party.
External threats, like war, encourage all the pro-system parties to form a single coalition. Grand coalitions are more common during times of crisis.
Constitutional requirements: Belgium (e.g.) is required to have a linguistically balanced cabinet.
Need for a supermajority: if your agenda includes some constitutional amendments, and those require more supermajority approval, you want an oversized cabinet.
Why form a minority cabinet?
No investiture requirement: you can take power without specific parliamentary approval
Constructive vote of no confidence can keep a minority govt in power (since it only loses power if the opposition can pass a no confidence measure).
Right to make proposals matters of confidence can keep minority govt in power: proposals become law unless an absolute majority votes to remove the cabinet
Strong parliamentary committees: excluded parties still have lots of power if they aren't in cabinet, so they are less concerned about being excluded.
Chapter 7: Executive-Legislative Balance (Presidentialism vs Parliamentarism)
Lijphart presents three dichotomous variables by which to differentiate parliamentary and presidential systems:
In parl. system, the head of government requires the legislature's continued confidence to stay in power; in presidential systems, the head of government stays in power until his term is up.
Popular selection vs. selection by legislature. Presidents are popularly elected; parliamentary cabinets are selected by the legislature.
Collective/collegial executive vs. one-person executive. Presidents tend to control the executive as an individual (albeit with assistance from appointed cabinet members), while parliamentary cabinets tend to share executive power, with individual ministers exerting considerable control over their portfolio.
These three variables lead to a typology of 8 governmental types: pure presidential, pure parliamentary, and six hybrids. The typology does not account for "semipresidential" (or "premier-presidential") regimes, as in Shugart and Carey (1992): in these unusual cases, Lijphart examines only the executive (prime minister or president) that he considers dominant. Using exceptionally bad data, he shows that, as the proportion of a state's cabinets that are elected by minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) goes up, the dominance of the executive over the legislature also goes up.
Chapter 8: Electoral Systems (Pluarlistic vs Proportional Representation)
Lijphart presents a typology of electoral systems with some (uncritical) discussion of Duverger's law. A focus on seven attributes of electoral systems: electoral formula, district magnitude, electoral threshold, size of body to be elected, influence of presidential elections on legislative elections (i.e. coattails), malapportionment (i.e. mismatch between a district's population and vote share), and interparty electoral links. Uses Gallagher's (1991) index of disproportionality, and finds a strong association between disproportionality and electoral system (Table 8.2). He then finds a strong association between frequency of "manufactured" majorities and electoral system.
Comment: This is bad analysis--the relationship is an artifact of having fewer parties in plurality democracies, which will naturally lead to more manufactured majorities, even without having greater disproportionality. He claims that Figure 8.2 shows a relationship between electoral disproportionality and the effective number of political parties, but there is no relationship whatsoever if you control for PR/other electoral system. (Note that the PR countries are all on the right, below 8 or so, and the plurality systems are all above 8 (on the x-axis).
The Federal-Unitary Dimension: Details
Chapter 10: Federalism
The literature has given us two ways to think about federalism:
A guaranteed division of power. Each level of govt has final say in some areas (from Riker)
"Distribution [decentralization] of power among multiple centers" (e.g. Elazar)
Lijphart favors a different method: Congruent vs. incongruent federalism.
Congruent federalism: Federal units all have similar demographics as the nation as a whole. Example: USA and Canada. Federal lines are (for the most part) not drawn with ethnic groups in mind.
Incongruent federalism: Federals units have differing demographics; within each federal unit, there is usually demographic (i.e. ethnic/religious/linguistic) homogeneity. Examples: India, Belgium, Switzerland.
Lijphart also discusses "secondary characteristics" of federalism; these are institutional features that ensure that federalism will persist (i.e. that the national majority will not be able to move power away from the federal units and back to the central government):
Bicameralism with a strong federal (territorial) chamber, like the US Senate
A written, rigid constitution
Judicial review to ensure constitutionality of legislation
Measuring how "federal" a country is can be difficult. Lijphart measures federalism using a five-point scale (p 189) that correlates well with other measures of federalism used in the literature (such as the percent of tax revenues that go to the central government).
We often hear that federalism promotes institutional/policy experimentation. This is possible, but rarely done; instead, most countries have the same regime type at national and regional levels. Example: USA is presidential both in the states and in Washington. But Lijphart promotes federalism not because it allows experimentaion, but because it ensures that minority groups have total control over some aspects of policy relevant to them.
Chapter 11: Bicameralism
The concentration/division of legislative power fits into Lijphart's federal-unitary dimension of consociationalism. He classifies legislatures along three variables:
bicameralism/unicameralism,
symmetrical/asymmetrical bicameralism (is one house dominant, or are they essentially equal?),
and congruent/incongruent bicameralism (do the two houses represent essentially the same population, as in the American states, or does the second chamber reflect a different basis of representation, like the territorial representation in the US Senate?).
Using these variables, Lijphart gives bicameralism scores in Table 11.2 to each country in the sample. This operationalization isn't as easy as it should be: Iceland and Norway fall somewhere in the middle.
A true consensus democracy would have symmetrical, incongruent bicameralism; a true majoritarian democracy would have unicameralism (or something close to it, like Britain's starkly asymmetrical bicameralism).
Chapter 12: Constitutions
The things that preserve federalism are constitutional rigidity (hard to amend) and judicial review by an independent court. It is largely irrelevant whether the constitution is written down, as long as it is rigid and subject to judicial review.
Lijphart notes that you cannot have constitutional rigidity without constitutional review. Without constitutional review, the legislature can bypass constitutional rules and effectively change the contitution.
Chapter 13: Central Bank Independence
Independent central banks are characterized by longer tenures for their governors and a focused mission (e.g. to only fight inflation, not to bail out failing banks). Central bank independence is highly correlated with the federal-unitary dimension. Comment: This isn't surprising, since central bank independence is part of the federal-unitary index that Lijphart is correlating it against.
Additional Comments and Criticisms
Chapter 16: Consociationalism and "kinder, gentler democracy"
Chapters 14-17 have some methodological shortcomings. Consider chapter 16, which argues that consensus democracies are "kinder" and "gentler" because they are more likely to (1) be welfare states, (2) take care of the environment, (3) imprison fewer people, (4) eschew the death penalty, and (5) provide generous foreign aid. Also, they (1) elect more women, (2) reduce economic disparity, (3) have higher electoral turnout, (4) produce citizens who tell pollsters that they are satisfied with their democracy, (5) select leaders with opinions that correspond more closely with citizens', (6) enhance accountability and minimize corruption, (7) ensure that the government is always backed by a majority, not just a plurality (like Bush in 2000 and several UK cabinets), and so forth. If you value these things, you should value consensus democracy.
Consider several methodological critiques of chapter 16, though:
Problem: x (consociationalism) is measured once, in 1971-1996. This is only a cross-sectional correlation, not a causal (time-series) test. (See page 248 for a list of how each country rates on his scale. Upper-right is majoritarian, lower-left is consociational.)
Problem: He assumes that economic disparity can be used as a proxy for political equality. Not true. This only works if you assume that everybody wants redistribution to themselves.
Counterexample: Why are there rich Democrats and poor Republicans? At least in the USA, politics is not solely about redistribution. Also, recall that Howard Dean (in 2004) bemoaned the fact the the Democratic Party wasn't reaching out to poor whites in the South; these poor whites were voting based on something other than economic redistribution, and Dean wanted the Democratic party to change that. But if Lijphart's proxy were valid, then Dean's concern never would have arisen in the first place. You cannot use economic disparity as a proxy for political disparity.
Problem: he argues against the idea that it is easier to hold parties accountable in a majoritarian system than in a consensus democracy. But although he gives evidence that it isn't always easy to exercise accountability in a majoritarian system, he gives insufficient evidence that consensus democracies are any better. In fact, one of the biggest criticisms of Lijphart's approach is that you can't throw a bum Grand Coalition out. Austrians had to vote for someone that many of them disliked--the rather extreme Joerg Haider--to break up persuade their wayward Grand Coalition to change.
Big problem: Lijphart tests lots of hypotheses, but only has 15-36 countries in each regression. He used up all of his degrees of freedom rapidly. (That he didn't test all the hypotheses in a single regression is irrelevant--he used up his d.f. by running several regressions on the same data set.) Also, a data set so small is easily influence by large outliers. Many of his tests could be driven by a couple of very strong outliers, the US and the UK especially. Further, he's got a major multicolliearity problem; most of the majoritarian systems are former British colonies. Are there cultural effects here? Also, most of Western Europe is in the "consensus" category. Again, is that driving anything? He has too few cases, too many hypotheses, too many variables that he should be controlling for (but does not), and too few degrees of freedom to resolve these problems. Is there a better way to test these hypotheses?
The main differencein these two forms of democracy is between minority and majority right:
he second type of democracy, consensus democracy, involves far greater compromise and significant minority rights.
Another difference is between the concentration of power and the diffusion of power.
----
General Overview and Main Conclusions
Chapters 1-4 call our attention to two competing types of democracy. The first, majoritarian or Westminster democracy, is what most people immediate think of when they think of democracy: A legislature elected by a simple majority of the voters governs, and voters throw the ruling party out if it governs poorly. Great Britian presents the best example of this type of democracy, hence the term "Westminster." The second type of democracy, consensus democracy, involves far greater compromise and significant minority rights. Westminster and consensus democracies differ along two dimensions, each of which has five elements; read on for details. Lijphart argues that consensus democracy is better (see below).
Place in Literature
Lijphart is the primary advocate of the consensus/consociational approach. See his other works to appreciate the development of this theme. In particular, consider his 1977 book, Democracy in Plural Societies. In this earlier book, he emphasized "consociational" democracy as a solution for states where traditional majoritarian democracy might not work due to deep ethnic, linguistic, or religious cleavages. But in the present book, Patterns of Democracy, Lijphart advocates "consensus democracy" (a modified version of consociational demoracy) as the ideal governance type for any state, not just deeply divided states.
As Lijphart has developed his arguments over the past few decades, he has attracted numerous critics. See Andeweg (2000) for an excellent review of consociationalism and its critics, as well as a discussion of the differences between consociationalism and consensus democracy. Note that the present book studies consensus democracy, not consociationalism.
Lijphart's Main Argument: Consensus Democracy is Better
General Advantages
Chapters 14-17 present statistical evidence to determine whether Westminster democracies produce consistently different policy outcomes than consensus democracies. Lijphart's main conclusion in this book: Contrary to the popular wisdom that decisive, effective, majoritarian leadership leads to better policy outcomes, Westminster democracies do not outperform consensus democracies. On some indicators (e.g. inflation), consensus democracies actually do significantly better than Westminster democracies; on most others, they do insignificantly better--which at the very least means that consensus democracies do no worse. Consensus democracies also have "kinder, gentler" traits: lower incarceration rates, less use of the death penalty, better care for the environment, more foreign aid work, and more welfare spending.
Special Advantages in Divided Societies
Consensus democracy has particular advantages for deeply divided societies. Majoritarian democracy might be criticized for excluding almost half the population from the governmental process, since it can leave 49.9% of the population out of the policy process. In the literature, we read that this criticism is void under two conditions. First, if today's minority has a realistic chance of becoming tomorrow's majority, then exclusion probably isn't a major problem, since each half of the country takes its turn being in charge (which will tend to moderate abuse of the minority by the majority). Second, if society is sufficiently homogeneous, then exclusion might not be a major problem, since the excluded minority's interests don't differ much from the majority's.
Lijphart contests these two arguments by pointing out that in many societies, especially in societies with deep ethnic, linguistic, religious, or ideological cleavages, neither condition holds. These deep divisions can prevent crossover ("swing") voting, preventing today's minority from ever having a realistic chance of being tomorrow's majority. Moreover, there is unlikely to be much overlap between the minority's and the majority's interests in such a society. Thus, the minority's permanent exclusion might lead to unrest or violence. Consensus democracy is Lijphart's institutional solution to this problem, allowing democracy to function by incorporating minority rights and allowing minority groups to influence policies. Though there might be less turnover in the legislature (see p 7), governments will represent a broader swath of interests (see pgs 31-33).
The Two Dimensions of Democracy
Consensus and Westminster democracies differ along two dimensions, each of which has five criteria. (Lijphart's earlier book, 'Democracies,' used factor analysis to show that these ten variables do actually load onto two distinct dimensions.) In the list below, I write the majoritarian characteristic first, followed by the consensus characteristic. Each bullet is discussed in greater detail below.
Executive-parties dimension
In effect: how easy is it for a single party to take complete control of the government?
"concentration of executive power in single-party majority [MWC] cabinets versus executive power-sharing in broad [not MWC] multiparty coalitions." (MWC means "minimal winning coalition"; is the cabinet just barely large enough to control a parliamentary majority (51%), or does the cabinet include more parties than it has to?)
the executive (president or cabinet/prime minister) is dominant over the legislature vs. a legislative-executive balance of power
two-party vs. multiparty system. (This is partly a function of electoral rules; see Cox 1997.)
pluralistic first-past-the-post electoral rules (which lead to disproportionate results) vs. proportional representation (PR)
pluralist (i.e. atomistic) interest groups vs. "'corporatist' interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation"
Federal-unitary dimension
In effect: once your party controls the government, how much can you change policy? Are there mechanisms to preserve the minority's voice/rights?
unitary vs. federal/decentralized structure
unicameral vs. bicameral legislature (with two "equally strong but differently constituted houses")
flexible, easily amended (or non-existent) constitutions vs. rigid, supermajority-amended constitutions
legislatures determine constitutionality of own legislation vs. judicial review of constitutionality by an independent court
executive control of central bank vs. central bank independence
Examples of Each Type
Lijphart presents Britain as the archetypical majoritarian democracy. Despite some caveats, it was almost purely majoritarian on most of the ten indicators (from 1945-1996). New Zealand was also almost purely majoritarian, at least until the recent adoption of PR. (See chapter 2.)
Lijphart illustrates the concept of consensus democracy by presenting Switzerland, Belgium, and even the EU as cases. (See chapter 3.)
The Executive-Parties Dimension: Details
Chapter 5: Party Systems (Two-party vs Multiparty)
Discusses measurement of political parties. Uses the "effective number of parties." Also discusses measurement of issue dimensions. Shows a strong correlation between the number of parties and the number of issue dimensions. Comment: I suspect that both are caused by something prior: per Cox (1997), institutional constraints impose an upper bound on the viable number of candidates. Since you can't have many more salient issue dimensions than there are parties, the strong correlation may be an artifact not only of social cleavages, but also of institutions. In other words, I think Lijphart has a correlation here, but not causation.
Chapter 6: Cabinets and Grand Coalitions
There are two key factors to examine when classifying governing coalitions: The number of parties in the cabinet, and the breadth of the cabinet's support base in parliament (i.e. how many seats the cabinet controls). The most majoritarian variant is a single party cabinet controlling a bare majority of seats (often called a "minimal winning coalition," or MWC). The consensus variant is a multiparty cabinet controlling more seats than it has to (an "oversized" cabinet, or a "grand coalition").
Lijphart gives an excellent summary of the six main theories of cabinet selection (p 92-96). Unfortunately, the literature's six theories have a problem (per Lijphart): They tend to predict some kind of MWC. Why is this a problem? If we ignore countries where a single party is large enough to control the cabinet without forming a coalition, only 39% of the remaining cabinets are actually MWCs; the rest are either oversized coalitions or minority cabinets. Why? Lijphart lists several possible factors.
Why form an oversized cabinet?
Information effect: you aren't sure that one of your coalition partners won't defect, so you include extra partners. Since no one partner is necessary to maintaining a majority, you have insurance against any particular partner that acts unexpectedly.
Size principle: You want your party to contain the median coalition member so that you can have bargaining strength. If your party forms a coalition with only one other party, then the median coalition member might be in the other party or in the fringe of your own. By including another party that is on the other side (ideologically) of you (relative to the first partner), you ensure that the median coalition member will be near the median of your own party.
External threats, like war, encourage all the pro-system parties to form a single coalition. Grand coalitions are more common during times of crisis.
Constitutional requirements: Belgium (e.g.) is required to have a linguistically balanced cabinet.
Need for a supermajority: if your agenda includes some constitutional amendments, and those require more supermajority approval, you want an oversized cabinet.
Why form a minority cabinet?
No investiture requirement: you can take power without specific parliamentary approval
Constructive vote of no confidence can keep a minority govt in power (since it only loses power if the opposition can pass a no confidence measure).
Right to make proposals matters of confidence can keep minority govt in power: proposals become law unless an absolute majority votes to remove the cabinet
Strong parliamentary committees: excluded parties still have lots of power if they aren't in cabinet, so they are less concerned about being excluded.
Chapter 7: Executive-Legislative Balance (Presidentialism vs Parliamentarism)
Lijphart presents three dichotomous variables by which to differentiate parliamentary and presidential systems:
In parl. system, the head of government requires the legislature's continued confidence to stay in power; in presidential systems, the head of government stays in power until his term is up.
Popular selection vs. selection by legislature. Presidents are popularly elected; parliamentary cabinets are selected by the legislature.
Collective/collegial executive vs. one-person executive. Presidents tend to control the executive as an individual (albeit with assistance from appointed cabinet members), while parliamentary cabinets tend to share executive power, with individual ministers exerting considerable control over their portfolio.
These three variables lead to a typology of 8 governmental types: pure presidential, pure parliamentary, and six hybrids. The typology does not account for "semipresidential" (or "premier-presidential") regimes, as in Shugart and Carey (1992): in these unusual cases, Lijphart examines only the executive (prime minister or president) that he considers dominant. Using exceptionally bad data, he shows that, as the proportion of a state's cabinets that are elected by minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) goes up, the dominance of the executive over the legislature also goes up.
Chapter 8: Electoral Systems (Pluarlistic vs Proportional Representation)
Lijphart presents a typology of electoral systems with some (uncritical) discussion of Duverger's law. A focus on seven attributes of electoral systems: electoral formula, district magnitude, electoral threshold, size of body to be elected, influence of presidential elections on legislative elections (i.e. coattails), malapportionment (i.e. mismatch between a district's population and vote share), and interparty electoral links. Uses Gallagher's (1991) index of disproportionality, and finds a strong association between disproportionality and electoral system (Table 8.2). He then finds a strong association between frequency of "manufactured" majorities and electoral system.
Comment: This is bad analysis--the relationship is an artifact of having fewer parties in plurality democracies, which will naturally lead to more manufactured majorities, even without having greater disproportionality. He claims that Figure 8.2 shows a relationship between electoral disproportionality and the effective number of political parties, but there is no relationship whatsoever if you control for PR/other electoral system. (Note that the PR countries are all on the right, below 8 or so, and the plurality systems are all above 8 (on the x-axis).
The Federal-Unitary Dimension: Details
Chapter 10: Federalism
The literature has given us two ways to think about federalism:
A guaranteed division of power. Each level of govt has final say in some areas (from Riker)
"Distribution [decentralization] of power among multiple centers" (e.g. Elazar)
Lijphart favors a different method: Congruent vs. incongruent federalism.
Congruent federalism: Federal units all have similar demographics as the nation as a whole. Example: USA and Canada. Federal lines are (for the most part) not drawn with ethnic groups in mind.
Incongruent federalism: Federals units have differing demographics; within each federal unit, there is usually demographic (i.e. ethnic/religious/linguistic) homogeneity. Examples: India, Belgium, Switzerland.
Lijphart also discusses "secondary characteristics" of federalism; these are institutional features that ensure that federalism will persist (i.e. that the national majority will not be able to move power away from the federal units and back to the central government):
Bicameralism with a strong federal (territorial) chamber, like the US Senate
A written, rigid constitution
Judicial review to ensure constitutionality of legislation
Measuring how "federal" a country is can be difficult. Lijphart measures federalism using a five-point scale (p 189) that correlates well with other measures of federalism used in the literature (such as the percent of tax revenues that go to the central government).
We often hear that federalism promotes institutional/policy experimentation. This is possible, but rarely done; instead, most countries have the same regime type at national and regional levels. Example: USA is presidential both in the states and in Washington. But Lijphart promotes federalism not because it allows experimentaion, but because it ensures that minority groups have total control over some aspects of policy relevant to them.
Chapter 11: Bicameralism
The concentration/division of legislative power fits into Lijphart's federal-unitary dimension of consociationalism. He classifies legislatures along three variables:
bicameralism/unicameralism,
symmetrical/asymmetrical bicameralism (is one house dominant, or are they essentially equal?),
and congruent/incongruent bicameralism (do the two houses represent essentially the same population, as in the American states, or does the second chamber reflect a different basis of representation, like the territorial representation in the US Senate?).
Using these variables, Lijphart gives bicameralism scores in Table 11.2 to each country in the sample. This operationalization isn't as easy as it should be: Iceland and Norway fall somewhere in the middle.
A true consensus democracy would have symmetrical, incongruent bicameralism; a true majoritarian democracy would have unicameralism (or something close to it, like Britain's starkly asymmetrical bicameralism).
Chapter 12: Constitutions
The things that preserve federalism are constitutional rigidity (hard to amend) and judicial review by an independent court. It is largely irrelevant whether the constitution is written down, as long as it is rigid and subject to judicial review.
Lijphart notes that you cannot have constitutional rigidity without constitutional review. Without constitutional review, the legislature can bypass constitutional rules and effectively change the contitution.
Chapter 13: Central Bank Independence
Independent central banks are characterized by longer tenures for their governors and a focused mission (e.g. to only fight inflation, not to bail out failing banks). Central bank independence is highly correlated with the federal-unitary dimension. Comment: This isn't surprising, since central bank independence is part of the federal-unitary index that Lijphart is correlating it against.
Additional Comments and Criticisms
Chapter 16: Consociationalism and "kinder, gentler democracy"
Chapters 14-17 have some methodological shortcomings. Consider chapter 16, which argues that consensus democracies are "kinder" and "gentler" because they are more likely to (1) be welfare states, (2) take care of the environment, (3) imprison fewer people, (4) eschew the death penalty, and (5) provide generous foreign aid. Also, they (1) elect more women, (2) reduce economic disparity, (3) have higher electoral turnout, (4) produce citizens who tell pollsters that they are satisfied with their democracy, (5) select leaders with opinions that correspond more closely with citizens', (6) enhance accountability and minimize corruption, (7) ensure that the government is always backed by a majority, not just a plurality (like Bush in 2000 and several UK cabinets), and so forth. If you value these things, you should value consensus democracy.
Consider several methodological critiques of chapter 16, though:
Problem: x (consociationalism) is measured once, in 1971-1996. This is only a cross-sectional correlation, not a causal (time-series) test. (See page 248 for a list of how each country rates on his scale. Upper-right is majoritarian, lower-left is consociational.)
Problem: He assumes that economic disparity can be used as a proxy for political equality. Not true. This only works if you assume that everybody wants redistribution to themselves.
Counterexample: Why are there rich Democrats and poor Republicans? At least in the USA, politics is not solely about redistribution. Also, recall that Howard Dean (in 2004) bemoaned the fact the the Democratic Party wasn't reaching out to poor whites in the South; these poor whites were voting based on something other than economic redistribution, and Dean wanted the Democratic party to change that. But if Lijphart's proxy were valid, then Dean's concern never would have arisen in the first place. You cannot use economic disparity as a proxy for political disparity.
Problem: he argues against the idea that it is easier to hold parties accountable in a majoritarian system than in a consensus democracy. But although he gives evidence that it isn't always easy to exercise accountability in a majoritarian system, he gives insufficient evidence that consensus democracies are any better. In fact, one of the biggest criticisms of Lijphart's approach is that you can't throw a bum Grand Coalition out. Austrians had to vote for someone that many of them disliked--the rather extreme Joerg Haider--to break up persuade their wayward Grand Coalition to change.
Big problem: Lijphart tests lots of hypotheses, but only has 15-36 countries in each regression. He used up all of his degrees of freedom rapidly. (That he didn't test all the hypotheses in a single regression is irrelevant--he used up his d.f. by running several regressions on the same data set.) Also, a data set so small is easily influence by large outliers. Many of his tests could be driven by a couple of very strong outliers, the US and the UK especially. Further, he's got a major multicolliearity problem; most of the majoritarian systems are former British colonies. Are there cultural effects here? Also, most of Western Europe is in the "consensus" category. Again, is that driving anything? He has too few cases, too many hypotheses, too many variables that he should be controlling for (but does not), and too few degrees of freedom to resolve these problems. Is there a better way to test these hypotheses?
Monday, March 24, 2008
Jacobs & Shapiro (2000) Politicians Don't Pander
Crafted Talk
1. Use polls to track public opinion
2. Manage press coverage—control the message!
3. Priming
Systematic conditions that enable an increase in “orchestrated presentations”
1. Partisan polarization—number of moderates???
2. Institutional individuation
3. Incumbency bias
4. Interest group proliferation
5. Interbranch relations
6. Proximity of elections
1. Use polls to track public opinion
2. Manage press coverage—control the message!
3. Priming
Systematic conditions that enable an increase in “orchestrated presentations”
1. Partisan polarization—number of moderates???
2. Institutional individuation
3. Incumbency bias
4. Interest group proliferation
5. Interbranch relations
6. Proximity of elections
Bartles (1996) Uninformed Votes: Inofrmation Effects in Presidential Elections
This study rejects the theory that cues are an appropriate replacement of actual political knowledge.
Bartels creates a hypothetical “fully informed” electorate. “How might the preferences of this hypothetical “fully informed” electorate differ from the preferences of the actual electorate? One possibility is to assume that increasing information reduces the variability of voters’ choice without altering the central tendency of their underlying preferences. Alternatively, we might suppose that more informed voters are more likely across the board to prefer Republicans (or Democrats), controlling for other relevant factors. Both of these assumptions seems unduly restrictive, however, in that they require information to have essentially similar effects on all voters regardless of their circumstances. In seems much more plausible to suppose that increasing information—by giving voters a better sense of their credibility and likely consequences of some voters systematically more Republican in their preferences but at the same time make others systematically more Democratic” (205).
H: Uninformed voters successfully use cues and information shortcuts to behave as if they were fully informed. Failing that, individual deviations from fully informed voting cancels out in a mass electorate, producing the same aggregate election outcomes as if voters were fully informed.
Results: hypothesis is disconfirmed; at the individual level, the average deviation of actual vote probabilies from hypothetical “fully informed” vote probabilities was about ten percentage points. In the electorate as a whole, these deviations were significantly deluted by aggregation, but by no means eliminated: incumbent presidents did almost five percentage points btter, and democratic candidates did almost two percentage points better, than they would have if voters had in fact been “fully informed.
“Given the variety of demonstrable differences between well-informed and less well-informed citiens in sensitivity to external stimuli, diversity and precision of political perceptions, information-processing strategies, access to shared understandings of politics, and integrative ability, it hardly seems outlandish to entertain the possibility that disparities in political information lead to systematically different vote choices by citizens in otherwise similar political circumstances, despite—or perhaps even, in part because of—the availability of cues and information short-cuts…” (202).
Methods: generate “fully informed” electorate (204).
Measurement; level of political sophistication:
Interviewer assessed: .95, .8, .5, .2, .05. corresponding to very high…very low.
Findings: “relatively uninformed voters are more likely, other things being equal, to support incumbents and democrats” (218). …suggesting that political ignorance has systematic and significant political consequences (220).
See Lau & Redlawsk 1999 for a really good summary of this article
Bartels creates a hypothetical “fully informed” electorate. “How might the preferences of this hypothetical “fully informed” electorate differ from the preferences of the actual electorate? One possibility is to assume that increasing information reduces the variability of voters’ choice without altering the central tendency of their underlying preferences. Alternatively, we might suppose that more informed voters are more likely across the board to prefer Republicans (or Democrats), controlling for other relevant factors. Both of these assumptions seems unduly restrictive, however, in that they require information to have essentially similar effects on all voters regardless of their circumstances. In seems much more plausible to suppose that increasing information—by giving voters a better sense of their credibility and likely consequences of some voters systematically more Republican in their preferences but at the same time make others systematically more Democratic” (205).
H: Uninformed voters successfully use cues and information shortcuts to behave as if they were fully informed. Failing that, individual deviations from fully informed voting cancels out in a mass electorate, producing the same aggregate election outcomes as if voters were fully informed.
Results: hypothesis is disconfirmed; at the individual level, the average deviation of actual vote probabilies from hypothetical “fully informed” vote probabilities was about ten percentage points. In the electorate as a whole, these deviations were significantly deluted by aggregation, but by no means eliminated: incumbent presidents did almost five percentage points btter, and democratic candidates did almost two percentage points better, than they would have if voters had in fact been “fully informed.
“Given the variety of demonstrable differences between well-informed and less well-informed citiens in sensitivity to external stimuli, diversity and precision of political perceptions, information-processing strategies, access to shared understandings of politics, and integrative ability, it hardly seems outlandish to entertain the possibility that disparities in political information lead to systematically different vote choices by citizens in otherwise similar political circumstances, despite—or perhaps even, in part because of—the availability of cues and information short-cuts…” (202).
Methods: generate “fully informed” electorate (204).
Measurement; level of political sophistication:
Interviewer assessed: .95, .8, .5, .2, .05. corresponding to very high…very low.
Findings: “relatively uninformed voters are more likely, other things being equal, to support incumbents and democrats” (218). …suggesting that political ignorance has systematic and significant political consequences (220).
See Lau & Redlawsk 1999 for a really good summary of this article
Bennett (1995) Comparing Americans' Political Information in 1988 and 1992
Measuring political awareness in 1989 and 1992
H1: voters in 1992 would demonstrate higher levels of political sophistication due to more quality coverage in the 1992 election (1992 saw more issue coverage and more coverage, in general)
Fndings: same level of politically informed in both elections.
What did Bennett leave out?
-Perot! People were more interested…perhaps not more informed. Need open ended questions?
Did Bennett use correct measures? i.e. back to the practical vs. civic knowledge debate.
Perot captured 19% of the popular vote. Obviously those who had previously felt disenfranchised now felt included—different demographic?
H1: voters in 1992 would demonstrate higher levels of political sophistication due to more quality coverage in the 1992 election (1992 saw more issue coverage and more coverage, in general)
Fndings: same level of politically informed in both elections.
What did Bennett leave out?
-Perot! People were more interested…perhaps not more informed. Need open ended questions?
Did Bennett use correct measures? i.e. back to the practical vs. civic knowledge debate.
Perot captured 19% of the popular vote. Obviously those who had previously felt disenfranchised now felt included—different demographic?
Druckman & Holmes (2004) Does Presidential Rhetoric Matter? Priming and Presidential Approval
“The public’s approval of the president plays a critical role in determining the president’s power and policy-making success.” And what the president says has much to do with his approval.
“In this article we examine the direct impact of presidential rhetoric on approval…We show that the president can have a substantial effect on his own approval by priming the criteria on which citizens base their approval evaluations” (755). [Controlling the message].
The media primes its audience, yes. But so do presidents!
Presidents can use rhetoric to shape their own approval. (TROUBLESOME).
By “priming” their audience (presenting the issues by which one will use as evaluative criteria), presidents are able to determine the criteria by which they will be judge. For example if Bush wants to detract attention from the Kyoto Protocol, he can focus on the economy. “Priming occurs when an individual changes the criteria on which he or she bases an overall evaluation, whereas persuasion involves altering what an individual thinks of the president on a given dimension (e.g., does the president do a good job or a poor jo on defense policy?) Priming does not involve changing perceptions of how well the presidenti is doing on an issue—it simply alters the issues on which individuals base their overall evaluations” (757).
“Our focus on priming follows a growing literature that shos how presidents strategically emphasize advantageous issues with the hope of making those issues salient un the mindes of votesr (e.g. Jacobs & Shapiro 1994; Druckman et al. 2004). The president many also influence his approval by persuading voters that they should support his policies, or by convincing them that he is performing well on specific issues…” (757).
Druckman et al (2004) suggests that the success of priming depends on the particular context [the war in Iraq-ideological plugs of patriotism!!], source, and audience.
Source credibility matters (Miller & Krosnick 2000; Druckman 2001). [thus the president’s approval???]
In terms of audience variables, political knowledge matters. [need a place to put it thus need SOME political knowledge—MB]. “Recall that McGraw & Ling (2003) argue with a relativel new issue, more knowledgable people will be more susceptible to priming. Thisis the case because “the more knowledge one has about politics, the more quickly and easily one can make sense of…[a new issue] and the more efficiuently one can srore it in…and retrieve it from, an elabotatie and organized mental filing system” (Krosnick & Brannon 1993, 966; Miller & Krosnick 2000).
Whether or not the issue is personally relevant also matters (Iyengar 1991; Miller & Krosnick 1996, 82).
This role of image is important (Druckman & Holmes 2004, 759; Erich et al. 2001)
METHODS:
Data: use of the State of the Union addresses to study how presidents set the agenda. (following Cohen 1995).
Expected findings: Given that Bush in 2002 overwhelmingly focused on terrorism and homeland security, speech watchers will place more weight on these issues when contructing theirt overll approval evals. Bush primed his audience to evaluate him based on terrorism/homeland security criteria. (Druckman & Holmes 2004, 762).
RESULTS:
The results support our expectations about both issue and image priming. The non-watchers based their overall approval evals on teir issue-specific approval evals of the war in Afgahnistan, the economy, and education, but not terrorism. The image variables and demographics had no effect…In contrast, the watchers based their overall approval opinions on their issue-specific evals of terrorisms and the economy, but not the war or education. This is consistent with the issue piming hypothesis—watching the address led to a significantly greater reliance on terrorism (i.e. the issue most emphasized in the address)…We find that the terrorism coefficient is indeed significantly greater for the watrchers than for the non-watchers. The speech also primed watchers awa froma reliance on the war and education as evaluative croteria; this is not surpormisng, given the lack of attention these issues received” (767).
“Regardless of the impact on overall approval, successfully altering evaluative criteria has substantial implications for what the public expects of the president, how the public holds his accountable, what policies the president addresses, and the presidents role in each of these domains (see Jamieson 2000, 17). In short, presidential rhetoric can play an important role in affecting presidential approval…” (768).
Knowledge results:
These results imply that the speech primed leadership perceptions only for low-knowledge participants, that it primed terrorism approval only for high-knowledlge participants, and that it primed away from war approval only for high-knowledge participants, This is an intruiging result—it suggests that issue priming works o the most knowledgeable, but image priming works on the least knowledgeable…The image priming results suggests that, as mentioned, in contrast to issues, political knowledge may not be necessary for infividuals to connect their image perceptions with the broader picture of presidential approval (see also Miller & Krosnick 2000)” (770).
“In this article we examine the direct impact of presidential rhetoric on approval…We show that the president can have a substantial effect on his own approval by priming the criteria on which citizens base their approval evaluations” (755). [Controlling the message].
The media primes its audience, yes. But so do presidents!
Presidents can use rhetoric to shape their own approval. (TROUBLESOME).
By “priming” their audience (presenting the issues by which one will use as evaluative criteria), presidents are able to determine the criteria by which they will be judge. For example if Bush wants to detract attention from the Kyoto Protocol, he can focus on the economy. “Priming occurs when an individual changes the criteria on which he or she bases an overall evaluation, whereas persuasion involves altering what an individual thinks of the president on a given dimension (e.g., does the president do a good job or a poor jo on defense policy?) Priming does not involve changing perceptions of how well the presidenti is doing on an issue—it simply alters the issues on which individuals base their overall evaluations” (757).
“Our focus on priming follows a growing literature that shos how presidents strategically emphasize advantageous issues with the hope of making those issues salient un the mindes of votesr (e.g. Jacobs & Shapiro 1994; Druckman et al. 2004). The president many also influence his approval by persuading voters that they should support his policies, or by convincing them that he is performing well on specific issues…” (757).
Druckman et al (2004) suggests that the success of priming depends on the particular context [the war in Iraq-ideological plugs of patriotism!!], source, and audience.
Source credibility matters (Miller & Krosnick 2000; Druckman 2001). [thus the president’s approval???]
In terms of audience variables, political knowledge matters. [need a place to put it thus need SOME political knowledge—MB]. “Recall that McGraw & Ling (2003) argue with a relativel new issue, more knowledgable people will be more susceptible to priming. Thisis the case because “the more knowledge one has about politics, the more quickly and easily one can make sense of…[a new issue] and the more efficiuently one can srore it in…and retrieve it from, an elabotatie and organized mental filing system” (Krosnick & Brannon 1993, 966; Miller & Krosnick 2000).
Whether or not the issue is personally relevant also matters (Iyengar 1991; Miller & Krosnick 1996, 82).
This role of image is important (Druckman & Holmes 2004, 759; Erich et al. 2001)
METHODS:
Data: use of the State of the Union addresses to study how presidents set the agenda. (following Cohen 1995).
Expected findings: Given that Bush in 2002 overwhelmingly focused on terrorism and homeland security, speech watchers will place more weight on these issues when contructing theirt overll approval evals. Bush primed his audience to evaluate him based on terrorism/homeland security criteria. (Druckman & Holmes 2004, 762).
RESULTS:
The results support our expectations about both issue and image priming. The non-watchers based their overall approval evals on teir issue-specific approval evals of the war in Afgahnistan, the economy, and education, but not terrorism. The image variables and demographics had no effect…In contrast, the watchers based their overall approval opinions on their issue-specific evals of terrorisms and the economy, but not the war or education. This is consistent with the issue piming hypothesis—watching the address led to a significantly greater reliance on terrorism (i.e. the issue most emphasized in the address)…We find that the terrorism coefficient is indeed significantly greater for the watrchers than for the non-watchers. The speech also primed watchers awa froma reliance on the war and education as evaluative croteria; this is not surpormisng, given the lack of attention these issues received” (767).
“Regardless of the impact on overall approval, successfully altering evaluative criteria has substantial implications for what the public expects of the president, how the public holds his accountable, what policies the president addresses, and the presidents role in each of these domains (see Jamieson 2000, 17). In short, presidential rhetoric can play an important role in affecting presidential approval…” (768).
Knowledge results:
These results imply that the speech primed leadership perceptions only for low-knowledge participants, that it primed terrorism approval only for high-knowledlge participants, and that it primed away from war approval only for high-knowledge participants, This is an intruiging result—it suggests that issue priming works o the most knowledgeable, but image priming works on the least knowledgeable…The image priming results suggests that, as mentioned, in contrast to issues, political knowledge may not be necessary for infividuals to connect their image perceptions with the broader picture of presidential approval (see also Miller & Krosnick 2000)” (770).
Nelson (2004). “Policy Goals, Public Rhetoric and Political Attitudes,” Journal of Politics, 66(2). 581-605.
Identification: Nelson, T. (2004). “Policy Goals, Public Rhetoric and Political Attitudes,” Journal of Politics, 66(2). 581-605.
Independent variables: In the laboratory experiment perspectives on three controversial policy matters were manipulated in the form of a newspaper article. Adoption law, affirmative actions and school voucher text was manipulated to represent either a “pro” frame or a “con” frame.
In the survey-based experiment manipulation took the form of changed question wording addressing doctor assisted suicide and school vouchers.
Dependent variables: There were three dependent variables: 1.) Policy opinions, 2.) Personal goal priorities and 3.) (objective) beliefs about the consequences of policy change.
Theories, rationales, and predictions: Nelson expected positive and negative frames to have a corresponding impact on participants’ “sense of the relative importance of competing policy goals” as well as participants’ policy opinions (591), and that the differences in policy opinions are explained by differences in goal priorities (586); Nelson did not expect the frames to have an impact on the participants’ beliefs about the consequences of policy change.
Subjects: Laboratory subjects were college undergraduates. The total number included in each of the experiments varied for each policy topic. There were around 20-60 participants for each condition.
Survey-based experiment subjects were residents of Ohio, contacted via telephone; over 800 people responded. Demographic details about those interviewed over the telephone are available upon request, by the author.
Procedure: two procedures were executed by the author: 1.) a laboratory experiment which “created stimuli that mimicked three types of framing rhetoric”, to examine if frames that target POLICY GOALS influence POLITICAL OPINIONS)
…and 2.) a survey-based experiment to test whether the framing effect found in the laboratory was replicable and could be “generalized beyond the sample, setting and issues of the laboratory studies” (596).
For each experiment participants were asked for their opinion about a policy issue that embodied a conflict between two meaningful socio-political goals or values. All participants were randomly assigned to either a “pro” frame or a “con” frame for each issue; both frames presented the same basic factual information about the issue. After reading the “pro” frame article or the “con” framed article which manipulated policy priorities in the form of persuasive argument using one of the three kinds of framing rhetoric (see Key Terms below), participants reported: 1.) their issue priorities 2.) their opinions on the issue and 3.) their beliefs about the consequences of a policy change (the three dependent variables).
Major results: A difference of means test found that frames do, indeed, affect participants’ sense of issue priorities which in turn influence their policy opinions.
Discussion: Whereas other approaches portray citizens as cognitive misers who do not think deeply about particular issues, especially in the realm of politics, this study anticipates that participants are aware on the conflicting values implicit in the policy topics. Yet even when existing beliefs are present, opinions can be shifted by means of policy/goal prioritizing. Thus the significance of this study is to introduce avenues for goal manipulation when conflicting opinions are already available, accessible and applicable; these avenues are GOAL RANKING, ISSUE CATEGORIZATION AND LABELING, AND INSTITUTIONAL ROLE ASSIGNMENT.
Question to consider: How do Nelson’s findings contribute to the discussion of media effects models, i.e. the minimal effects model, the not-so-minimal effects model?
Key Terms:
Framing: alternative descriptions or interpretations of the same information, problem or solution.
Three types of framing rhetoric: 1.) GOAL RANKING: trivializing the goal represented by the opponent.2.) ISSUE CATEGORIZATION AND LABELING: refute applicability of the categorization of the opposing information, “thereby denying the relevance of a rival goal or value” (585). 3.) INSTITUTIONAL ROLE ASSIGNMENT: arguing a goal or value is the responsibility of a particular institution and that goal or value should take precedence over any rivaling goals or values when determining the institutions policies.
Independent variables: In the laboratory experiment perspectives on three controversial policy matters were manipulated in the form of a newspaper article. Adoption law, affirmative actions and school voucher text was manipulated to represent either a “pro” frame or a “con” frame.
In the survey-based experiment manipulation took the form of changed question wording addressing doctor assisted suicide and school vouchers.
Dependent variables: There were three dependent variables: 1.) Policy opinions, 2.) Personal goal priorities and 3.) (objective) beliefs about the consequences of policy change.
Theories, rationales, and predictions: Nelson expected positive and negative frames to have a corresponding impact on participants’ “sense of the relative importance of competing policy goals” as well as participants’ policy opinions (591), and that the differences in policy opinions are explained by differences in goal priorities (586); Nelson did not expect the frames to have an impact on the participants’ beliefs about the consequences of policy change.
Subjects: Laboratory subjects were college undergraduates. The total number included in each of the experiments varied for each policy topic. There were around 20-60 participants for each condition.
Survey-based experiment subjects were residents of Ohio, contacted via telephone; over 800 people responded. Demographic details about those interviewed over the telephone are available upon request, by the author.
Procedure: two procedures were executed by the author: 1.) a laboratory experiment which “created stimuli that mimicked three types of framing rhetoric”, to examine if frames that target POLICY GOALS influence POLITICAL OPINIONS)
…and 2.) a survey-based experiment to test whether the framing effect found in the laboratory was replicable and could be “generalized beyond the sample, setting and issues of the laboratory studies” (596).
For each experiment participants were asked for their opinion about a policy issue that embodied a conflict between two meaningful socio-political goals or values. All participants were randomly assigned to either a “pro” frame or a “con” frame for each issue; both frames presented the same basic factual information about the issue. After reading the “pro” frame article or the “con” framed article which manipulated policy priorities in the form of persuasive argument using one of the three kinds of framing rhetoric (see Key Terms below), participants reported: 1.) their issue priorities 2.) their opinions on the issue and 3.) their beliefs about the consequences of a policy change (the three dependent variables).
Major results: A difference of means test found that frames do, indeed, affect participants’ sense of issue priorities which in turn influence their policy opinions.
Discussion: Whereas other approaches portray citizens as cognitive misers who do not think deeply about particular issues, especially in the realm of politics, this study anticipates that participants are aware on the conflicting values implicit in the policy topics. Yet even when existing beliefs are present, opinions can be shifted by means of policy/goal prioritizing. Thus the significance of this study is to introduce avenues for goal manipulation when conflicting opinions are already available, accessible and applicable; these avenues are GOAL RANKING, ISSUE CATEGORIZATION AND LABELING, AND INSTITUTIONAL ROLE ASSIGNMENT.
Question to consider: How do Nelson’s findings contribute to the discussion of media effects models, i.e. the minimal effects model, the not-so-minimal effects model?
Key Terms:
Framing: alternative descriptions or interpretations of the same information, problem or solution.
Three types of framing rhetoric: 1.) GOAL RANKING: trivializing the goal represented by the opponent.2.) ISSUE CATEGORIZATION AND LABELING: refute applicability of the categorization of the opposing information, “thereby denying the relevance of a rival goal or value” (585). 3.) INSTITUTIONAL ROLE ASSIGNMENT: arguing a goal or value is the responsibility of a particular institution and that goal or value should take precedence over any rivaling goals or values when determining the institutions policies.
Druckman (2004) Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation,
sarah's notes:
How contextual forces (elite competition and deliberation) and individual attributes affect success of framing. When do rationality assumptions apply?
(equivalency) Framing: “different but logically equivalent phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences.” Ie positive or negative framing of an issue. Not in reference to issue framing where issues are framed in the context of different values, these are not logically equivalent.
Rat choice: people have preferences that are used to base decisions on
-violated with equivalency framing effects, but not issue framing effects
framing manipulates the salience of diff. aspects of the information (gains versus losses) and triggers diff mental associations (good v. bad)
-with internal deliberation of possible alternate frames, the effect is washed out.
-competing frames reduce the effect of each singularly
H1: people exposed to counter-framing will be less susceptible to framing effects
H2: people who participate in a heterogeneous (w/people with different frames) discussion will be less susceptible to framing effects than those without conversation (no prediction about homogeneous conversation)
H3: “experts” less susceptible than “non-experts”
-expert defined as a combination of need for cognition and training
method
experiment: random assignment to 8 groups on two dimensions (see table 1 for more details)
1. positive or negative framing
2. context: control, counterframing, heterogeneous discussion, homogeneous discussion
Results
Frames (without taking account of conditions) had a significant effect on preference.
Context variables had a significant moderating effect of framing
Control had significant framing effects
Counterframe groups (given both positive and negative frames, altering which came first) had no effect of framing
Group conditions reduced, but did not eliminate framing effect. Heterogeneous discussion reduced effect more
Individual variables had no effect (expert or student/not student)
In homogeneous discussion groups, non-experts more affected by framing—effect of expertise depends on context
Confidence: those who express preference in the direction of the frame did so with greater confidence (evidence for incoherent preferences). Homogeneous discussion increases this confidence. – overconfidence bias of framing
Conclusion: more research needs to focus on context. Previous research that does not take context into account should be questioned for problems of external validity and generalizability.
My notes:
Framing effects: your preferences are changed by the “frame.” This is why we are concerned about the media’s role; how much power do they have?
After deliberation, people are less effected by the frames. W00t.
Hetero discussion—most change.
Homo discussion—still change from condition form when there was no discussion.
No discussion-least amount of change.
Counter-frame: CNN and Fox
What happens when you are exposed to both frames? i.e. CNN and Fox. Decrease framing effects. And you end up with “authentic” opinion, which is consistent with your values (liberalism/conservatism).
Neutrality = no counter-frame. What happens here?
How contextual forces (elite competition and deliberation) and individual attributes affect success of framing. When do rationality assumptions apply?
(equivalency) Framing: “different but logically equivalent phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences.” Ie positive or negative framing of an issue. Not in reference to issue framing where issues are framed in the context of different values, these are not logically equivalent.
Rat choice: people have preferences that are used to base decisions on
-violated with equivalency framing effects, but not issue framing effects
framing manipulates the salience of diff. aspects of the information (gains versus losses) and triggers diff mental associations (good v. bad)
-with internal deliberation of possible alternate frames, the effect is washed out.
-competing frames reduce the effect of each singularly
H1: people exposed to counter-framing will be less susceptible to framing effects
H2: people who participate in a heterogeneous (w/people with different frames) discussion will be less susceptible to framing effects than those without conversation (no prediction about homogeneous conversation)
H3: “experts” less susceptible than “non-experts”
-expert defined as a combination of need for cognition and training
method
experiment: random assignment to 8 groups on two dimensions (see table 1 for more details)
1. positive or negative framing
2. context: control, counterframing, heterogeneous discussion, homogeneous discussion
Results
Frames (without taking account of conditions) had a significant effect on preference.
Context variables had a significant moderating effect of framing
Control had significant framing effects
Counterframe groups (given both positive and negative frames, altering which came first) had no effect of framing
Group conditions reduced, but did not eliminate framing effect. Heterogeneous discussion reduced effect more
Individual variables had no effect (expert or student/not student)
In homogeneous discussion groups, non-experts more affected by framing—effect of expertise depends on context
Confidence: those who express preference in the direction of the frame did so with greater confidence (evidence for incoherent preferences). Homogeneous discussion increases this confidence. – overconfidence bias of framing
Conclusion: more research needs to focus on context. Previous research that does not take context into account should be questioned for problems of external validity and generalizability.
My notes:
Framing effects: your preferences are changed by the “frame.” This is why we are concerned about the media’s role; how much power do they have?
After deliberation, people are less effected by the frames. W00t.
Hetero discussion—most change.
Homo discussion—still change from condition form when there was no discussion.
No discussion-least amount of change.
Counter-frame: CNN and Fox
What happens when you are exposed to both frames? i.e. CNN and Fox. Decrease framing effects. And you end up with “authentic” opinion, which is consistent with your values (liberalism/conservatism).
Neutrality = no counter-frame. What happens here?
Jacoby (2000) Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending
Effect of issue framing on opinion of government spending. Different frames evoke different influences on attitudes.
Republican and democrat appeals about spending differ in level of specificity (rep.s more broad, restrictive view vs. dem.s specific appeals for certain important programs.) relative framing changes opinion of issue
Issue framing as a political tool: framing effects are used to shift support in the favor of the one putting out the frame “one of the most important “tools” political elites have at their disposal”
General issue frames: general statements about issue areas “government should protect the environment” focus on feeling toward the government, which is more negative, leading to negative opinions of the statements
Specific issue frame: gives specific targets for policy, beneficiaries and costs of policy “government should protect environment to reduce pollution and protect people threatened by toxic waste dumps.” Emphasis on who benefits (the needy or me) leading to positive opinion of issue
1992 election: Bush used general frame for (reduced) govt. spending, Clinton used specific framing for increases
-issue is central to politics, ideological positions,
Data/Methods
Based on 1992 NES survey questions
-continuum of general cut spending vs. increase spending
-additive scale of seven questions about various welfare spending programs (specific framing, mentioning group that benefits)
responses to the two types of framing are highly correlated, evidence that they are about the same issue.
Results
Distribution of responses
- for general spending is unimodal and symmetrical.
- for specific spending is unimodal but skewed toward greater spending
-greater average support for specific spending
-reactions to general questions reflect feelings about government, specific frames reflect feelings about subject of spending
-individual and aggregate level effects of framing
Part 2 Individual level correlates to spending opinions
IVs:
a. Thermometer feeling about government, evaluation of the economy,
b. Feelings about recipients: symbolic racism, feelings about welfare and toward the poor,
c. demos: income, race, gender, age, employment status
d. party id, liberal-conservative rating
DV: reaction to general and specific spending questions
Results
IVs in sections a and b (feelings about government and recipients) had predicted effects on attitudes about spending.
Democrats favored increased spending in both cases- ideology mediates framing effects
People are reacting in ways consistent with the feelings that are evoked with different frames. People act in ways that support their general feelings about the government when that is the only cue, but use other cues also when given the prompting to do so. Issue framing effects are actually not inconsistent, irrational.
Framing can be used by elites that can control the frame to convince people to support their preferred side of an issue. Framing, nonetheless, is inevitable.
Republican and democrat appeals about spending differ in level of specificity (rep.s more broad, restrictive view vs. dem.s specific appeals for certain important programs.) relative framing changes opinion of issue
Issue framing as a political tool: framing effects are used to shift support in the favor of the one putting out the frame “one of the most important “tools” political elites have at their disposal”
General issue frames: general statements about issue areas “government should protect the environment” focus on feeling toward the government, which is more negative, leading to negative opinions of the statements
Specific issue frame: gives specific targets for policy, beneficiaries and costs of policy “government should protect environment to reduce pollution and protect people threatened by toxic waste dumps.” Emphasis on who benefits (the needy or me) leading to positive opinion of issue
1992 election: Bush used general frame for (reduced) govt. spending, Clinton used specific framing for increases
-issue is central to politics, ideological positions,
Data/Methods
Based on 1992 NES survey questions
-continuum of general cut spending vs. increase spending
-additive scale of seven questions about various welfare spending programs (specific framing, mentioning group that benefits)
responses to the two types of framing are highly correlated, evidence that they are about the same issue.
Results
Distribution of responses
- for general spending is unimodal and symmetrical.
- for specific spending is unimodal but skewed toward greater spending
-greater average support for specific spending
-reactions to general questions reflect feelings about government, specific frames reflect feelings about subject of spending
-individual and aggregate level effects of framing
Part 2 Individual level correlates to spending opinions
IVs:
a. Thermometer feeling about government, evaluation of the economy,
b. Feelings about recipients: symbolic racism, feelings about welfare and toward the poor,
c. demos: income, race, gender, age, employment status
d. party id, liberal-conservative rating
DV: reaction to general and specific spending questions
Results
IVs in sections a and b (feelings about government and recipients) had predicted effects on attitudes about spending.
Democrats favored increased spending in both cases- ideology mediates framing effects
People are reacting in ways consistent with the feelings that are evoked with different frames. People act in ways that support their general feelings about the government when that is the only cue, but use other cues also when given the prompting to do so. Issue framing effects are actually not inconsistent, irrational.
Framing can be used by elites that can control the frame to convince people to support their preferred side of an issue. Framing, nonetheless, is inevitable.
Tuesday, January 1, 2008
Althaus, S.L. (2003) Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics.
Althaus (2003) Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics
This book examines the quality of political representation provided by surveys; thus conceptualizing public opinion research in the “classic tradition” (Lazarsfeld 1957), using empirical methods to pursue and refine the foundational questions about popular sovereignty raised by political theorists. “It does so through a statistically analysis of representation in surveys where quality is analyzed from the standpoint of two foundational concepts in democratic theory: the degree to which surveys regard and promote the political equality of all individuals in a population and the likelihood that surveys represent the political interests of all individuals in a population” (9).
Introduction
What is public opinion? In what form ought it be recognized?
What is its nature? What characteristics should it possess?
What kind of political power does it have? What kind of power should it be given?
These should/ought questions are more normative, than empirical, but still very important to ask.
Opinion surveys:
Relevant? Since the 1930s there has been a growing acceptance to use polls as proxy for peoples’ voice. Sample surveys allow scholars to look beyond one’s vote as a signal of needs and wants—its more a more expansive and comprehensive measure of preferences than a vote.
Advocates: Useful for mass democracies because they can reveal what the people are thinking (Verba 1996) (2). Page & Shapiro (1992) and Converse (1990) also find surveys to be laudable, and “conclude that the traditional understanding of public opinion as volatile and capricious is incorrect” (2). –this idea of a RATIONAL public. Also supported by Jacobs & Shapiro (2000). Yet these authors are all empiricists. (not all empiricists applaud polling results; many recognize that what individuals say in polls is shallow, vacillating, illogical, and coarse) (7). In contrast to these scholars, few political philosophers would aver that polling/samples offer a justification for democratic rule. Scholars are suspicious of aggregate preference to reveal the common good (Arendt 1958; Barber 1984; Habermas 1989, 1996).
Polling criticisms:
sampling error
question wording
draw attention away from “real” concerns (Ginsberg 1986)
construe a fictitious public mind (Bourdieu 1979)
Thus we still have to call into question “whether opinion surveys can tell us reliably what the people really want” (3).
This book calls into question two (2) major concerns:
(1) Do citizens have enough knowledge about the political world to regularly formulate policy preference that are consistent with their needs, wants, and values?
(2) Is the quality of political representation provided by opinion surveys adequate for the uses to which they are put in democratic politics?
Overall, political knowledge among citizens is low and thus not to be trusted (Almond 1950; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Patterson 1980).
I. But some scholars contend that aggregation of the informed and uninformed balance each other out (Converse 1990; Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 1992; Miller 1996; Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). “When aggregated, the argument goes, the more or less random responses from ill-informed or unopinionated respondents should tend to cancel each other out” (12). Page and Shapiro say that informed opinions persist because uninformed opinion cancel out (why would they err in the same direction?)
Althaus argues there is NOT a balance/canceling out. Uninformed people do not give randomly balanced responses. They are influenced by the information environment… the uninformed are making the decisions, because the INFORMED are canceling one another out. And that uniformed opinions drive the collective choice. Althaus says the uninformed GROUP on the same answers (framing effects). Informed people group around the poles, and thus cancel each other out. The uninformed choose the middle, the more accessible frame, and… etc. etc. especially try in a 2 party system. Especially true in surveys that give a 7 point scale (uniformed choose 3—the middle).
** (informed, canceled out)
XXXXXXXXXXX (uniformed, mean)
** (informed, canceled out)
II. Others argue citizens—though low on political ken —use heuristic shortcuts “interpretive schema or cues from political elites” (13)—in place of factual knowledge (Popkin 1991, 1993; Kuklinski & Quirk 2000; Iyengar 1990).
But, Althaus finds both to lack adequate empirical support (14) and states: “both revisionist perspectives tend to overlook an important fact: low information levels are only half the problem. Just as important is the observation that some kinds of people tend to be better informed than others” (14).
What other way could we measure the “skewed noise.”
Political Knowledge:
Low levels and uneven social distribution of political knowledge affect the quality of representation afforded by collective preferences. Much of the variation in knowledge levels is due to individual differences in (1) motivation, (2) ability and (3) opportunity.
(1) Motivation: influenced by a person’s interest in politics, civic duty, and anxiety about the future (I would also argue social acceptance, given one’s social circle—in some, albeit small, pockets, its cool to know this stuff).
(2) Ability: influenced by education. It is the ability to process the info.
(3) Opportunity: mobilization efforts; exposure to media markets, thus geographical component here, as well.
Who are the politically savvy? They share characteristics (other than information advantages)
- groups with distinctive and competitive interests
- white, middle class, male, middle-aged, married
- college grads
- affluent
Consequences?
(1) people who are knowledgeable tend to give opinions more often
(2) people who are well informed are better able to form opinions consistent with political predispositions (Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996).
Consequences of the consequences?
Information effects: “a bias in the shape of collective opinion caused by the low levels and uneven social distribution of political knowledge in a population.”
Collective opinion: any aggregation of individual preferences.
Bias: a distortion away from what collective opinion might look like if all relevant groups in a population were equally and optimally well informed about politics.
Thus majority opinions are driven by a SMALL NUMBER of respondents who have an intense and unified view. People from higher SES groups tend to dominate the public opinion channels—contacting officials, volunteering for campaigns, contributing money.
Thus, conventional wisdom might lead one to recognize that the special value of a sample survey is that it is more representative. Yet Althus argues it may not be as representative as commonly thought, and we need to reconsider how we use opinion surveys in the political process.
Chapter 2
Putting the power of aggregation to the test; an assessment of the information-pooling properties of collective opinion (aggregation and Philip Converse).
Althus argues that collective rationality models (Converse 1990; Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 1992; Miller 1996; Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996) suffer from several conceptual problems; using a computer simulation of 28,000 opinion distributions, Althus finds…
Chapter 3
Examines whether the opinions expressed in sample surveys possess the critical characteristics necessary for collective rationality to work.
Less-informed are more likely to respond “don’t know” or “no opinion.” This hints at a political knowledge issue, which I cover in detail, above. But indeed, opinions expressed in sample surveys are not expressive of the collective rationality—overresponse rate by well-informed; ill-informed are all like-minded in responses (whether purposively or not).
Chapter 4
Tests the impact of information effects (see definition above) on collective preferences.
Data: 1988, 1992, 1996 ANES survey.
Model: what collective prefs might look like if all respondents were as well informed about politics as most knowledgeable ones.
The model shows what Althus predicts in chapter 3—the mass public’s low levels of pol info cause surveys to misrepresent views. Other findings: collective opinions appear more progressive on some issues and more conservative on others than they would if fully informed; “After controlling for info effects, collective opinion tends to become less approving of presidents and Congress, more dovish and interventionist on foreign policy, less conservative of social, enviro, and equal rights issues, and more conservative on morality issues and questions about the proper limits of gov activity.”
Chapter 5
This chapter looks at when and why information effects are highest.
When questions are more cognitively demanding there are greater disparities in informed responses between the well and ill-informed. Differences also arise from the social and psychological factors that “influence how people establish and update their political prefs.”
Chapter 6
This chapter assesses information effects, over time (time series data from 1980-1998). Findings: “information effects tend to grow smaller when the political environment motivates citizens to process information systematically, although many of these changes turn out to be short-lived.”
This chapter also talks about the “simulated measures of fully informed opinion.” I am still confused as to how they “simulate” such a measure, but when it is done it is accurate in predicting collective policy prefs. But the author does note that although statistical simulations are spot-on they don’t represent the latent interests of the population (is this bc the latent interests are not expressed? Im still a bit confused, and REALLY am not motivated to answer my own question. Although im confuse, I am not interested )
Chapter 7
This chapter looks at how information effects complicate the use of opinion surveys in political decision making. Ive already touched upon many of the problems (misrep, overrep etc). This chapter addresses these problems in more depth, but also suggests two conditions that would help overcome representation issues (information effects):
(1) ensure the sample has the same demographic characteristics of the population they are suppose to represent.
(2) When the number of well-informed give the same number of mixed opinions as the less informed
But concludes “the absence of info effects should not be taken as a sign of enlightened prefs. Instead, the absence of info effects confirms only that a collective pref provides good info about what the people want, rightly or wrongly.”
Chapter 8
Information effects can influence the usefulness of survey results; surveys can be problematic, but also have potential. If the suggestions in chapter 7 are met then public opinion surveys have a place in directing democratic politics.
Conclusion:
The primary culprit is not any inherent shortcoming in the methods of survey research. Rather, it is the limited degree of knowledge held by ordinary citizens about public affairs and the tendency for some kinds of people to be better informed than others” (10).
Class notes:
Collective choice with more information doesn’t change at the aggregate.
General knowledge vs. specific issue
ISSUE KNOWLEDGE inconsistent with schematic network?
Aggregation on a particular point (i.e. blacks and affirmative action) even though in general, might be characterized as uninformed. Thus familiarity with an issue makes a BIG difference. The question being asked matters.
When people are not “activated” they can still make the policy decision? (not if public opinion doesn’t drive policy!).
Even without an authentic opinion, you can drive a policy.
Dispersion v. Consistency of opinions
Convergence hypothesis:
Althaus finds that it holds
If this is the case then info effects in the collective… there is not a converging in the middle. Increasing information effects. More people are not settled in the middle, but off to the sides, creating a divergence in expectation and what results.
Depletion hypothesis: information effect (the difference between opinion that you get at time one from simulated opinion—fully informed). people who give the DK answers have less knowledge, but demographically the same (151). The DKs are female; men guess (Luskin).
Not much of an impact. (is it because white men v. women is trying to explain the difference?)
If its not the depletion effect, what is it?
(1) Survey method (framing—is the way we are asking the question forcing people to answer questions a way in which they otherwise would not).
(2) 2
(3) social distribution of policy specific knowledge. Are you able to tap into policy specific ken instead of general?
(4) Relative salience of political ken; do we see that the info effects decreases in presidential elections because the information matters (socially/self-monitoring).
The purpose of these test and setting up infor effects:
Are we using polls to set up policy? Is policy not reflecting the people bc of information effects? If yes, we need to improve surveys; limit the availability of a middle answer, framing, etc. By knowing the general ways frames etc. influence info effects we can distinguish between good surveys and bad surveys (straw polls). Concludes: surveys are problematic. Duh.
Take home effects:
Value issues more vulnerable to change? Value issues that we thinking we know, and we more info we change them! Collective value opinion is more vulnerable to change than policy info; policy info is actually more authentic. (127)
THERE ARE INFORMATION EFFECTS—there are consistent differences. And they are LARGE. (1/5 TO 1/3 of collective prefs will change with more information. Milner links to institutions.
This book examines the quality of political representation provided by surveys; thus conceptualizing public opinion research in the “classic tradition” (Lazarsfeld 1957), using empirical methods to pursue and refine the foundational questions about popular sovereignty raised by political theorists. “It does so through a statistically analysis of representation in surveys where quality is analyzed from the standpoint of two foundational concepts in democratic theory: the degree to which surveys regard and promote the political equality of all individuals in a population and the likelihood that surveys represent the political interests of all individuals in a population” (9).
Introduction
What is public opinion? In what form ought it be recognized?
What is its nature? What characteristics should it possess?
What kind of political power does it have? What kind of power should it be given?
These should/ought questions are more normative, than empirical, but still very important to ask.
Opinion surveys:
Relevant? Since the 1930s there has been a growing acceptance to use polls as proxy for peoples’ voice. Sample surveys allow scholars to look beyond one’s vote as a signal of needs and wants—its more a more expansive and comprehensive measure of preferences than a vote.
Advocates: Useful for mass democracies because they can reveal what the people are thinking (Verba 1996) (2). Page & Shapiro (1992) and Converse (1990) also find surveys to be laudable, and “conclude that the traditional understanding of public opinion as volatile and capricious is incorrect” (2). –this idea of a RATIONAL public. Also supported by Jacobs & Shapiro (2000). Yet these authors are all empiricists. (not all empiricists applaud polling results; many recognize that what individuals say in polls is shallow, vacillating, illogical, and coarse) (7). In contrast to these scholars, few political philosophers would aver that polling/samples offer a justification for democratic rule. Scholars are suspicious of aggregate preference to reveal the common good (Arendt 1958; Barber 1984; Habermas 1989, 1996).
Polling criticisms:
sampling error
question wording
draw attention away from “real” concerns (Ginsberg 1986)
construe a fictitious public mind (Bourdieu 1979)
Thus we still have to call into question “whether opinion surveys can tell us reliably what the people really want” (3).
This book calls into question two (2) major concerns:
(1) Do citizens have enough knowledge about the political world to regularly formulate policy preference that are consistent with their needs, wants, and values?
(2) Is the quality of political representation provided by opinion surveys adequate for the uses to which they are put in democratic politics?
Overall, political knowledge among citizens is low and thus not to be trusted (Almond 1950; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Patterson 1980).
I. But some scholars contend that aggregation of the informed and uninformed balance each other out (Converse 1990; Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 1992; Miller 1996; Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). “When aggregated, the argument goes, the more or less random responses from ill-informed or unopinionated respondents should tend to cancel each other out” (12). Page and Shapiro say that informed opinions persist because uninformed opinion cancel out (why would they err in the same direction?)
Althaus argues there is NOT a balance/canceling out. Uninformed people do not give randomly balanced responses. They are influenced by the information environment… the uninformed are making the decisions, because the INFORMED are canceling one another out. And that uniformed opinions drive the collective choice. Althaus says the uninformed GROUP on the same answers (framing effects). Informed people group around the poles, and thus cancel each other out. The uninformed choose the middle, the more accessible frame, and… etc. etc. especially try in a 2 party system. Especially true in surveys that give a 7 point scale (uniformed choose 3—the middle).
** (informed, canceled out)
XXXXXXXXXXX (uniformed, mean)
** (informed, canceled out)
II. Others argue citizens—though low on political ken —use heuristic shortcuts “interpretive schema or cues from political elites” (13)—in place of factual knowledge (Popkin 1991, 1993; Kuklinski & Quirk 2000; Iyengar 1990).
But, Althaus finds both to lack adequate empirical support (14) and states: “both revisionist perspectives tend to overlook an important fact: low information levels are only half the problem. Just as important is the observation that some kinds of people tend to be better informed than others” (14).
What other way could we measure the “skewed noise.”
Political Knowledge:
Low levels and uneven social distribution of political knowledge affect the quality of representation afforded by collective preferences. Much of the variation in knowledge levels is due to individual differences in (1) motivation, (2) ability and (3) opportunity.
(1) Motivation: influenced by a person’s interest in politics, civic duty, and anxiety about the future (I would also argue social acceptance, given one’s social circle—in some, albeit small, pockets, its cool to know this stuff).
(2) Ability: influenced by education. It is the ability to process the info.
(3) Opportunity: mobilization efforts; exposure to media markets, thus geographical component here, as well.
Who are the politically savvy? They share characteristics (other than information advantages)
- groups with distinctive and competitive interests
- white, middle class, male, middle-aged, married
- college grads
- affluent
Consequences?
(1) people who are knowledgeable tend to give opinions more often
(2) people who are well informed are better able to form opinions consistent with political predispositions (Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996).
Consequences of the consequences?
Information effects: “a bias in the shape of collective opinion caused by the low levels and uneven social distribution of political knowledge in a population.”
Collective opinion: any aggregation of individual preferences.
Bias: a distortion away from what collective opinion might look like if all relevant groups in a population were equally and optimally well informed about politics.
Thus majority opinions are driven by a SMALL NUMBER of respondents who have an intense and unified view. People from higher SES groups tend to dominate the public opinion channels—contacting officials, volunteering for campaigns, contributing money.
Thus, conventional wisdom might lead one to recognize that the special value of a sample survey is that it is more representative. Yet Althus argues it may not be as representative as commonly thought, and we need to reconsider how we use opinion surveys in the political process.
Chapter 2
Putting the power of aggregation to the test; an assessment of the information-pooling properties of collective opinion (aggregation and Philip Converse).
Althus argues that collective rationality models (Converse 1990; Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 1992; Miller 1996; Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996) suffer from several conceptual problems; using a computer simulation of 28,000 opinion distributions, Althus finds…
Chapter 3
Examines whether the opinions expressed in sample surveys possess the critical characteristics necessary for collective rationality to work.
Less-informed are more likely to respond “don’t know” or “no opinion.” This hints at a political knowledge issue, which I cover in detail, above. But indeed, opinions expressed in sample surveys are not expressive of the collective rationality—overresponse rate by well-informed; ill-informed are all like-minded in responses (whether purposively or not).
Chapter 4
Tests the impact of information effects (see definition above) on collective preferences.
Data: 1988, 1992, 1996 ANES survey.
Model: what collective prefs might look like if all respondents were as well informed about politics as most knowledgeable ones.
The model shows what Althus predicts in chapter 3—the mass public’s low levels of pol info cause surveys to misrepresent views. Other findings: collective opinions appear more progressive on some issues and more conservative on others than they would if fully informed; “After controlling for info effects, collective opinion tends to become less approving of presidents and Congress, more dovish and interventionist on foreign policy, less conservative of social, enviro, and equal rights issues, and more conservative on morality issues and questions about the proper limits of gov activity.”
Chapter 5
This chapter looks at when and why information effects are highest.
When questions are more cognitively demanding there are greater disparities in informed responses between the well and ill-informed. Differences also arise from the social and psychological factors that “influence how people establish and update their political prefs.”
Chapter 6
This chapter assesses information effects, over time (time series data from 1980-1998). Findings: “information effects tend to grow smaller when the political environment motivates citizens to process information systematically, although many of these changes turn out to be short-lived.”
This chapter also talks about the “simulated measures of fully informed opinion.” I am still confused as to how they “simulate” such a measure, but when it is done it is accurate in predicting collective policy prefs. But the author does note that although statistical simulations are spot-on they don’t represent the latent interests of the population (is this bc the latent interests are not expressed? Im still a bit confused, and REALLY am not motivated to answer my own question. Although im confuse, I am not interested )
Chapter 7
This chapter looks at how information effects complicate the use of opinion surveys in political decision making. Ive already touched upon many of the problems (misrep, overrep etc). This chapter addresses these problems in more depth, but also suggests two conditions that would help overcome representation issues (information effects):
(1) ensure the sample has the same demographic characteristics of the population they are suppose to represent.
(2) When the number of well-informed give the same number of mixed opinions as the less informed
But concludes “the absence of info effects should not be taken as a sign of enlightened prefs. Instead, the absence of info effects confirms only that a collective pref provides good info about what the people want, rightly or wrongly.”
Chapter 8
Information effects can influence the usefulness of survey results; surveys can be problematic, but also have potential. If the suggestions in chapter 7 are met then public opinion surveys have a place in directing democratic politics.
Conclusion:
The primary culprit is not any inherent shortcoming in the methods of survey research. Rather, it is the limited degree of knowledge held by ordinary citizens about public affairs and the tendency for some kinds of people to be better informed than others” (10).
Class notes:
Collective choice with more information doesn’t change at the aggregate.
General knowledge vs. specific issue
ISSUE KNOWLEDGE inconsistent with schematic network?
Aggregation on a particular point (i.e. blacks and affirmative action) even though in general, might be characterized as uninformed. Thus familiarity with an issue makes a BIG difference. The question being asked matters.
When people are not “activated” they can still make the policy decision? (not if public opinion doesn’t drive policy!).
Even without an authentic opinion, you can drive a policy.
Dispersion v. Consistency of opinions
Convergence hypothesis:
Althaus finds that it holds
If this is the case then info effects in the collective… there is not a converging in the middle. Increasing information effects. More people are not settled in the middle, but off to the sides, creating a divergence in expectation and what results.
Depletion hypothesis: information effect (the difference between opinion that you get at time one from simulated opinion—fully informed). people who give the DK answers have less knowledge, but demographically the same (151). The DKs are female; men guess (Luskin).
Not much of an impact. (is it because white men v. women is trying to explain the difference?)
If its not the depletion effect, what is it?
(1) Survey method (framing—is the way we are asking the question forcing people to answer questions a way in which they otherwise would not).
(2) 2
(3) social distribution of policy specific knowledge. Are you able to tap into policy specific ken instead of general?
(4) Relative salience of political ken; do we see that the info effects decreases in presidential elections because the information matters (socially/self-monitoring).
The purpose of these test and setting up infor effects:
Are we using polls to set up policy? Is policy not reflecting the people bc of information effects? If yes, we need to improve surveys; limit the availability of a middle answer, framing, etc. By knowing the general ways frames etc. influence info effects we can distinguish between good surveys and bad surveys (straw polls). Concludes: surveys are problematic. Duh.
Take home effects:
Value issues more vulnerable to change? Value issues that we thinking we know, and we more info we change them! Collective value opinion is more vulnerable to change than policy info; policy info is actually more authentic. (127)
THERE ARE INFORMATION EFFECTS—there are consistent differences. And they are LARGE. (1/5 TO 1/3 of collective prefs will change with more information. Milner links to institutions.
Milner, H. (2002) Civic Literac
Why do PR systems have distributive income systems? Looks at as a function of Civic Literacy.
Theme: the causes and consequences of differences in political knowledge and what makes social-democratic welfare states sustainable
I. Civic Engagement and Social Capital develop skills that matter (Putnam says we get these from group associations; the no. leads to our S.C. stock).
Social Capital (as conceptualized by Putnam) measured as:
1. Trust (horizontal= interpersonal trust; vertical = trust in government)
2. associational density
definition of social capital: a public good; public trust, interpersonal and in government; community organization; voluntary associations.
Findings: Democratic institutions that equally distribute intellectial resources also more equally distribute material resources (high C.L. societies). AND Democratic institutions that more equally distribute intellectual resources attain higher levels of political parties.
Civic Engagement:
Organizational membership > ^trust in government > Civic engagement (voting)
II. Civic Literacy
Measured as:
1. willingness (the vote; @ the local level)
2. ability (knowledge-supply (media) and demand (people need)+ factual and cognitive)
- supply: “The nature and intensity of such efforts are seen to be a function of institutionalized incentives; in other words, political institutions matter when it comes to the accessibility and intelligibility of political information” (6).
III. Political ken
1. Individual Factors: education, age, income
2. Institutional Factors: electoral system; electoral system influences access, usefulness, and intelligibility.
IV. Sources of Civic Literacy
Measuring C.L.:
Civil: turning out to vote in local elections—more valid measure because they require more information; anyone can vote for a president. It takes more effort to vote in a local election.
Literacy: knowledge of U.N.
V. Political Parties and Political Institutions
-“The extent to which voters are informed on matters relevant to the decision to vote is in fact closely linked to the political institutions in which elections take place” (66).
Political Institutions > Political Ken > Political Participation
Electoral systems and Turnout
PR 71%
Maj 50%
VI. Political Institutions (78)
“each system has its own district long-term representational logic and it is via this logic that the citizens makes sense of the political choices available. Candidates in majoritarian systems are primarily oriented toward the median voter in the electorate, while those under PR systems are more oriented toward the median voter of their party (Wessels 1996)” (80). In FPTP political actors tend to misrepresent.
Consensus democracy: PR > ^ C.L. > ^ Voter Turnout
FPTP (first past the post) PR (proportional representation)
Ambiguity of leaders Less ambiguity
Zero Sum Better at supply side of ken
Mandates Visible compromises
SM cater to narrow interests Coalitions
Clear political map and more political information***
VII. C.L. and the Media
VIII. C.L. and Institutions
IX. Adult Education
Formal education and creating habits of civic literacy; as assessment of more deliberative democracy. Are people prone to change their minds when they have more information?
X. Case Study: New Zealand
Economy driven by a strong public sector; classic Westminster model. Milner has a negative evaluation of changes in New Zealand. Participation gone down following changes made by the state
XI. Economic Outcomes
XII. Case: Sweden
Universalism; decommodify labor (Epsing-Anderson conception). Excellent public health care, public transportation and education levels.
High levels of civic literacy; potential to also be economically successful (even though socialist). Taxation in Sweden is regressive (not redistributive). Is Milner making incorrect assumptions about Sweden?
What has been the impact of the war (immigrants/refuges) on the state of Sweden? They are taking in the most downtrodden and hopeless. The Swedish population is having a hard time adjusting to the influx; immigrants are having trouble assimilating. Milner is an institutionalist; he argues that the Scandinavian egalitarian culture was created by their institutions. But is the egalitarian culture changing? Outside of the immigrant communities you have a very knowledgeable, articulate population. Yet because immigrants are not acclimating, are the Sweds’ egalitarian virtues going the way of the buffalo? Taxes in Sweden are really high; immigrants are not contributing equally. This also upsets the more educated, homogenous native Sweds.
XIII. The Welfare State
Milner finds that economic performance is not connected to the welfare state; Asian tigers vs socialist democrats.
XIV. Conclusions on the Welfare State
How/why does Civic Literacy matter? What do high levels of civic literacy mean? Policy? Economy? Highly levels of DL make better decision and institute better institutions. Reinforcing, then. Since institutions make a difference toward the fostering of CL.
Milner class notes: Nordic countries vs market media
In PR systems, people vote more: vote is not wasted.
Milner argues that PR makes every single race competitive—and provide more information to the public in the pursuit of the seat; here are no safe seats, so parties compete in all districts.
2nd argument: if you are more informed you will vote for more welfare-oriented parties (leans to the left). 75% of the governments in PR system are left, or center left. 74% of majoritarian districts are right or center-right (personalized campaigns = lean right).
This is why information matters; people CHOOSE DIFFERENTLY when they have more information. What is the minimum level? Making accurate choices. At some point you will come to an equalibrium (no more impact on the collective decision). Once that is the same, we can compare apples to apples. According to Milner, there is more sophistication in Sweden.
There is a larger middle class in more equal societies, than in industrialized countries.
Now must look at where the rubber hits the road: What is the impact on POLICY?
I.e. If we were COMPLETELY informed about what led up to 9/11 (i.e. if we knew there were no WMDs or Iraqis on the plane, initially.
The dots start with the electoral system.
Theme: the causes and consequences of differences in political knowledge and what makes social-democratic welfare states sustainable
I. Civic Engagement and Social Capital develop skills that matter (Putnam says we get these from group associations; the no. leads to our S.C. stock).
Social Capital (as conceptualized by Putnam) measured as:
1. Trust (horizontal= interpersonal trust; vertical = trust in government)
2. associational density
definition of social capital: a public good; public trust, interpersonal and in government; community organization; voluntary associations.
Findings: Democratic institutions that equally distribute intellectial resources also more equally distribute material resources (high C.L. societies). AND Democratic institutions that more equally distribute intellectual resources attain higher levels of political parties.
Civic Engagement:
Organizational membership > ^trust in government > Civic engagement (voting)
II. Civic Literacy
Measured as:
1. willingness (the vote; @ the local level)
2. ability (knowledge-supply (media) and demand (people need)+ factual and cognitive)
- supply: “The nature and intensity of such efforts are seen to be a function of institutionalized incentives; in other words, political institutions matter when it comes to the accessibility and intelligibility of political information” (6).
III. Political ken
1. Individual Factors: education, age, income
2. Institutional Factors: electoral system; electoral system influences access, usefulness, and intelligibility.
IV. Sources of Civic Literacy
Measuring C.L.:
Civil: turning out to vote in local elections—more valid measure because they require more information; anyone can vote for a president. It takes more effort to vote in a local election.
Literacy: knowledge of U.N.
V. Political Parties and Political Institutions
-“The extent to which voters are informed on matters relevant to the decision to vote is in fact closely linked to the political institutions in which elections take place” (66).
Political Institutions > Political Ken > Political Participation
Electoral systems and Turnout
PR 71%
Maj 50%
VI. Political Institutions (78)
“each system has its own district long-term representational logic and it is via this logic that the citizens makes sense of the political choices available. Candidates in majoritarian systems are primarily oriented toward the median voter in the electorate, while those under PR systems are more oriented toward the median voter of their party (Wessels 1996)” (80). In FPTP political actors tend to misrepresent.
Consensus democracy: PR > ^ C.L. > ^ Voter Turnout
FPTP (first past the post) PR (proportional representation)
Ambiguity of leaders Less ambiguity
Zero Sum Better at supply side of ken
Mandates Visible compromises
SM cater to narrow interests Coalitions
Clear political map and more political information***
VII. C.L. and the Media
VIII. C.L. and Institutions
IX. Adult Education
Formal education and creating habits of civic literacy; as assessment of more deliberative democracy. Are people prone to change their minds when they have more information?
X. Case Study: New Zealand
Economy driven by a strong public sector; classic Westminster model. Milner has a negative evaluation of changes in New Zealand. Participation gone down following changes made by the state
XI. Economic Outcomes
XII. Case: Sweden
Universalism; decommodify labor (Epsing-Anderson conception). Excellent public health care, public transportation and education levels.
High levels of civic literacy; potential to also be economically successful (even though socialist). Taxation in Sweden is regressive (not redistributive). Is Milner making incorrect assumptions about Sweden?
What has been the impact of the war (immigrants/refuges) on the state of Sweden? They are taking in the most downtrodden and hopeless. The Swedish population is having a hard time adjusting to the influx; immigrants are having trouble assimilating. Milner is an institutionalist; he argues that the Scandinavian egalitarian culture was created by their institutions. But is the egalitarian culture changing? Outside of the immigrant communities you have a very knowledgeable, articulate population. Yet because immigrants are not acclimating, are the Sweds’ egalitarian virtues going the way of the buffalo? Taxes in Sweden are really high; immigrants are not contributing equally. This also upsets the more educated, homogenous native Sweds.
XIII. The Welfare State
Milner finds that economic performance is not connected to the welfare state; Asian tigers vs socialist democrats.
XIV. Conclusions on the Welfare State
How/why does Civic Literacy matter? What do high levels of civic literacy mean? Policy? Economy? Highly levels of DL make better decision and institute better institutions. Reinforcing, then. Since institutions make a difference toward the fostering of CL.
Milner class notes: Nordic countries vs market media
In PR systems, people vote more: vote is not wasted.
Milner argues that PR makes every single race competitive—and provide more information to the public in the pursuit of the seat; here are no safe seats, so parties compete in all districts.
2nd argument: if you are more informed you will vote for more welfare-oriented parties (leans to the left). 75% of the governments in PR system are left, or center left. 74% of majoritarian districts are right or center-right (personalized campaigns = lean right).
This is why information matters; people CHOOSE DIFFERENTLY when they have more information. What is the minimum level? Making accurate choices. At some point you will come to an equalibrium (no more impact on the collective decision). Once that is the same, we can compare apples to apples. According to Milner, there is more sophistication in Sweden.
There is a larger middle class in more equal societies, than in industrialized countries.
Now must look at where the rubber hits the road: What is the impact on POLICY?
I.e. If we were COMPLETELY informed about what led up to 9/11 (i.e. if we knew there were no WMDs or Iraqis on the plane, initially.
The dots start with the electoral system.
Norris. (2000) Virtuous Circle.
Part I News Media and Civic Malaise
Media potential role: (1) Watch Dog (2) Civic Forum (3) Mobilizing Agent
Part II Trends in PolComm
Newspapers: sales are still relatively high; the concentration of news ownership does not effect the coverage or freedom of the press; whether or not there has been a ‘tabloidization’ of newspapers is still understudied.
TV: There has been an increase in entertainment coverage
Internet: Mobilization Theory vs. Reinforcement Theory (does the Internet bring more people into the political discussion, or merely reinforce the digital gap theory. Is Norris’s analysis dated? She does not consider the recent boom in Internet use, especially among younger people and people of lower socioeconomic status. When she wrote her book about 20% of the population was connected.
Part III The Impact on Democracy
In conclusion, Norris associates high levels of news consumption with higher levels of efficacy, higher levels of political participation and low levels of government cynicism.
Chapter 10 Knows Little? Information and Choice
Three perspectives are common in the literature to establish political knowledge benchmarks:
(1) Civics approach assumes narrow type of ideal info about gov and public policy that all citizens need to know
(2) Relativist stances acknowledges that people have a limited reservoir of political information but suggests that it is sufficient to cast a vote.
(3) Practical Knowledge: citizens need enough knowledge to help them connect their political and social prefs to the available options.
Pg 214: 5 questions that measure political knowledge.
General class discussion: What is the difference between civic and practical knowledge, and which is more important for informing citizens?
-Civic knowledge would be knowledge of Supreme Court Justices, etc.
-Practical knowledge would be a knowledge of which political party is likely to support privatized health care, etc. Which type of knowledge is more important to measures of sophistication? Which type of knowledge does Norris capture in her surveys?
Media potential role: (1) Watch Dog (2) Civic Forum (3) Mobilizing Agent
Part II Trends in PolComm
Newspapers: sales are still relatively high; the concentration of news ownership does not effect the coverage or freedom of the press; whether or not there has been a ‘tabloidization’ of newspapers is still understudied.
TV: There has been an increase in entertainment coverage
Internet: Mobilization Theory vs. Reinforcement Theory (does the Internet bring more people into the political discussion, or merely reinforce the digital gap theory. Is Norris’s analysis dated? She does not consider the recent boom in Internet use, especially among younger people and people of lower socioeconomic status. When she wrote her book about 20% of the population was connected.
Part III The Impact on Democracy
In conclusion, Norris associates high levels of news consumption with higher levels of efficacy, higher levels of political participation and low levels of government cynicism.
Chapter 10 Knows Little? Information and Choice
Three perspectives are common in the literature to establish political knowledge benchmarks:
(1) Civics approach assumes narrow type of ideal info about gov and public policy that all citizens need to know
(2) Relativist stances acknowledges that people have a limited reservoir of political information but suggests that it is sufficient to cast a vote.
(3) Practical Knowledge: citizens need enough knowledge to help them connect their political and social prefs to the available options.
Pg 214: 5 questions that measure political knowledge.
General class discussion: What is the difference between civic and practical knowledge, and which is more important for informing citizens?
-Civic knowledge would be knowledge of Supreme Court Justices, etc.
-Practical knowledge would be a knowledge of which political party is likely to support privatized health care, etc. Which type of knowledge is more important to measures of sophistication? Which type of knowledge does Norris capture in her surveys?
Dalton, RJ. (2002) Citizens Politics.
Chapter 5 Values in Change
Values define the essence of our lives. “We study values because they provide the standards that guide the attitudes and behavior of the public” (82). “People develop a general framework for making these decisions by arranging values in terms of their importance of their importance to the individual” (82).
Inglehart (1977): describes value change as due to a combination of the scarcity hypotheses (we value that which are relatively short in supply), and the socialization hypotheses (our values reflect conditions that prevailed during our preadult years). “once value priorities develop, they tend to endure…” (83). [formative conditions]
Clarke & Nitish (1991) link our values to the ebb and flow of economic conditions. [present circumstances]
Potential values:
Economic growth
A stable economy
More say in work/community
Fight against crime
Protect free speech
Strong defense
Measuring values (86)
“Public values are changing” (96). And there are a diversity. “the mix of values makes it difficult for journalists to discern the public’s priorities” (96).
Chapter 6 Issues and Ideological Orientations
“Issues are the everyday currency of politics. Issue opinions identify the public’s preferences for government action and their expectations for the political process. Political parties are largely defined by their issue positions, and elections provide a means for the public to select between the competing issue programs they offer” (100).
“Issue opinions also represent the translation of broad value orientations into specific political concerns. Issues are partially determined by the values examined in the last chapter, as well as by other factors: cues from political elites, the flow of political events, and the contexts of specific situations. For example a persn may favor the principle of equal rights for all citizens; but attitudes towards voting rights, job discrimination, school busing, and open housing, and other civil rights legislation represents different mixes of values and practical concerns. Consequently, issue opinions are more changeable and valued than broad value orientations” (100).
“Issue opinions are a dynamic aspect of politics, and the theme of changing popular values can be carried over to the study of issues” (100).
“People are changing their opinions on many issues. Attitudes on equality issues display a dramatic shift over the past generation…” toward a more liberal orientation. (119).
Public Opinion and Political Change (121)
Issue interest has expanded (environmental issues. Etc). “The expansion of the boundaries of politics to include these new issues has several implications for the nature of contemporary politics. Governments have increased the scope of their activity: now they must worry not only about economic policy but also whether the environment is clean and whether personal life choices are tolerated… The proliferation of issue publics also changes the structure of political representation and decision making. Issue publics focus their effort to maximize representation on their issue, but the proliferation of such interests probably increases the complexity of the governing process…Policymakers thus see conflicting signals emanating from the public, without a method (or perhaps motivation) to resolve these conflicts systematically…One of the challenges facing contemporary government is how to adapt the democratic process to this different pattern of interest representation” (122).
VOTING
“The new style of citizen politics therefore should include a more fluid and volatile pattern of party alignments. Political coalitions and voting patterns will lack the permanence of past class and religious cleavages. Whithou clear social cues, voting decisions will become a more demanding task for voters—more dependent on the individual beliefs and values and citizens” (175).
PARTISANSHIP
“Each election presents voters with a choices over polici proposals and candidates for office. While social characteristics and group cues may be a basis for making decisions, citizens also hold a variety of political beliefs and values that affect their electoral calculus. Often, these considerations go beyond group ties or the perceptions derived from group cues. Consequently, contemporary electoral research emphasizes the attitudes and values of voters as key factors in understanding electoral choice…Citizens make judgments about which party best represents their interests, and these perceptions guide voting behavior. Attitudes toward the issues and candidates of an election are thus a necessary outcome in any realistic model of voting. Attitudes are also changeable, and their incorporation into a voting model helps explain variation in arty results across elections” (177).
The sociopsychological model of voting (178-ish)
Partisan attachments + specific issue opinions
Partisan attitudes:
Partisan loyalties serve as a cue (179). …a low cost cue (187). They make politics “user-friendly” (185). “The cue-giving function of partisanship is clearly sees for voting behavior. Partisanship means that voters enter an election with a predisposition to support their preferred party. Philip Converse (1966) described partisanship as the basis for a “normal vote”—the vote expected when other factors in the election are evenly balanced. If other factors come into play, such as issue positions or candidate images, their influence can be measured by their ability to cause defections from standing partisan commitments” (187).
But in the US there are a vast collection of partisan candidates to choose from. “Thus the separation between attitudes and behavior is most noticeable in American elections…” (187)… “In highly visible and politicized presidential elections, candidate images and issue appeals have the potential to counteract partisan preferences, and thus party defections are common in these elections” (187).
Party bonds are strongest among older voters. Partisans tend to be more politically active (186).
Party dealignment (188)
Consequences (191)
-weakening partisan-centered voting choice
-increase in fluidity of voting patterns
-decline in participation
-rise in issue concerns and candidates (their party-cue is GONE)
Structural Causes (193-194)
Cognitive Mobilization Theory Typology (195)
Some voters remain oriented to politics based on their partisan attachments (cognitive partisans, ritual partisans) whereas other voters remain oriented to politics on their own (apartisans, cognitive partisans).
TWO MOBILIZING DIMENSIONS: PARTISANSHIP, COGNITIVE
1.Apoliticals-unmobilized
2.Ritual Partisans-PARTISAN mobilized
3.Cognitive Partisans-highly ranked on both mobilizing dimensions.
4.Apartisans-cognitively mobilized
chapter 10; ATTITUDES AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR (201)
“Issues and candidates give political meaning to the partisan attachements and social divisions we have discussed in earler chapters” (201)….issue beliefs and candidate images explan the ebbs and flows of voting outcomes over time” (201).
ISSUE VOTING (202):
Framework: performance (candidates’effectiveness) and position (defines the conflict).
CANDIDATE IMAGES (215):
Prototype literature
We are more politically sophisticated, today (220). Consequences (220); i.e. what about people who are not (221).
Chapter 11; political representation (223)
“In the broadest sense of the term, the representativeness of elite attitude is measured by their similarity to the overall attitudes of the public” (224).
Domestic policy options
Socioeconomic issues and the state
Big vs small government: “In comparison to most EUs, America are more reserved in their acceptance of government action” (103).
Race and Equality
Gender Issues (110)
Environmental Protection
Social and Moral Issues (114) “…Americans are more conservative than EUs on social and moral issues. This pattern is likely the result of national differences in religious feelings… The US is among the most religious of Western societies. American chruch attendance and religious feelings are among the highest in the work. A full 96 percent of America considered say they believe in God, compared to 60-70 percent among EUs.
Values define the essence of our lives. “We study values because they provide the standards that guide the attitudes and behavior of the public” (82). “People develop a general framework for making these decisions by arranging values in terms of their importance of their importance to the individual” (82).
Inglehart (1977): describes value change as due to a combination of the scarcity hypotheses (we value that which are relatively short in supply), and the socialization hypotheses (our values reflect conditions that prevailed during our preadult years). “once value priorities develop, they tend to endure…” (83). [formative conditions]
Clarke & Nitish (1991) link our values to the ebb and flow of economic conditions. [present circumstances]
Potential values:
Economic growth
A stable economy
More say in work/community
Fight against crime
Protect free speech
Strong defense
Measuring values (86)
“Public values are changing” (96). And there are a diversity. “the mix of values makes it difficult for journalists to discern the public’s priorities” (96).
Chapter 6 Issues and Ideological Orientations
“Issues are the everyday currency of politics. Issue opinions identify the public’s preferences for government action and their expectations for the political process. Political parties are largely defined by their issue positions, and elections provide a means for the public to select between the competing issue programs they offer” (100).
“Issue opinions also represent the translation of broad value orientations into specific political concerns. Issues are partially determined by the values examined in the last chapter, as well as by other factors: cues from political elites, the flow of political events, and the contexts of specific situations. For example a persn may favor the principle of equal rights for all citizens; but attitudes towards voting rights, job discrimination, school busing, and open housing, and other civil rights legislation represents different mixes of values and practical concerns. Consequently, issue opinions are more changeable and valued than broad value orientations” (100).
“Issue opinions are a dynamic aspect of politics, and the theme of changing popular values can be carried over to the study of issues” (100).
“People are changing their opinions on many issues. Attitudes on equality issues display a dramatic shift over the past generation…” toward a more liberal orientation. (119).
Public Opinion and Political Change (121)
Issue interest has expanded (environmental issues. Etc). “The expansion of the boundaries of politics to include these new issues has several implications for the nature of contemporary politics. Governments have increased the scope of their activity: now they must worry not only about economic policy but also whether the environment is clean and whether personal life choices are tolerated… The proliferation of issue publics also changes the structure of political representation and decision making. Issue publics focus their effort to maximize representation on their issue, but the proliferation of such interests probably increases the complexity of the governing process…Policymakers thus see conflicting signals emanating from the public, without a method (or perhaps motivation) to resolve these conflicts systematically…One of the challenges facing contemporary government is how to adapt the democratic process to this different pattern of interest representation” (122).
VOTING
“The new style of citizen politics therefore should include a more fluid and volatile pattern of party alignments. Political coalitions and voting patterns will lack the permanence of past class and religious cleavages. Whithou clear social cues, voting decisions will become a more demanding task for voters—more dependent on the individual beliefs and values and citizens” (175).
PARTISANSHIP
“Each election presents voters with a choices over polici proposals and candidates for office. While social characteristics and group cues may be a basis for making decisions, citizens also hold a variety of political beliefs and values that affect their electoral calculus. Often, these considerations go beyond group ties or the perceptions derived from group cues. Consequently, contemporary electoral research emphasizes the attitudes and values of voters as key factors in understanding electoral choice…Citizens make judgments about which party best represents their interests, and these perceptions guide voting behavior. Attitudes toward the issues and candidates of an election are thus a necessary outcome in any realistic model of voting. Attitudes are also changeable, and their incorporation into a voting model helps explain variation in arty results across elections” (177).
The sociopsychological model of voting (178-ish)
Partisan attachments + specific issue opinions
Partisan attitudes:
Partisan loyalties serve as a cue (179). …a low cost cue (187). They make politics “user-friendly” (185). “The cue-giving function of partisanship is clearly sees for voting behavior. Partisanship means that voters enter an election with a predisposition to support their preferred party. Philip Converse (1966) described partisanship as the basis for a “normal vote”—the vote expected when other factors in the election are evenly balanced. If other factors come into play, such as issue positions or candidate images, their influence can be measured by their ability to cause defections from standing partisan commitments” (187).
But in the US there are a vast collection of partisan candidates to choose from. “Thus the separation between attitudes and behavior is most noticeable in American elections…” (187)… “In highly visible and politicized presidential elections, candidate images and issue appeals have the potential to counteract partisan preferences, and thus party defections are common in these elections” (187).
Party bonds are strongest among older voters. Partisans tend to be more politically active (186).
Party dealignment (188)
Consequences (191)
-weakening partisan-centered voting choice
-increase in fluidity of voting patterns
-decline in participation
-rise in issue concerns and candidates (their party-cue is GONE)
Structural Causes (193-194)
Cognitive Mobilization Theory Typology (195)
Some voters remain oriented to politics based on their partisan attachments (cognitive partisans, ritual partisans) whereas other voters remain oriented to politics on their own (apartisans, cognitive partisans).
TWO MOBILIZING DIMENSIONS: PARTISANSHIP, COGNITIVE
1.Apoliticals-unmobilized
2.Ritual Partisans-PARTISAN mobilized
3.Cognitive Partisans-highly ranked on both mobilizing dimensions.
4.Apartisans-cognitively mobilized
chapter 10; ATTITUDES AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR (201)
“Issues and candidates give political meaning to the partisan attachements and social divisions we have discussed in earler chapters” (201)….issue beliefs and candidate images explan the ebbs and flows of voting outcomes over time” (201).
ISSUE VOTING (202):
Framework: performance (candidates’effectiveness) and position (defines the conflict).
CANDIDATE IMAGES (215):
Prototype literature
We are more politically sophisticated, today (220). Consequences (220); i.e. what about people who are not (221).
Chapter 11; political representation (223)
“In the broadest sense of the term, the representativeness of elite attitude is measured by their similarity to the overall attitudes of the public” (224).
Domestic policy options
Socioeconomic issues and the state
Big vs small government: “In comparison to most EUs, America are more reserved in their acceptance of government action” (103).
Race and Equality
Gender Issues (110)
Environmental Protection
Social and Moral Issues (114) “…Americans are more conservative than EUs on social and moral issues. This pattern is likely the result of national differences in religious feelings… The US is among the most religious of Western societies. American chruch attendance and religious feelings are among the highest in the work. A full 96 percent of America considered say they believe in God, compared to 60-70 percent among EUs.
Kuklinski et al. (2001) The Political Environment and Citizen Competence.
Key Terms: the Political Environment: Motivation + Available Information
How do the value of information and induced motivation work together to influence the quality of citizens decision-making?
What is the “political environment?” “The totality of politically relevant communication to which citizens are exposed. It includes all the statements and information that the media, public officials, interest groups and other relevant actors provide with respect to a iven issue or policy debate” (footnote 411). When the environment invokes MOTIVATION decision making is improved (Sanbonmatsu & Fazio 1990). “The most relevant motivation in the context of evaluating policy, then, is simply the inclination to evaluate policies thoughtfully and seriously, then just as political environments can vary in the quality of the information they provide, so can they vary in the extent to which they encourage thoughtful evaluation” (413).
Data: Survey of 1160 random adults in Illinois.
Issue: Health Care Tradeoffs
Condition 1: environment devoid of information and incentive; will respondents make tradeoffs when they don’t have to? (questionnaire with 7 goals, rate from 1-10/ p. 416)
Findings: most people rated each of the 7 goals as a 10 importance completion; when we control for education, those highly educated are likely to demand less.
Condition 2: respondent received general information item about tradeoffs. Not a significant change—“Simply stating that decision about governmental programs require giving up one thing to get something else does not redice the overall demand to achieve all of the goals” (419).
Condition 3: a randomly selected 25% were told that people do best on these types of questions when they take time to think…” another 25% were told to act as if they were a public official. Both conditions were meant to increase cognitive processing and induce a greater willingness to overcome the unpleasantness with compromising some desired goals. (motivational instruction). Insignificant findings. Asking people to think doesn’t change their responses.
Condition 4: general information + motivational instruction = significance. (reduce demand, invoke tradeoffs).
Also, respondents are more likely to make tradeoffs in high information environments (57% of respondents choice tradeoff option).
How do the value of information and induced motivation work together to influence the quality of citizens decision-making?
What is the “political environment?” “The totality of politically relevant communication to which citizens are exposed. It includes all the statements and information that the media, public officials, interest groups and other relevant actors provide with respect to a iven issue or policy debate” (footnote 411). When the environment invokes MOTIVATION decision making is improved (Sanbonmatsu & Fazio 1990). “The most relevant motivation in the context of evaluating policy, then, is simply the inclination to evaluate policies thoughtfully and seriously, then just as political environments can vary in the quality of the information they provide, so can they vary in the extent to which they encourage thoughtful evaluation” (413).
Data: Survey of 1160 random adults in Illinois.
Issue: Health Care Tradeoffs
Condition 1: environment devoid of information and incentive; will respondents make tradeoffs when they don’t have to? (questionnaire with 7 goals, rate from 1-10/ p. 416)
Findings: most people rated each of the 7 goals as a 10 importance completion; when we control for education, those highly educated are likely to demand less.
Condition 2: respondent received general information item about tradeoffs. Not a significant change—“Simply stating that decision about governmental programs require giving up one thing to get something else does not redice the overall demand to achieve all of the goals” (419).
Condition 3: a randomly selected 25% were told that people do best on these types of questions when they take time to think…” another 25% were told to act as if they were a public official. Both conditions were meant to increase cognitive processing and induce a greater willingness to overcome the unpleasantness with compromising some desired goals. (motivational instruction). Insignificant findings. Asking people to think doesn’t change their responses.
Condition 4: general information + motivational instruction = significance. (reduce demand, invoke tradeoffs).
Also, respondents are more likely to make tradeoffs in high information environments (57% of respondents choice tradeoff option).
Gilens, M. (2001) Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences.
Not measuring policy preferences; merely political information levels.
raw policy facts have a significant influence on the public’s political judgments.
I show that:
(1) ignorance of policy-specific information leads many Americans to hold different views from those they would hold otherwise
(2) the effect of policy specific information is not adequately captured by the measures of general political knowledge used in previous research
(3) the effect of policy-specific ignorance is greatest for Americans with the highest levels of political knowledge. Rather than serve to dilute the influence of new information, general knowledge (and the cognitive capacities it reflects) appears to facilitate the incorporation of new policy-specific information into political judgments (379). The more political informed have somewhere to couch the information.
Methods: impute the hypothetical “fully informed” electorate (Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter).
Data—3 kinds:
(1) measure of general political knowledge
(2) measure of policy specific information
(3) measure of policy prefs plausible
expanding the literature:
(1) assess the effect of “policy-specific ignorance” on the policy preferences of those who are deemed fully informed by the criteria of prior research.
(2) compare policy preferences expressed by respondents who were randomly chosen to receive specific political information to the preferences of a control group.
(3) ask how the effects of policy-specific information differs for respondents with different levels of political information. TWO ALTERNATIVES have been suggested. On the one hand, general political knowledge, and its correlates such as political interest and cognitive sophisticntion, may enhance individuals’ ability and motivation to respond to new policy-specific information (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). On the other hand, heneral political knowledge may provide a resource to resist the influence of new policy-specific information (Zaller 1992). And if both forces are at work we many find a curvilinear relationship between general political knowledge and the effect of policy specific information or not apparent relationship at all” (380).
Expected findings: much of what separates actual political preferences from hypothetical “enlightened preferences” is due to ignorance of specific policy-relevant facts, not a lack of general political knowledge or the cognitive skills or orientations that measures of general political information reflect” (380). And policy-specific information has a stronger influence on respondents who display higher levels of general political knowledge. (what does Bartels say about the effect of information on the vote choice of highly sophisticated?).
Policy specific information:
Crime & Foreign Aid (merely true false questions; not an issue of preferences—but do they influence policy preferences? What are the effects of policy specific information on policy preferences).
sarah's notes:
Policy specific information => opinion change
Method: surveys and survey-based experiments
Would political judgments change if people were more/fully informed?
Previous research:
-Give a representative group more information and see if their judgements change
-Impute preferences based on demographics and vary level of information, see if opinions differ
This research uses the second method, but with policy-specific knowledge as the variable instead of broad, general knowledge, with all respondents at high general knowledge level
Also use experiment that randomly gives some people policy information and others none, and test for differences in opinion.
Also, include general knowledge as a variable, and test effect of policy knowledge on those with high and low general knowledge
Conclusions:
1. general knowledge is an incomplete measure of knowledge neccesarry to form preferences
2. policy-specific ignorance has a greater effect on preferences than general knowledge
3. policy-specific knowledge has a greater effect on more knowledgeable ppl.
Survey: People who have high general knowledge are more likely to have policy-specific knowledge, but policy-specific knowledge is still widespread, especially for certain issues (crime rate, environmental policy under Reagan, budget to foreign aid).
Survey: Imputed preferences under full policy-specific and general knowledge produced different preferences than those observed. Fully informed opinion has a liberal tendency (when study is done during republican presidency)
Experiment: People who are given policy-specific information have different policy preferences matching predictions and changes in the survey situation.
Both methods have issues, but consistency between them gives validity to both.
In theory, more knowledgeable people may react more or less to policy-specific information. Less because they already probably know more and so each new piece of information has less effect. More because thy are better at incorporating new information and their preferences are more ideologically consistent, hence more apt to change in consistent ways.
People who had high general knowledge were more affected by policy-specific knowledge. Lowest knowledge category mostly unaffected by specific information.
raw policy facts have a significant influence on the public’s political judgments.
I show that:
(1) ignorance of policy-specific information leads many Americans to hold different views from those they would hold otherwise
(2) the effect of policy specific information is not adequately captured by the measures of general political knowledge used in previous research
(3) the effect of policy-specific ignorance is greatest for Americans with the highest levels of political knowledge. Rather than serve to dilute the influence of new information, general knowledge (and the cognitive capacities it reflects) appears to facilitate the incorporation of new policy-specific information into political judgments (379). The more political informed have somewhere to couch the information.
Methods: impute the hypothetical “fully informed” electorate (Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter).
Data—3 kinds:
(1) measure of general political knowledge
(2) measure of policy specific information
(3) measure of policy prefs plausible
expanding the literature:
(1) assess the effect of “policy-specific ignorance” on the policy preferences of those who are deemed fully informed by the criteria of prior research.
(2) compare policy preferences expressed by respondents who were randomly chosen to receive specific political information to the preferences of a control group.
(3) ask how the effects of policy-specific information differs for respondents with different levels of political information. TWO ALTERNATIVES have been suggested. On the one hand, general political knowledge, and its correlates such as political interest and cognitive sophisticntion, may enhance individuals’ ability and motivation to respond to new policy-specific information (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). On the other hand, heneral political knowledge may provide a resource to resist the influence of new policy-specific information (Zaller 1992). And if both forces are at work we many find a curvilinear relationship between general political knowledge and the effect of policy specific information or not apparent relationship at all” (380).
Expected findings: much of what separates actual political preferences from hypothetical “enlightened preferences” is due to ignorance of specific policy-relevant facts, not a lack of general political knowledge or the cognitive skills or orientations that measures of general political information reflect” (380). And policy-specific information has a stronger influence on respondents who display higher levels of general political knowledge. (what does Bartels say about the effect of information on the vote choice of highly sophisticated?).
Policy specific information:
Crime & Foreign Aid (merely true false questions; not an issue of preferences—but do they influence policy preferences? What are the effects of policy specific information on policy preferences).
sarah's notes:
Policy specific information => opinion change
Method: surveys and survey-based experiments
Would political judgments change if people were more/fully informed?
Previous research:
-Give a representative group more information and see if their judgements change
-Impute preferences based on demographics and vary level of information, see if opinions differ
This research uses the second method, but with policy-specific knowledge as the variable instead of broad, general knowledge, with all respondents at high general knowledge level
Also use experiment that randomly gives some people policy information and others none, and test for differences in opinion.
Also, include general knowledge as a variable, and test effect of policy knowledge on those with high and low general knowledge
Conclusions:
1. general knowledge is an incomplete measure of knowledge neccesarry to form preferences
2. policy-specific ignorance has a greater effect on preferences than general knowledge
3. policy-specific knowledge has a greater effect on more knowledgeable ppl.
Survey: People who have high general knowledge are more likely to have policy-specific knowledge, but policy-specific knowledge is still widespread, especially for certain issues (crime rate, environmental policy under Reagan, budget to foreign aid).
Survey: Imputed preferences under full policy-specific and general knowledge produced different preferences than those observed. Fully informed opinion has a liberal tendency (when study is done during republican presidency)
Experiment: People who are given policy-specific information have different policy preferences matching predictions and changes in the survey situation.
Both methods have issues, but consistency between them gives validity to both.
In theory, more knowledgeable people may react more or less to policy-specific information. Less because they already probably know more and so each new piece of information has less effect. More because thy are better at incorporating new information and their preferences are more ideologically consistent, hence more apt to change in consistent ways.
People who had high general knowledge were more affected by policy-specific knowledge. Lowest knowledge category mostly unaffected by specific information.
Gastil & Dillard. (1999). Increasing Political Sophistication Through Public...
Does information make individuals move left or right? Framing effects?
Face-to-face deliberation will result in (1) more coherent and certain political judgments and (2) more integrated and differentiated political judgments, and reduced attitudinal uncertainly.
Deliberative Democratic Theory: deliberation aids in the development of political sophistication. (discussion and reflection) (Barber 1984, Fishkin 1991,1995; Gastil & Adam 1995).
Test this claim: authors studied associations between face-to-face political deliberation and subsequent changes in the coherence, integration, differentiation, and detail of participants’ political beliefs (dep. var). authors administered questionnaire pre and post deliberative discussions of political issues.
Clarification
Schema: a cognitive structure that represents one’s general knowledge about a given concept (Fiske & Taylor 1984, 12; also Eagly and Chaiken 1993). I.e. liberal and conservative schemas; liberalism: individual freedom, egalitarianism, tolerance, social change, secular rationality, and constitutional participatory democracy that protects minority interests. Conservatism: religion, morality, status quo, natural inequality, competition, personal liberty, initiative, and property emphasis.
(1) Schematic coherence: an issue is clearly and CONSISTENTLY defined.
(2) Integrated and differentiated beliefs: ideologically (liberalism/conservatism) consistent
Schematic cohernce and certainty will come from modeling and experiential learning.
Schematic integration a nd differentiation will develop through other educational processes—instruction and inference. Persuasion.
First set of hypotheses test the effects of deliberation on political sophistical:
H1: part. With more formal education will express perform attitudes that reflect:
a. greater internal coherence (inter-item correlations with attitude scale)
b. greater schematic integration (positive correlation of ideologically similar scales)
c. greater schematic differentiation (negative correlation of dissimilar scales) and
d. lower attitudinal uncertainty (fewer DK responses).
Second set of hypotheses test the effect of deliberation on participants pre-forum opinions, regardless of initial sophistication level.
H2 In comparison with pre-forums opinions, participants post-forum political views will show:
a. greater schematic coherence
b. more schematic integration
c. more schematic differentiation
d. reduced attitudinal uncertainty
Data:
7 issue books—pre and postforum data;
participants completed NIF ballots between 1991 and 1993; 88% white; 58% female
To test the 2 sets of hypotheses an educ attainment ballot was trichotomized: (1) some high school or diploma, (2) some college or 4 year degree and (3) some grad schoool/grd degree.
Set 1:
Schematic integration: 2 liberal scales or 2 conservative scales
Schematic differentiation: negative correlation between ideologically dissimilar scales.
Attitudinal uncertainty = DKs.
Set 2:
Analysis of change scores (subtracting pre attitude score and post).
Findings:
H1a: few stat sig diffs among schem coherence for all three educ groups.
H2a: same
H1b: supported
H2b: supported
H1c: supported
H2c: supported
H1d: supported
H2d: supported
Conclusion: NIF deliberation had a short-term effect on the sophistication of participants’ schematic networks. After forums, they had more diff and integrated views and exhibited less attit uncertainty. Well, if DK is also associated with people who don’t vote, we can assume its not ambivalence but low information-levels.
Class notes:
How do we recognize when someone is “open” instead of “uncertain?”
Questions posed and criticisms made:
Also, why is consistency associated with informed?
Are we talking about “change” of opinion or “reinforcement” of opinion? Which is bad, if the original opinion was inconsistent with the persons interests?
Plus, NIF forces one to have an opinion—what if this opinion is merely held for the duration of the discussion.
Druckman (2004)
Framing effects: your preferences are changed by the “frame.” This is why we are concerned about the media’s role; how much power do they have?
After deliberation, people are less affected by the frames. W00t.
Hetero discussion—most change.
Homo discussion—still change from condition form when there was no discussion.
No discussion-least amount of change.
Counter-frame: CNN and Fox
What happens when you are exposed to both frames? i.e. CNN and Fox. Decrease framing effects. And you end up with “authentic” opinion, which is consistent with your values (liberalism/conservatism).
Neutrality = no counter-frame. What happens here?
Barabas (2004)
How does deliberation work? Why do we always assume deliberative effects are good?
Where is deliberation working?
Barabas measures enlightenment, normal conversation (as opposed to just be exposed to arguments).
Moderated.
Key var: need to be open-minded. People had to be reminded to be open-minded.
Must have a diversity of opinion and open-mindedness to have deliberation.
Hypotheses (690)
Ideal, achieve consensus?
Expects deliberation will have a positive effect on enlightenment.
Effects on softening ones view?
What is about the information environment that fosters authentic opinions?
Framing leads to increased polarization?
To decrease polarization we need more moderated frames?
Issue 1: Free Speech: How Free is Too Free
Choice 1: The case for legal sanctions (Conservative 1a)
Choice 2: The private-sector solutions (Conservative 1b)
Choice 3: More speech, not enforced silence (Liberal 3)
Issue 2: America’s Role in the World: New Risks, New Realities
Choice 1: support for a superpower strategy (Conservative 1)
Choice 2:support for a multilateral approach (Liberal 3)
Issue 3: Energy Options: Finding a Solution to the Power Predicament
Choice 1: support for alternatives such as wind and solar (Liberal 2)
Choice 2: support for nucmear power (Conservative 3)
Choice 3: reduce use of energy and oil (Liberal 4a)
Choice 4: we are in an energy crisis (Liberal 4b)
Issue 4: Prescription for Prosperity: Four Paths to Economic Renewel
Choice 1: support free market (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: support for public investment (Liberal 2)
Choice 3: interventionist industrial policy (Liberal 4)
Issue 5: Criminal Violence: What Direction Now for the War on Crime
Choice 1: support for tough laws (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: social reform approach (Liberal 3)
Choice 3: Strict sentences (Conservative 3)
Issue 6: The Health Care Crisis: Containing Costs, Expanding Coverage
Choice 1: support of status quo (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: support of universal health care (Liberal 2)
Choice 3: cost-cutting approach (Liberal 4)
Issue 7: People and Politics: Who Should Govern?
Choice 1: All liberal
Results:
Schematic Integration H1b and H2b (positively associated with formal education)
Educ scale (1 hs, 2 college, 3 grad)
Conservative s.i. preforum statistically significant for free speech
1 .57
2 .61
3 .71
also statistic sig. preforum: (study numbers 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) Environment on all liberal scales, economy for liberal scales, crime for conservative scales, healthcare for liberal scales, and all of item 7 (liberal scales).
Schmematic Differentiation H1c H2c (differentiation of liberals from conservatives)
Significant in 5 of the 7 studies) im not sure how they measured this
Attitude Certainty H1d H2d (comparison of “not sure/DK” answers
H2d was supported in all 7 studies—thus fewer DKs after deliberation
Conclusions (15)
Face-to-face deliberation will result in (1) more coherent and certain political judgments and (2) more integrated and differentiated political judgments, and reduced attitudinal uncertainly.
Deliberative Democratic Theory: deliberation aids in the development of political sophistication. (discussion and reflection) (Barber 1984, Fishkin 1991,1995; Gastil & Adam 1995).
Test this claim: authors studied associations between face-to-face political deliberation and subsequent changes in the coherence, integration, differentiation, and detail of participants’ political beliefs (dep. var). authors administered questionnaire pre and post deliberative discussions of political issues.
Clarification
Schema: a cognitive structure that represents one’s general knowledge about a given concept (Fiske & Taylor 1984, 12; also Eagly and Chaiken 1993). I.e. liberal and conservative schemas; liberalism: individual freedom, egalitarianism, tolerance, social change, secular rationality, and constitutional participatory democracy that protects minority interests. Conservatism: religion, morality, status quo, natural inequality, competition, personal liberty, initiative, and property emphasis.
(1) Schematic coherence: an issue is clearly and CONSISTENTLY defined.
(2) Integrated and differentiated beliefs: ideologically (liberalism/conservatism) consistent
Schematic cohernce and certainty will come from modeling and experiential learning.
Schematic integration a nd differentiation will develop through other educational processes—instruction and inference. Persuasion.
First set of hypotheses test the effects of deliberation on political sophistical:
H1: part. With more formal education will express perform attitudes that reflect:
a. greater internal coherence (inter-item correlations with attitude scale)
b. greater schematic integration (positive correlation of ideologically similar scales)
c. greater schematic differentiation (negative correlation of dissimilar scales) and
d. lower attitudinal uncertainty (fewer DK responses).
Second set of hypotheses test the effect of deliberation on participants pre-forum opinions, regardless of initial sophistication level.
H2 In comparison with pre-forums opinions, participants post-forum political views will show:
a. greater schematic coherence
b. more schematic integration
c. more schematic differentiation
d. reduced attitudinal uncertainty
Data:
7 issue books—pre and postforum data;
participants completed NIF ballots between 1991 and 1993; 88% white; 58% female
To test the 2 sets of hypotheses an educ attainment ballot was trichotomized: (1) some high school or diploma, (2) some college or 4 year degree and (3) some grad schoool/grd degree.
Set 1:
Schematic integration: 2 liberal scales or 2 conservative scales
Schematic differentiation: negative correlation between ideologically dissimilar scales.
Attitudinal uncertainty = DKs.
Set 2:
Analysis of change scores (subtracting pre attitude score and post).
Findings:
H1a: few stat sig diffs among schem coherence for all three educ groups.
H2a: same
H1b: supported
H2b: supported
H1c: supported
H2c: supported
H1d: supported
H2d: supported
Conclusion: NIF deliberation had a short-term effect on the sophistication of participants’ schematic networks. After forums, they had more diff and integrated views and exhibited less attit uncertainty. Well, if DK is also associated with people who don’t vote, we can assume its not ambivalence but low information-levels.
Class notes:
How do we recognize when someone is “open” instead of “uncertain?”
Questions posed and criticisms made:
Also, why is consistency associated with informed?
Are we talking about “change” of opinion or “reinforcement” of opinion? Which is bad, if the original opinion was inconsistent with the persons interests?
Plus, NIF forces one to have an opinion—what if this opinion is merely held for the duration of the discussion.
Druckman (2004)
Framing effects: your preferences are changed by the “frame.” This is why we are concerned about the media’s role; how much power do they have?
After deliberation, people are less affected by the frames. W00t.
Hetero discussion—most change.
Homo discussion—still change from condition form when there was no discussion.
No discussion-least amount of change.
Counter-frame: CNN and Fox
What happens when you are exposed to both frames? i.e. CNN and Fox. Decrease framing effects. And you end up with “authentic” opinion, which is consistent with your values (liberalism/conservatism).
Neutrality = no counter-frame. What happens here?
Barabas (2004)
How does deliberation work? Why do we always assume deliberative effects are good?
Where is deliberation working?
Barabas measures enlightenment, normal conversation (as opposed to just be exposed to arguments).
Moderated.
Key var: need to be open-minded. People had to be reminded to be open-minded.
Must have a diversity of opinion and open-mindedness to have deliberation.
Hypotheses (690)
Ideal, achieve consensus?
Expects deliberation will have a positive effect on enlightenment.
Effects on softening ones view?
What is about the information environment that fosters authentic opinions?
Framing leads to increased polarization?
To decrease polarization we need more moderated frames?
Issue 1: Free Speech: How Free is Too Free
Choice 1: The case for legal sanctions (Conservative 1a)
Choice 2: The private-sector solutions (Conservative 1b)
Choice 3: More speech, not enforced silence (Liberal 3)
Issue 2: America’s Role in the World: New Risks, New Realities
Choice 1: support for a superpower strategy (Conservative 1)
Choice 2:support for a multilateral approach (Liberal 3)
Issue 3: Energy Options: Finding a Solution to the Power Predicament
Choice 1: support for alternatives such as wind and solar (Liberal 2)
Choice 2: support for nucmear power (Conservative 3)
Choice 3: reduce use of energy and oil (Liberal 4a)
Choice 4: we are in an energy crisis (Liberal 4b)
Issue 4: Prescription for Prosperity: Four Paths to Economic Renewel
Choice 1: support free market (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: support for public investment (Liberal 2)
Choice 3: interventionist industrial policy (Liberal 4)
Issue 5: Criminal Violence: What Direction Now for the War on Crime
Choice 1: support for tough laws (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: social reform approach (Liberal 3)
Choice 3: Strict sentences (Conservative 3)
Issue 6: The Health Care Crisis: Containing Costs, Expanding Coverage
Choice 1: support of status quo (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: support of universal health care (Liberal 2)
Choice 3: cost-cutting approach (Liberal 4)
Issue 7: People and Politics: Who Should Govern?
Choice 1: All liberal
Results:
Schematic Integration H1b and H2b (positively associated with formal education)
Educ scale (1 hs, 2 college, 3 grad)
Conservative s.i. preforum statistically significant for free speech
1 .57
2 .61
3 .71
also statistic sig. preforum: (study numbers 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) Environment on all liberal scales, economy for liberal scales, crime for conservative scales, healthcare for liberal scales, and all of item 7 (liberal scales).
Schmematic Differentiation H1c H2c (differentiation of liberals from conservatives)
Significant in 5 of the 7 studies) im not sure how they measured this
Attitude Certainty H1d H2d (comparison of “not sure/DK” answers
H2d was supported in all 7 studies—thus fewer DKs after deliberation
Conclusions (15)
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