Samuels. 2002. "Pork Barreling is Not Credit Claiming."

Samuels (2002)
“…the relationship they establish w/the owners of private firms ultimately may be more important to their career success than the actual amount of pork that they deliver to voters because this relationship brings campaign contributions, and the contributions provide the resources that candidates need to advance campaigns” (852).

Argument refuting: Congressman get votes, via pork. Case study: Brazil.
Pork is really important in Brazil;
What is the electoral system?
Use pork to get attention (Ames)
But Samuels says its not the pork that brings in the votes; its money.
Because competition makes it difficult for congressmen to get credit for their pork; thus pork projects offer fewer “returns.”
Regression 1: Pork and Money
Pork does not directly influence votes, but money does.
Regression 2: the more Pork you bring in, the more money you have.

Conclusion: relationships with private firms are more important; pork is for the private interests, and not for constituents.
Mayhew says—serving constituents, bring home the particularized benefits, so you can claim credit, which brings the voters. But Samuels (2002) separates pork barreling from credit claiming—we just think that is what is going on. But in Brazil that is not what is going on. Pork, in Brazil, is for the rich (concrete companies, etc). infividual firms are benefiting. The bridge to nowhere in AK does not benefit AK; it benefits people building the bridge. In the American discipline we WANT to link constituency service with victory; but in reality, those congressmen that bring the most constituency service are actually the ones of the bubble. Why? Because those representatives with insecure positions need to attract more votes. Hasn’t been an empirical connection.
Further research: “my results suggest that research on pork barreling should not be isolated from research on campaign finance” (847).