Immergut (1992) “Institutions, Veto Points, and Policy Results: A Comparative Analysis of Health Care.”

Immergut (1992) “Institutions, Veto Points, and Policy Results: A Comparative Analysis of Health Care.”
Veto points/gate:
The executive—more likely to get legislation passed when the veto point is the EXEC.
Case and point:
Sweden: executive rested in secure parliament majority. Majority + arty discipline = executive wins; Sweden lacked veto points.
France: Executive did not enjoy stable parliamentary majority. Veto point = parliament! IGs influence went up.
Swiss: Referenda; IGs had major electoral influence.
Unitary. Not federal.
Parliamentary. Not Presidential (presidential system = reps more vulnerable)
Parliamentary system: the cabinet is the single veto point. When there is a parliamentary majority, government can impose their will, i.e. NHI.
Reduced interest power with executive decision making.
The best ability to impose costs is a dictatorship (best outcomes, i.e. NHI); most difficult to impose costs is in a deliberative democracy.
Thus in order to get a very publc good yo hve to remove the public from the decision making, and allow government to make decisions against the IGs.

Where do politicians become vulnerable to interest groups? The specific example used is the AMA. In each case the government wanted NHI.
Sweden: impose most costs; gove cant do anything.
France: After a major change gov was able to do something.
Switzerland: EUs California (votes in referenda). Women got the vote in 1971, because men didn’t want women to vote. IGs influence the public (Much like fear appeals used in 1992 (harry and louis) against H.Clinton’s plan).