Immergut (1992) “Institutions, Veto Points, and Policy Results: A Comparative Analysis of Health Care.”
Veto points/gate:
The executive—more likely to get legislation passed when the veto point is the EXEC.
Case and point:
Sweden: executive rested in secure parliament majority. Majority + arty discipline = executive wins; Sweden lacked veto points.
France: Executive did not enjoy stable parliamentary majority. Veto point = parliament! IGs influence went up.
Swiss: Referenda; IGs had major electoral influence.
Unitary. Not federal.
Parliamentary. Not Presidential (presidential system = reps more vulnerable)
Parliamentary system: the cabinet is the single veto point. When there is a parliamentary majority, government can impose their will, i.e. NHI.
Reduced interest power with executive decision making.
The best ability to impose costs is a dictatorship (best outcomes, i.e. NHI); most difficult to impose costs is in a deliberative democracy.
Thus in order to get a very publc good yo hve to remove the public from the decision making, and allow government to make decisions against the IGs.
Where do politicians become vulnerable to interest groups? The specific example used is the AMA. In each case the government wanted NHI.
Sweden: impose most costs; gove cant do anything.
France: After a major change gov was able to do something.
Switzerland: EUs California (votes in referenda). Women got the vote in 1971, because men didn’t want women to vote. IGs influence the public (Much like fear appeals used in 1992 (harry and louis) against H.Clinton’s plan).
Monday, November 10, 2008
Tsebelis (1995) “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parlimentarianism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism.”
Tsebelis (1995) “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parlimentarianism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism.”
Distiguishes between two types of coalitions.
Veto Gates—federal/unitary distinction
Veto Players—executive parties dimension
Distiguishes between two types of coalitions.
Veto Gates—federal/unitary distinction
Veto Players—executive parties dimension
Samuels. 2002. "Pork Barreling is Not Credit Claiming."
Samuels (2002)
“…the relationship they establish w/the owners of private firms ultimately may be more important to their career success than the actual amount of pork that they deliver to voters because this relationship brings campaign contributions, and the contributions provide the resources that candidates need to advance campaigns” (852).
Argument refuting: Congressman get votes, via pork. Case study: Brazil.
Pork is really important in Brazil;
What is the electoral system?
Use pork to get attention (Ames)
But Samuels says its not the pork that brings in the votes; its money.
Because competition makes it difficult for congressmen to get credit for their pork; thus pork projects offer fewer “returns.”
Regression 1: Pork and Money
Pork does not directly influence votes, but money does.
Regression 2: the more Pork you bring in, the more money you have.
Conclusion: relationships with private firms are more important; pork is for the private interests, and not for constituents.
Mayhew says—serving constituents, bring home the particularized benefits, so you can claim credit, which brings the voters. But Samuels (2002) separates pork barreling from credit claiming—we just think that is what is going on. But in Brazil that is not what is going on. Pork, in Brazil, is for the rich (concrete companies, etc). infividual firms are benefiting. The bridge to nowhere in AK does not benefit AK; it benefits people building the bridge. In the American discipline we WANT to link constituency service with victory; but in reality, those congressmen that bring the most constituency service are actually the ones of the bubble. Why? Because those representatives with insecure positions need to attract more votes. Hasn’t been an empirical connection.
Further research: “my results suggest that research on pork barreling should not be isolated from research on campaign finance” (847).
“…the relationship they establish w/the owners of private firms ultimately may be more important to their career success than the actual amount of pork that they deliver to voters because this relationship brings campaign contributions, and the contributions provide the resources that candidates need to advance campaigns” (852).
Argument refuting: Congressman get votes, via pork. Case study: Brazil.
Pork is really important in Brazil;
What is the electoral system?
Use pork to get attention (Ames)
But Samuels says its not the pork that brings in the votes; its money.
Because competition makes it difficult for congressmen to get credit for their pork; thus pork projects offer fewer “returns.”
Regression 1: Pork and Money
Pork does not directly influence votes, but money does.
Regression 2: the more Pork you bring in, the more money you have.
Conclusion: relationships with private firms are more important; pork is for the private interests, and not for constituents.
Mayhew says—serving constituents, bring home the particularized benefits, so you can claim credit, which brings the voters. But Samuels (2002) separates pork barreling from credit claiming—we just think that is what is going on. But in Brazil that is not what is going on. Pork, in Brazil, is for the rich (concrete companies, etc). infividual firms are benefiting. The bridge to nowhere in AK does not benefit AK; it benefits people building the bridge. In the American discipline we WANT to link constituency service with victory; but in reality, those congressmen that bring the most constituency service are actually the ones of the bubble. Why? Because those representatives with insecure positions need to attract more votes. Hasn’t been an empirical connection.
Further research: “my results suggest that research on pork barreling should not be isolated from research on campaign finance” (847).
Monday, November 3, 2008
Katz (1986)
“Intra-party Preference Voting”
Barack Obama supporters are more median voters. Uniting. We are purple. Not as concerned with the means.
Participation costs:
Rallies (faithful, or not? Social acceptance, or not? Politics is trendy, now).
Watching a debate (whether or not you will watch. What is the independent variable? debate format? Divisiveness? Candidates similarity?).
Wearing a sticker.
(who are invested).
Depends on rewards:
1. material: Tangible rewards that can easily be converted into money.
2. solidarity: Intangible rewards that stem from social interaction.
3. purposive: intrinsic rewards that derive from the act of participation itself.
Preference voting; where does it happen?
Where pref. voting occurs:
A candidate cannot rely solely on his or her party for election. “Rather at some point he must distinguish himself from the other candidates of the same party in order to compete for preference votes. This requires the development of an independent base of support within, or in addition to, the regular party apparatus” (101). (In the primaries, in the US, candidates Distinguish themselves by picking different policies!!! Once the general election rolls around, they move to characteristic centered talk/campaigning).
Why do we focus on personal characteristics? The middle is where we need to sway. Not goin to sway swing voters with policy. They are paying attention, now, but not to specifics. Strictly character difference. Dumbed down, etc. because they understand the more personal things.
What is preference voting? Making a list. 2nd vote getting can get a seat, as party captures more vote. (3 seat district??). quotas. Take all votes for least popular candidate and move them up. The votes from the bottom do not come up until quotas are full.
Intraparty turnover
Do incumbents lose on account of intra or inter?
Look at party cohesion, form the inside. Which part. Members actually get elected will determine policy production.
STV (single transferable vote)
SNTV (single nontransferable vote): Japan; candidates run for more than one party; you have only one vote. You as a party may lose some seats if the candidate is too popular (how?). LDP powers in government distributed benefits (so you definitely voted for LDP in your district), and one person campaigned in one district, and another person in another district, and then the LDP gave away cash and the district voted for their particular representative.
SMD (single member district)
Plurality: through use of direct primary, allows for pref. voting. Candidate reputations are really important in the US.
What is the role of ideology?
Two candidates of the same party to compete for a vote (list PR), generates intraparty pref. voting. Which creates a focus on candidates reps. Not parties.
Intraparty preference voting is important in Ireland’s system, as well as Malta’s primary.
The primary is important. Who would lead if there were no primary (if party leaders chose who was going to run on the ticket). But it has made personalities more important.
Barack Obama supporters are more median voters. Uniting. We are purple. Not as concerned with the means.
Participation costs:
Rallies (faithful, or not? Social acceptance, or not? Politics is trendy, now).
Watching a debate (whether or not you will watch. What is the independent variable? debate format? Divisiveness? Candidates similarity?).
Wearing a sticker.
(who are invested).
Depends on rewards:
1. material: Tangible rewards that can easily be converted into money.
2. solidarity: Intangible rewards that stem from social interaction.
3. purposive: intrinsic rewards that derive from the act of participation itself.
Preference voting; where does it happen?
Where pref. voting occurs:
A candidate cannot rely solely on his or her party for election. “Rather at some point he must distinguish himself from the other candidates of the same party in order to compete for preference votes. This requires the development of an independent base of support within, or in addition to, the regular party apparatus” (101). (In the primaries, in the US, candidates Distinguish themselves by picking different policies!!! Once the general election rolls around, they move to characteristic centered talk/campaigning).
Why do we focus on personal characteristics? The middle is where we need to sway. Not goin to sway swing voters with policy. They are paying attention, now, but not to specifics. Strictly character difference. Dumbed down, etc. because they understand the more personal things.
What is preference voting? Making a list. 2nd vote getting can get a seat, as party captures more vote. (3 seat district??). quotas. Take all votes for least popular candidate and move them up. The votes from the bottom do not come up until quotas are full.
Intraparty turnover
Do incumbents lose on account of intra or inter?
Look at party cohesion, form the inside. Which part. Members actually get elected will determine policy production.
STV (single transferable vote)
SNTV (single nontransferable vote): Japan; candidates run for more than one party; you have only one vote. You as a party may lose some seats if the candidate is too popular (how?). LDP powers in government distributed benefits (so you definitely voted for LDP in your district), and one person campaigned in one district, and another person in another district, and then the LDP gave away cash and the district voted for their particular representative.
SMD (single member district)
Plurality: through use of direct primary, allows for pref. voting. Candidate reputations are really important in the US.
What is the role of ideology?
Two candidates of the same party to compete for a vote (list PR), generates intraparty pref. voting. Which creates a focus on candidates reps. Not parties.
Intraparty preference voting is important in Ireland’s system, as well as Malta’s primary.
The primary is important. Who would lead if there were no primary (if party leaders chose who was going to run on the ticket). But it has made personalities more important.
Carey & Shugart (1994)
Carey & Shugart. 1994. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas,” Electoral Studies 14(4): 417-439.
Campaigning on personal, rather than party reputation.
Abstract.
In this article, we present a method for estimating the relative value to legislators (and candidates for legislative seats) of personal reputations vs. party reputations for advancing political careers.
Variables:
(1) ballot control (2) vote pooling (3) types of votes (4) district magnitude
Electoral system makes a difference (418).
“…it is widely accepted that in open list systems, personal reputation is more valuable to legislative candidates than in close list systems” (418).
Operationalization:
Rank ordering of systems
Representation focus:
People’s political knowledge is going to vary; we expect this. At a certain level we do not vote our personal interests. Tragic. A coherent ideology is a necessary precondition to be political sophistication. And thus competition that is framed around ideologies matter.
In both PR and SMD systems there are some candidate focused elections and some party focused elections.
Candidate centered: Focus on individuals where personalities matter.
The casual mechanism might be institutionalized incentives to cultivate a personal vote; not party affiliation or policy positions.
Campaigning on personal, rather than party reputation.
Abstract.
In this article, we present a method for estimating the relative value to legislators (and candidates for legislative seats) of personal reputations vs. party reputations for advancing political careers.
Variables:
(1) ballot control (2) vote pooling (3) types of votes (4) district magnitude
Electoral system makes a difference (418).
“…it is widely accepted that in open list systems, personal reputation is more valuable to legislative candidates than in close list systems” (418).
Operationalization:
Rank ordering of systems
Representation focus:
People’s political knowledge is going to vary; we expect this. At a certain level we do not vote our personal interests. Tragic. A coherent ideology is a necessary precondition to be political sophistication. And thus competition that is framed around ideologies matter.
In both PR and SMD systems there are some candidate focused elections and some party focused elections.
Candidate centered: Focus on individuals where personalities matter.
The casual mechanism might be institutionalized incentives to cultivate a personal vote; not party affiliation or policy positions.
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