Key Terms: the Political Environment: Motivation + Available Information
How do the value of information and induced motivation work together to influence the quality of citizens decision-making?
What is the “political environment?” “The totality of politically relevant communication to which citizens are exposed. It includes all the statements and information that the media, public officials, interest groups and other relevant actors provide with respect to a iven issue or policy debate” (footnote 411). When the environment invokes MOTIVATION decision making is improved (Sanbonmatsu & Fazio 1990). “The most relevant motivation in the context of evaluating policy, then, is simply the inclination to evaluate policies thoughtfully and seriously, then just as political environments can vary in the quality of the information they provide, so can they vary in the extent to which they encourage thoughtful evaluation” (413).
Data: Survey of 1160 random adults in Illinois.
Issue: Health Care Tradeoffs
Condition 1: environment devoid of information and incentive; will respondents make tradeoffs when they don’t have to? (questionnaire with 7 goals, rate from 1-10/ p. 416)
Findings: most people rated each of the 7 goals as a 10 importance completion; when we control for education, those highly educated are likely to demand less.
Condition 2: respondent received general information item about tradeoffs. Not a significant change—“Simply stating that decision about governmental programs require giving up one thing to get something else does not redice the overall demand to achieve all of the goals” (419).
Condition 3: a randomly selected 25% were told that people do best on these types of questions when they take time to think…” another 25% were told to act as if they were a public official. Both conditions were meant to increase cognitive processing and induce a greater willingness to overcome the unpleasantness with compromising some desired goals. (motivational instruction). Insignificant findings. Asking people to think doesn’t change their responses.
Condition 4: general information + motivational instruction = significance. (reduce demand, invoke tradeoffs).
Also, respondents are more likely to make tradeoffs in high information environments (57% of respondents choice tradeoff option).
Tuesday, January 1, 2008
Gilens, M. (2001) Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences.
Not measuring policy preferences; merely political information levels.
raw policy facts have a significant influence on the public’s political judgments.
I show that:
(1) ignorance of policy-specific information leads many Americans to hold different views from those they would hold otherwise
(2) the effect of policy specific information is not adequately captured by the measures of general political knowledge used in previous research
(3) the effect of policy-specific ignorance is greatest for Americans with the highest levels of political knowledge. Rather than serve to dilute the influence of new information, general knowledge (and the cognitive capacities it reflects) appears to facilitate the incorporation of new policy-specific information into political judgments (379). The more political informed have somewhere to couch the information.
Methods: impute the hypothetical “fully informed” electorate (Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter).
Data—3 kinds:
(1) measure of general political knowledge
(2) measure of policy specific information
(3) measure of policy prefs plausible
expanding the literature:
(1) assess the effect of “policy-specific ignorance” on the policy preferences of those who are deemed fully informed by the criteria of prior research.
(2) compare policy preferences expressed by respondents who were randomly chosen to receive specific political information to the preferences of a control group.
(3) ask how the effects of policy-specific information differs for respondents with different levels of political information. TWO ALTERNATIVES have been suggested. On the one hand, general political knowledge, and its correlates such as political interest and cognitive sophisticntion, may enhance individuals’ ability and motivation to respond to new policy-specific information (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). On the other hand, heneral political knowledge may provide a resource to resist the influence of new policy-specific information (Zaller 1992). And if both forces are at work we many find a curvilinear relationship between general political knowledge and the effect of policy specific information or not apparent relationship at all” (380).
Expected findings: much of what separates actual political preferences from hypothetical “enlightened preferences” is due to ignorance of specific policy-relevant facts, not a lack of general political knowledge or the cognitive skills or orientations that measures of general political information reflect” (380). And policy-specific information has a stronger influence on respondents who display higher levels of general political knowledge. (what does Bartels say about the effect of information on the vote choice of highly sophisticated?).
Policy specific information:
Crime & Foreign Aid (merely true false questions; not an issue of preferences—but do they influence policy preferences? What are the effects of policy specific information on policy preferences).
sarah's notes:
Policy specific information => opinion change
Method: surveys and survey-based experiments
Would political judgments change if people were more/fully informed?
Previous research:
-Give a representative group more information and see if their judgements change
-Impute preferences based on demographics and vary level of information, see if opinions differ
This research uses the second method, but with policy-specific knowledge as the variable instead of broad, general knowledge, with all respondents at high general knowledge level
Also use experiment that randomly gives some people policy information and others none, and test for differences in opinion.
Also, include general knowledge as a variable, and test effect of policy knowledge on those with high and low general knowledge
Conclusions:
1. general knowledge is an incomplete measure of knowledge neccesarry to form preferences
2. policy-specific ignorance has a greater effect on preferences than general knowledge
3. policy-specific knowledge has a greater effect on more knowledgeable ppl.
Survey: People who have high general knowledge are more likely to have policy-specific knowledge, but policy-specific knowledge is still widespread, especially for certain issues (crime rate, environmental policy under Reagan, budget to foreign aid).
Survey: Imputed preferences under full policy-specific and general knowledge produced different preferences than those observed. Fully informed opinion has a liberal tendency (when study is done during republican presidency)
Experiment: People who are given policy-specific information have different policy preferences matching predictions and changes in the survey situation.
Both methods have issues, but consistency between them gives validity to both.
In theory, more knowledgeable people may react more or less to policy-specific information. Less because they already probably know more and so each new piece of information has less effect. More because thy are better at incorporating new information and their preferences are more ideologically consistent, hence more apt to change in consistent ways.
People who had high general knowledge were more affected by policy-specific knowledge. Lowest knowledge category mostly unaffected by specific information.
raw policy facts have a significant influence on the public’s political judgments.
I show that:
(1) ignorance of policy-specific information leads many Americans to hold different views from those they would hold otherwise
(2) the effect of policy specific information is not adequately captured by the measures of general political knowledge used in previous research
(3) the effect of policy-specific ignorance is greatest for Americans with the highest levels of political knowledge. Rather than serve to dilute the influence of new information, general knowledge (and the cognitive capacities it reflects) appears to facilitate the incorporation of new policy-specific information into political judgments (379). The more political informed have somewhere to couch the information.
Methods: impute the hypothetical “fully informed” electorate (Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter).
Data—3 kinds:
(1) measure of general political knowledge
(2) measure of policy specific information
(3) measure of policy prefs plausible
expanding the literature:
(1) assess the effect of “policy-specific ignorance” on the policy preferences of those who are deemed fully informed by the criteria of prior research.
(2) compare policy preferences expressed by respondents who were randomly chosen to receive specific political information to the preferences of a control group.
(3) ask how the effects of policy-specific information differs for respondents with different levels of political information. TWO ALTERNATIVES have been suggested. On the one hand, general political knowledge, and its correlates such as political interest and cognitive sophisticntion, may enhance individuals’ ability and motivation to respond to new policy-specific information (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). On the other hand, heneral political knowledge may provide a resource to resist the influence of new policy-specific information (Zaller 1992). And if both forces are at work we many find a curvilinear relationship between general political knowledge and the effect of policy specific information or not apparent relationship at all” (380).
Expected findings: much of what separates actual political preferences from hypothetical “enlightened preferences” is due to ignorance of specific policy-relevant facts, not a lack of general political knowledge or the cognitive skills or orientations that measures of general political information reflect” (380). And policy-specific information has a stronger influence on respondents who display higher levels of general political knowledge. (what does Bartels say about the effect of information on the vote choice of highly sophisticated?).
Policy specific information:
Crime & Foreign Aid (merely true false questions; not an issue of preferences—but do they influence policy preferences? What are the effects of policy specific information on policy preferences).
sarah's notes:
Policy specific information => opinion change
Method: surveys and survey-based experiments
Would political judgments change if people were more/fully informed?
Previous research:
-Give a representative group more information and see if their judgements change
-Impute preferences based on demographics and vary level of information, see if opinions differ
This research uses the second method, but with policy-specific knowledge as the variable instead of broad, general knowledge, with all respondents at high general knowledge level
Also use experiment that randomly gives some people policy information and others none, and test for differences in opinion.
Also, include general knowledge as a variable, and test effect of policy knowledge on those with high and low general knowledge
Conclusions:
1. general knowledge is an incomplete measure of knowledge neccesarry to form preferences
2. policy-specific ignorance has a greater effect on preferences than general knowledge
3. policy-specific knowledge has a greater effect on more knowledgeable ppl.
Survey: People who have high general knowledge are more likely to have policy-specific knowledge, but policy-specific knowledge is still widespread, especially for certain issues (crime rate, environmental policy under Reagan, budget to foreign aid).
Survey: Imputed preferences under full policy-specific and general knowledge produced different preferences than those observed. Fully informed opinion has a liberal tendency (when study is done during republican presidency)
Experiment: People who are given policy-specific information have different policy preferences matching predictions and changes in the survey situation.
Both methods have issues, but consistency between them gives validity to both.
In theory, more knowledgeable people may react more or less to policy-specific information. Less because they already probably know more and so each new piece of information has less effect. More because thy are better at incorporating new information and their preferences are more ideologically consistent, hence more apt to change in consistent ways.
People who had high general knowledge were more affected by policy-specific knowledge. Lowest knowledge category mostly unaffected by specific information.
Gastil & Dillard. (1999). Increasing Political Sophistication Through Public...
Does information make individuals move left or right? Framing effects?
Face-to-face deliberation will result in (1) more coherent and certain political judgments and (2) more integrated and differentiated political judgments, and reduced attitudinal uncertainly.
Deliberative Democratic Theory: deliberation aids in the development of political sophistication. (discussion and reflection) (Barber 1984, Fishkin 1991,1995; Gastil & Adam 1995).
Test this claim: authors studied associations between face-to-face political deliberation and subsequent changes in the coherence, integration, differentiation, and detail of participants’ political beliefs (dep. var). authors administered questionnaire pre and post deliberative discussions of political issues.
Clarification
Schema: a cognitive structure that represents one’s general knowledge about a given concept (Fiske & Taylor 1984, 12; also Eagly and Chaiken 1993). I.e. liberal and conservative schemas; liberalism: individual freedom, egalitarianism, tolerance, social change, secular rationality, and constitutional participatory democracy that protects minority interests. Conservatism: religion, morality, status quo, natural inequality, competition, personal liberty, initiative, and property emphasis.
(1) Schematic coherence: an issue is clearly and CONSISTENTLY defined.
(2) Integrated and differentiated beliefs: ideologically (liberalism/conservatism) consistent
Schematic cohernce and certainty will come from modeling and experiential learning.
Schematic integration a nd differentiation will develop through other educational processes—instruction and inference. Persuasion.
First set of hypotheses test the effects of deliberation on political sophistical:
H1: part. With more formal education will express perform attitudes that reflect:
a. greater internal coherence (inter-item correlations with attitude scale)
b. greater schematic integration (positive correlation of ideologically similar scales)
c. greater schematic differentiation (negative correlation of dissimilar scales) and
d. lower attitudinal uncertainty (fewer DK responses).
Second set of hypotheses test the effect of deliberation on participants pre-forum opinions, regardless of initial sophistication level.
H2 In comparison with pre-forums opinions, participants post-forum political views will show:
a. greater schematic coherence
b. more schematic integration
c. more schematic differentiation
d. reduced attitudinal uncertainty
Data:
7 issue books—pre and postforum data;
participants completed NIF ballots between 1991 and 1993; 88% white; 58% female
To test the 2 sets of hypotheses an educ attainment ballot was trichotomized: (1) some high school or diploma, (2) some college or 4 year degree and (3) some grad schoool/grd degree.
Set 1:
Schematic integration: 2 liberal scales or 2 conservative scales
Schematic differentiation: negative correlation between ideologically dissimilar scales.
Attitudinal uncertainty = DKs.
Set 2:
Analysis of change scores (subtracting pre attitude score and post).
Findings:
H1a: few stat sig diffs among schem coherence for all three educ groups.
H2a: same
H1b: supported
H2b: supported
H1c: supported
H2c: supported
H1d: supported
H2d: supported
Conclusion: NIF deliberation had a short-term effect on the sophistication of participants’ schematic networks. After forums, they had more diff and integrated views and exhibited less attit uncertainty. Well, if DK is also associated with people who don’t vote, we can assume its not ambivalence but low information-levels.
Class notes:
How do we recognize when someone is “open” instead of “uncertain?”
Questions posed and criticisms made:
Also, why is consistency associated with informed?
Are we talking about “change” of opinion or “reinforcement” of opinion? Which is bad, if the original opinion was inconsistent with the persons interests?
Plus, NIF forces one to have an opinion—what if this opinion is merely held for the duration of the discussion.
Druckman (2004)
Framing effects: your preferences are changed by the “frame.” This is why we are concerned about the media’s role; how much power do they have?
After deliberation, people are less affected by the frames. W00t.
Hetero discussion—most change.
Homo discussion—still change from condition form when there was no discussion.
No discussion-least amount of change.
Counter-frame: CNN and Fox
What happens when you are exposed to both frames? i.e. CNN and Fox. Decrease framing effects. And you end up with “authentic” opinion, which is consistent with your values (liberalism/conservatism).
Neutrality = no counter-frame. What happens here?
Barabas (2004)
How does deliberation work? Why do we always assume deliberative effects are good?
Where is deliberation working?
Barabas measures enlightenment, normal conversation (as opposed to just be exposed to arguments).
Moderated.
Key var: need to be open-minded. People had to be reminded to be open-minded.
Must have a diversity of opinion and open-mindedness to have deliberation.
Hypotheses (690)
Ideal, achieve consensus?
Expects deliberation will have a positive effect on enlightenment.
Effects on softening ones view?
What is about the information environment that fosters authentic opinions?
Framing leads to increased polarization?
To decrease polarization we need more moderated frames?
Issue 1: Free Speech: How Free is Too Free
Choice 1: The case for legal sanctions (Conservative 1a)
Choice 2: The private-sector solutions (Conservative 1b)
Choice 3: More speech, not enforced silence (Liberal 3)
Issue 2: America’s Role in the World: New Risks, New Realities
Choice 1: support for a superpower strategy (Conservative 1)
Choice 2:support for a multilateral approach (Liberal 3)
Issue 3: Energy Options: Finding a Solution to the Power Predicament
Choice 1: support for alternatives such as wind and solar (Liberal 2)
Choice 2: support for nucmear power (Conservative 3)
Choice 3: reduce use of energy and oil (Liberal 4a)
Choice 4: we are in an energy crisis (Liberal 4b)
Issue 4: Prescription for Prosperity: Four Paths to Economic Renewel
Choice 1: support free market (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: support for public investment (Liberal 2)
Choice 3: interventionist industrial policy (Liberal 4)
Issue 5: Criminal Violence: What Direction Now for the War on Crime
Choice 1: support for tough laws (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: social reform approach (Liberal 3)
Choice 3: Strict sentences (Conservative 3)
Issue 6: The Health Care Crisis: Containing Costs, Expanding Coverage
Choice 1: support of status quo (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: support of universal health care (Liberal 2)
Choice 3: cost-cutting approach (Liberal 4)
Issue 7: People and Politics: Who Should Govern?
Choice 1: All liberal
Results:
Schematic Integration H1b and H2b (positively associated with formal education)
Educ scale (1 hs, 2 college, 3 grad)
Conservative s.i. preforum statistically significant for free speech
1 .57
2 .61
3 .71
also statistic sig. preforum: (study numbers 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) Environment on all liberal scales, economy for liberal scales, crime for conservative scales, healthcare for liberal scales, and all of item 7 (liberal scales).
Schmematic Differentiation H1c H2c (differentiation of liberals from conservatives)
Significant in 5 of the 7 studies) im not sure how they measured this
Attitude Certainty H1d H2d (comparison of “not sure/DK” answers
H2d was supported in all 7 studies—thus fewer DKs after deliberation
Conclusions (15)
Face-to-face deliberation will result in (1) more coherent and certain political judgments and (2) more integrated and differentiated political judgments, and reduced attitudinal uncertainly.
Deliberative Democratic Theory: deliberation aids in the development of political sophistication. (discussion and reflection) (Barber 1984, Fishkin 1991,1995; Gastil & Adam 1995).
Test this claim: authors studied associations between face-to-face political deliberation and subsequent changes in the coherence, integration, differentiation, and detail of participants’ political beliefs (dep. var). authors administered questionnaire pre and post deliberative discussions of political issues.
Clarification
Schema: a cognitive structure that represents one’s general knowledge about a given concept (Fiske & Taylor 1984, 12; also Eagly and Chaiken 1993). I.e. liberal and conservative schemas; liberalism: individual freedom, egalitarianism, tolerance, social change, secular rationality, and constitutional participatory democracy that protects minority interests. Conservatism: religion, morality, status quo, natural inequality, competition, personal liberty, initiative, and property emphasis.
(1) Schematic coherence: an issue is clearly and CONSISTENTLY defined.
(2) Integrated and differentiated beliefs: ideologically (liberalism/conservatism) consistent
Schematic cohernce and certainty will come from modeling and experiential learning.
Schematic integration a nd differentiation will develop through other educational processes—instruction and inference. Persuasion.
First set of hypotheses test the effects of deliberation on political sophistical:
H1: part. With more formal education will express perform attitudes that reflect:
a. greater internal coherence (inter-item correlations with attitude scale)
b. greater schematic integration (positive correlation of ideologically similar scales)
c. greater schematic differentiation (negative correlation of dissimilar scales) and
d. lower attitudinal uncertainty (fewer DK responses).
Second set of hypotheses test the effect of deliberation on participants pre-forum opinions, regardless of initial sophistication level.
H2 In comparison with pre-forums opinions, participants post-forum political views will show:
a. greater schematic coherence
b. more schematic integration
c. more schematic differentiation
d. reduced attitudinal uncertainty
Data:
7 issue books—pre and postforum data;
participants completed NIF ballots between 1991 and 1993; 88% white; 58% female
To test the 2 sets of hypotheses an educ attainment ballot was trichotomized: (1) some high school or diploma, (2) some college or 4 year degree and (3) some grad schoool/grd degree.
Set 1:
Schematic integration: 2 liberal scales or 2 conservative scales
Schematic differentiation: negative correlation between ideologically dissimilar scales.
Attitudinal uncertainty = DKs.
Set 2:
Analysis of change scores (subtracting pre attitude score and post).
Findings:
H1a: few stat sig diffs among schem coherence for all three educ groups.
H2a: same
H1b: supported
H2b: supported
H1c: supported
H2c: supported
H1d: supported
H2d: supported
Conclusion: NIF deliberation had a short-term effect on the sophistication of participants’ schematic networks. After forums, they had more diff and integrated views and exhibited less attit uncertainty. Well, if DK is also associated with people who don’t vote, we can assume its not ambivalence but low information-levels.
Class notes:
How do we recognize when someone is “open” instead of “uncertain?”
Questions posed and criticisms made:
Also, why is consistency associated with informed?
Are we talking about “change” of opinion or “reinforcement” of opinion? Which is bad, if the original opinion was inconsistent with the persons interests?
Plus, NIF forces one to have an opinion—what if this opinion is merely held for the duration of the discussion.
Druckman (2004)
Framing effects: your preferences are changed by the “frame.” This is why we are concerned about the media’s role; how much power do they have?
After deliberation, people are less affected by the frames. W00t.
Hetero discussion—most change.
Homo discussion—still change from condition form when there was no discussion.
No discussion-least amount of change.
Counter-frame: CNN and Fox
What happens when you are exposed to both frames? i.e. CNN and Fox. Decrease framing effects. And you end up with “authentic” opinion, which is consistent with your values (liberalism/conservatism).
Neutrality = no counter-frame. What happens here?
Barabas (2004)
How does deliberation work? Why do we always assume deliberative effects are good?
Where is deliberation working?
Barabas measures enlightenment, normal conversation (as opposed to just be exposed to arguments).
Moderated.
Key var: need to be open-minded. People had to be reminded to be open-minded.
Must have a diversity of opinion and open-mindedness to have deliberation.
Hypotheses (690)
Ideal, achieve consensus?
Expects deliberation will have a positive effect on enlightenment.
Effects on softening ones view?
What is about the information environment that fosters authentic opinions?
Framing leads to increased polarization?
To decrease polarization we need more moderated frames?
Issue 1: Free Speech: How Free is Too Free
Choice 1: The case for legal sanctions (Conservative 1a)
Choice 2: The private-sector solutions (Conservative 1b)
Choice 3: More speech, not enforced silence (Liberal 3)
Issue 2: America’s Role in the World: New Risks, New Realities
Choice 1: support for a superpower strategy (Conservative 1)
Choice 2:support for a multilateral approach (Liberal 3)
Issue 3: Energy Options: Finding a Solution to the Power Predicament
Choice 1: support for alternatives such as wind and solar (Liberal 2)
Choice 2: support for nucmear power (Conservative 3)
Choice 3: reduce use of energy and oil (Liberal 4a)
Choice 4: we are in an energy crisis (Liberal 4b)
Issue 4: Prescription for Prosperity: Four Paths to Economic Renewel
Choice 1: support free market (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: support for public investment (Liberal 2)
Choice 3: interventionist industrial policy (Liberal 4)
Issue 5: Criminal Violence: What Direction Now for the War on Crime
Choice 1: support for tough laws (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: social reform approach (Liberal 3)
Choice 3: Strict sentences (Conservative 3)
Issue 6: The Health Care Crisis: Containing Costs, Expanding Coverage
Choice 1: support of status quo (Conservative 1)
Choice 2: support of universal health care (Liberal 2)
Choice 3: cost-cutting approach (Liberal 4)
Issue 7: People and Politics: Who Should Govern?
Choice 1: All liberal
Results:
Schematic Integration H1b and H2b (positively associated with formal education)
Educ scale (1 hs, 2 college, 3 grad)
Conservative s.i. preforum statistically significant for free speech
1 .57
2 .61
3 .71
also statistic sig. preforum: (study numbers 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) Environment on all liberal scales, economy for liberal scales, crime for conservative scales, healthcare for liberal scales, and all of item 7 (liberal scales).
Schmematic Differentiation H1c H2c (differentiation of liberals from conservatives)
Significant in 5 of the 7 studies) im not sure how they measured this
Attitude Certainty H1d H2d (comparison of “not sure/DK” answers
H2d was supported in all 7 studies—thus fewer DKs after deliberation
Conclusions (15)
Barabas, J. (2004). “How Deliberation Affects Policy Opinions,” APSR 98:4, 687-701.
A theory of opinion updating where citizens who deliberate revise their prior beliefs, particularly why they encourney consensual messages. A key aspect of this model is that opinion strength modetertes the deliberative opinion change process.
Deliberation must meet two criteria:
(1) diversity of messages
(2) participants have an open mind
Prior→new information→Posterior (can become more certain or can change entirely)
To start we must know discussants predeliberative opinions and how strongly they are held. then given clear information; then, do they come to a verbal agreement?
“Significant opinion change is probable only for individuals who do not hold strong opinions…Opinion shift in the aggregate only when diverse deliberators with weak views come to an agreement” (690).
H1 Citizens who deliberate will significantly increase number of correct responses
H2 Aggregate opinions will move significantly in the direction of consensual deliberation
H3 opinion strength will moderate opinion change.
“Overall, then, before the forum the two groups were indistinguishable, afterward, the citizens who attended the deliberation forum were much more likely to know the correct answers to six specific pieces of factual information in the social security program less likely to offer incorrect or don’t know responses” (693).
Further, “the opinions of forum participants coalesced on the issues where they found common ground during deliberation” (694) –consensus effects.
Additionally, those with the weakest initial opinions saw the most change (this speaks to idea that stable opinion are the most informed. For example, as explained by Chong and Druckman (2007):
…stable opinions are a misguided criterion for evaluating the quality of political evaluations…(120). Stable attitudes can reflect sophisticated reasoning or dogmatism and inflexibility. Hence, both excessive instability and excessive stability of public opinion can be liabilities in a democracy. At one extreme we have citizens without sufficiently developed attitudes, who can be routinely manipulated by alternative frames of a problem; at the other extreme, we have citizens whose attitudes are held so tightly that they seek only to reinforce existing views, and every frame elicits the same close-minded response. It is not apparent which portrait of the public is less desirable (121 emphasis added).
Deliberation must meet two criteria:
(1) diversity of messages
(2) participants have an open mind
Prior→new information→Posterior (can become more certain or can change entirely)
To start we must know discussants predeliberative opinions and how strongly they are held. then given clear information; then, do they come to a verbal agreement?
“Significant opinion change is probable only for individuals who do not hold strong opinions…Opinion shift in the aggregate only when diverse deliberators with weak views come to an agreement” (690).
H1 Citizens who deliberate will significantly increase number of correct responses
H2 Aggregate opinions will move significantly in the direction of consensual deliberation
H3 opinion strength will moderate opinion change.
“Overall, then, before the forum the two groups were indistinguishable, afterward, the citizens who attended the deliberation forum were much more likely to know the correct answers to six specific pieces of factual information in the social security program less likely to offer incorrect or don’t know responses” (693).
Further, “the opinions of forum participants coalesced on the issues where they found common ground during deliberation” (694) –consensus effects.
Additionally, those with the weakest initial opinions saw the most change (this speaks to idea that stable opinion are the most informed. For example, as explained by Chong and Druckman (2007):
…stable opinions are a misguided criterion for evaluating the quality of political evaluations…(120). Stable attitudes can reflect sophisticated reasoning or dogmatism and inflexibility. Hence, both excessive instability and excessive stability of public opinion can be liabilities in a democracy. At one extreme we have citizens without sufficiently developed attitudes, who can be routinely manipulated by alternative frames of a problem; at the other extreme, we have citizens whose attitudes are held so tightly that they seek only to reinforce existing views, and every frame elicits the same close-minded response. It is not apparent which portrait of the public is less desirable (121 emphasis added).
Iyengar (1987) “Television News and Citizens’ Explanations of National Affairs”
Abstract: Causal beliefs are important ingredients of public opinion. Citizens are able to identify the causes of complex national issues and do so spontaneously. Evidence is presented that individuals; explanations of political issues are significantly influenced by the manner in which television news presentations “frame” these issues. These results are politically consequential, for individual explanations of national issues independently affect their assessments of presidential performance.
Causal beliefs:
Why is explanatory knowledge important?
Answers to causal questions abound in popular culture, making the task of explanation relatively inexpensive (consider information costs in this regard to be low)
Its usable! More important, explanatory knowledge is connotative knowledge. To “know” that unemployment occurs because of motivational deficiencies on the party of the unemployed is relevant to our attitudes toward the unemployed and our policy prefs regarding unemployment.
Iyengar conducted experiments
People watched 7 stories, 1 was manipulated.
Then answered open-ended questions.
Poverty question:
Iyengar found that there were corresponding responses to the frame and to some extent on the type of person depicted in the story (ie. Race).
Unemployment question:
High unemployment (structural frame)
Focus on unemployed person (individual frame)
Individual frame: more supportive of Reagan—problem is seen as individual, not governmental. (are both actually “correct?” doesn’t get at this. just
For the least informed, framing effects can drive the changes.
It appears to be that institutions have this effect
Causal beliefs:
Why is explanatory knowledge important?
Answers to causal questions abound in popular culture, making the task of explanation relatively inexpensive (consider information costs in this regard to be low)
Its usable! More important, explanatory knowledge is connotative knowledge. To “know” that unemployment occurs because of motivational deficiencies on the party of the unemployed is relevant to our attitudes toward the unemployed and our policy prefs regarding unemployment.
Iyengar conducted experiments
People watched 7 stories, 1 was manipulated.
Then answered open-ended questions.
Poverty question:
Iyengar found that there were corresponding responses to the frame and to some extent on the type of person depicted in the story (ie. Race).
Unemployment question:
High unemployment (structural frame)
Focus on unemployed person (individual frame)
Individual frame: more supportive of Reagan—problem is seen as individual, not governmental. (are both actually “correct?” doesn’t get at this. just
For the least informed, framing effects can drive the changes.
It appears to be that institutions have this effect
Amy (2002) Real Choices, Real Voices
What is most useful?
What is it that the PR system brings to the table that alter political sophistication?
Chapter 1 Fair Representation For All
John Stuart Mill: “It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented. No real democtacy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it.”
“The essential purpose of democratic elections is to allow as many people as possible to gain representation and to produce a legislature that faithfully reflects the various political views of the electorate” (25). SMDs fail to do so. A large number of Americans come away from elections without any representation, and thus go without any say in government. SMP elections represent only the majority or plurality of voters in a district. “Thus only the voters who are actually represented are those who vote for the winning candidate” (26). The rest “wasted” their vote.
Non-Rep contributes to:
-Voter apathy (low turnout, chapter 7).
-Legitimacy of our elections
Why does it continue?
-our reps claim to represent “all of us”
How does PR fix this?
Chapter 3 Improving Election Campaigns
State in the US: Mudslinging, slogan-ridden. 99% incumbency rate; SMPs encourage politicians to:
(1) neglect a serious discussion of issues and
(2) give candidates incentive to pursue negative campaigns (69).
(1) Neglecting the issues
“Ideally election campaigns should be opportunities for the voters to learn about the candidates’ policy positions and the social and economic theories that underlie them…But these are hardly the campaigns we get today, when issues and policies rarely play a central role in political campaigns” (70). All style, no content advertisements.
Benjamin Page:
“The most striking feature of candidates’ rhetoric about policy is its extreme vagueness. The typical campaign speech says virtually nothing specific about policy alternatives; discussions of the issues are hidden away in little-publicized statemesnts and position papers…In short, policy stands are infrequent, inconspicuous, and unspecific…Candidates are silled at appearing to say much while actually saying very little” (60, 1993).
*The usual suspects: the press, the public the politician.
**Why it’s the Voting system:
-Plurality makes issues risky because in order to capture a majority, candidates have to please as many of their constituents as possible; they cannot do this if they take strong positions that alienate a large proportion of the voters. “offend as few people as possible” (64, 1993). “Voter alienation multiples as the candidates broadcast more and more…eventually threatening their ability to put together a majority coalition” (65, 1993). “Instead of emphasizing issue stands—which is risky—it is much safer to campaign on character and personality” (65, 1993).
(2) Negative campaigns
designed to make it more difficult to capture majority..
Why PR is different:
-candidates are not obsessed with pleasing most of the people most of the time to get elected. Thus, they are more honest about their policy positions and can run issue-oriented campaigns.
-candidates run on a party label. Thus the character and personality of the candidates is not in the limelight, and even is inconsequential (68 1993).
-the character if multiple parties encourages a discussion of policy prefs. Candidates and parties have to distinguish themselves from opponents (1993, 70).
Chapter 4: Toward a Multi-Party System
Probs with a 2-party system:
-feelings of dissatisfaction
-the two parties are tweedle dee and tweedle dum (77, 1993).
HOW IS THIS CAUSED BY THE SMDs?
-Lowi: the “effect of a plurality system is that over time it contributes to the development not only of a two-party system, but on two moderate parties, that generally differ only slightly in their programs and policies” (80 1993). The candidates migrate to the middle.
Duverger’s Law: explains the supportive relationship between plurality rules and 2-party systems; voting rules work against multi-party governance in 2 ways: 1. The mechanical effect: the tendency of the plurality system to give the largest party more seats than it deserves and to give smaller parties fewer seats than they deserve (83). 2. The psychological effect: potential supporters will hesitate to vote for a minor-party candidate if they believe the candidate has little chance.
Chapter 7: Encouraging Voter Turnout
The poor abstain from voting because they see few politicians from either party as offering policies that would significantly address their problems (142, 1993). (attitudinal explanation); but mostly, institutional barriers such as voter registration guidelines (non-compulsory voting).
Amy (2002) recognizes eight problems with plurality elections: (1) Low voter turnout, (2) Tweedledum and Tweedledee candidates, (3) the two-party monopoly, (4) wasted votes, (5) issueless campaigns, (6) underrepresentation of women, (7) lack of minority representation, and (8) gerrymandering. These eight conditions work together to discourage motivation for being political knowledgeable.
Plurality rules encourage a two-party system. Duverger’s Law attributes the plurality systems as working against multi-party governance in two ways: (1) The mechanical effect which is the tendency of the plurality system to give the largest party more seats than it deserves and to give smaller parties fewer seats than they deserve And (2) the psychological effect which holds that potential supporters will hesitate to vote for a minor-party candidate if they believe the candidate has little chance. (Amy 1993, 83). Amy (2002) uses a grocery store shopping analogy to simplify the negative impact of the plurality system on our choices: when we go to the cereal isle at a grocery store we expect to be able to choose from more than just two kinds of cereal, yet we do not get to choose from more than two viable candidates, in our elections. Amy (2002) and numerous other scholars are fundamentally at odds with a system that encourages limited selection.
Further, candidates from the two major parties conglomerate around the middle. “The effect of a plurality system is that over time it contributes to the development not only of a two-party system, but on two moderate parties, that generally differ only slightly in their programs and policies” (Chase, Holt & Turner 1980, 115); in other words, the candidates migrate to the middle. When candidates migrate to the middle, citizens do not feel that there is a dimes-worth-of difference between the candidates, and they are less motivated to gather political information.
Another way in which plurality voting systems discourage the gathering of political information is by rejecting substantive, issue-oriented campaigns:
Ideally election campaigns should be opportunities for the voters to learn about the candidates’ policy positions and the social and economic theories that underlie them…But these are hardly the campaigns we get today, when issues and policies rarely play a central role in political campaigns (Amy 1993, 70).
Instead of campaigning on issues and substance, candidates invoke all style and no content advertisements. Benjamin Page (1978) describes the campaigning of modern candidates as “vague.” “The typical campaign speech says virtually nothing specific about policy alternatives; discussions of the issues are hidden away in little-publicized statements and position papers…In short, policy stands are infrequent, inconspicuous, and unspecific…Candidates are skilled at appearing to say much while actually saying very little” (153).
The vagueness described by Page is due to the risks that invoking “issue” speech conjures. Under plurality voting rules, initiating issue talk is potentially dangerous because in order to capture a majority, candidates have to please as many of their constituents as possible; they cannot do this if they take strong positions that alienate a large proportion of the voters (Amy 1993, 64). By focusing on his or her character and relying on his or her personality, candidates are able to avoid issue-talk.
The negative affects of candidates emphasizing their character and personality is that it makes issue-education almost unnecessary. If the candidates focus on their days as a football player, voters judge the candidates based on athleticism. In this way candidates “frame” the debate to highlight their personal appeal, at the expense of addressing the real issues. In contrast to the plurality system, a proportional representation system motivates individuals to be more political informed. The PR system elects multiple parties to government, enlists candidates with very different policy positions to run for office, and invokes issue-substantive campaigns, peaking citizen interest in a way that is unattainable in the U.S. (Amy 2002).
In a PR system, seats are awarded proportionally—in other words, the number of seats a party is issued corresponds with the percentage of the votes they received. If a party wins 40% of the vote in a district with 10 seats, that party is awarded 4 seats. In a plurality system, that same party would have been awarded zero seats if another party won more than 40% of the vote. By awarding seats in this matter, minority parties become more viable and increasingly likely to be represented in government. In such a situation, citizens become more engaged and excited.
In addition to awarding numerous parties seats in government, PR systems encourage descriptively different candidates to run for office. Amy (2002) notes: “Evidence clearly shows that countries with proportional representation consistently nominate and elect much higher numbers of women candidates.” The same is true for racial minorities. With higher numbers of women and racial minorities as candidates and representatives, previously marginalized groups now have a louder voice. What more, when citizens feel represented they are more inclined to be political informed.
Also, candidates running for office in a PR system do not have to shy away from the issues. Because they are less concerned with capturing a majority of the votes, candidates can take “principled stands,” enlivening the political debate, without fear of losing any chance of election. With an enlivened debate on the issues in the public discourse, citizens are motivated to gather information, engage in deliberation with friends, family and co-workers, and develop personal opinions and positions on specific issues. Characteristics such as these are largely unheard of in the U.S. The PR system can return such an electoral shift.
Heuristic and systematic processing models almost conclusively find that when given the option of processing a message heuristically or systematically, heuristic processing wins out (Torodov, Chaiken & Henderson 2002). This is due to the ease of processing messages heuristically. Yet I have shown that reliance on heuristics is problematic for two reasons: it encourages irrelevant evaluations and allows politicians to use “crafted talk.” Thus, in order to move away from heuristics an environment that encourages systematic processing needs to be cultivated. This analysis has shined light on the ways in which a proportional representation electoral system heightens individuals’ motivation to gather political information, and encourages scenarios and situations that invoke systematic processing of messages.
What is it that the PR system brings to the table that alter political sophistication?
Chapter 1 Fair Representation For All
John Stuart Mill: “It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented. No real democtacy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it.”
“The essential purpose of democratic elections is to allow as many people as possible to gain representation and to produce a legislature that faithfully reflects the various political views of the electorate” (25). SMDs fail to do so. A large number of Americans come away from elections without any representation, and thus go without any say in government. SMP elections represent only the majority or plurality of voters in a district. “Thus only the voters who are actually represented are those who vote for the winning candidate” (26). The rest “wasted” their vote.
Non-Rep contributes to:
-Voter apathy (low turnout, chapter 7).
-Legitimacy of our elections
Why does it continue?
-our reps claim to represent “all of us”
How does PR fix this?
Chapter 3 Improving Election Campaigns
State in the US: Mudslinging, slogan-ridden. 99% incumbency rate; SMPs encourage politicians to:
(1) neglect a serious discussion of issues and
(2) give candidates incentive to pursue negative campaigns (69).
(1) Neglecting the issues
“Ideally election campaigns should be opportunities for the voters to learn about the candidates’ policy positions and the social and economic theories that underlie them…But these are hardly the campaigns we get today, when issues and policies rarely play a central role in political campaigns” (70). All style, no content advertisements.
Benjamin Page:
“The most striking feature of candidates’ rhetoric about policy is its extreme vagueness. The typical campaign speech says virtually nothing specific about policy alternatives; discussions of the issues are hidden away in little-publicized statemesnts and position papers…In short, policy stands are infrequent, inconspicuous, and unspecific…Candidates are silled at appearing to say much while actually saying very little” (60, 1993).
*The usual suspects: the press, the public the politician.
**Why it’s the Voting system:
-Plurality makes issues risky because in order to capture a majority, candidates have to please as many of their constituents as possible; they cannot do this if they take strong positions that alienate a large proportion of the voters. “offend as few people as possible” (64, 1993). “Voter alienation multiples as the candidates broadcast more and more…eventually threatening their ability to put together a majority coalition” (65, 1993). “Instead of emphasizing issue stands—which is risky—it is much safer to campaign on character and personality” (65, 1993).
(2) Negative campaigns
designed to make it more difficult to capture majority..
Why PR is different:
-candidates are not obsessed with pleasing most of the people most of the time to get elected. Thus, they are more honest about their policy positions and can run issue-oriented campaigns.
-candidates run on a party label. Thus the character and personality of the candidates is not in the limelight, and even is inconsequential (68 1993).
-the character if multiple parties encourages a discussion of policy prefs. Candidates and parties have to distinguish themselves from opponents (1993, 70).
Chapter 4: Toward a Multi-Party System
Probs with a 2-party system:
-feelings of dissatisfaction
-the two parties are tweedle dee and tweedle dum (77, 1993).
HOW IS THIS CAUSED BY THE SMDs?
-Lowi: the “effect of a plurality system is that over time it contributes to the development not only of a two-party system, but on two moderate parties, that generally differ only slightly in their programs and policies” (80 1993). The candidates migrate to the middle.
Duverger’s Law: explains the supportive relationship between plurality rules and 2-party systems; voting rules work against multi-party governance in 2 ways: 1. The mechanical effect: the tendency of the plurality system to give the largest party more seats than it deserves and to give smaller parties fewer seats than they deserve (83). 2. The psychological effect: potential supporters will hesitate to vote for a minor-party candidate if they believe the candidate has little chance.
Chapter 7: Encouraging Voter Turnout
The poor abstain from voting because they see few politicians from either party as offering policies that would significantly address their problems (142, 1993). (attitudinal explanation); but mostly, institutional barriers such as voter registration guidelines (non-compulsory voting).
Amy (2002) recognizes eight problems with plurality elections: (1) Low voter turnout, (2) Tweedledum and Tweedledee candidates, (3) the two-party monopoly, (4) wasted votes, (5) issueless campaigns, (6) underrepresentation of women, (7) lack of minority representation, and (8) gerrymandering. These eight conditions work together to discourage motivation for being political knowledgeable.
Plurality rules encourage a two-party system. Duverger’s Law attributes the plurality systems as working against multi-party governance in two ways: (1) The mechanical effect which is the tendency of the plurality system to give the largest party more seats than it deserves and to give smaller parties fewer seats than they deserve And (2) the psychological effect which holds that potential supporters will hesitate to vote for a minor-party candidate if they believe the candidate has little chance. (Amy 1993, 83). Amy (2002) uses a grocery store shopping analogy to simplify the negative impact of the plurality system on our choices: when we go to the cereal isle at a grocery store we expect to be able to choose from more than just two kinds of cereal, yet we do not get to choose from more than two viable candidates, in our elections. Amy (2002) and numerous other scholars are fundamentally at odds with a system that encourages limited selection.
Further, candidates from the two major parties conglomerate around the middle. “The effect of a plurality system is that over time it contributes to the development not only of a two-party system, but on two moderate parties, that generally differ only slightly in their programs and policies” (Chase, Holt & Turner 1980, 115); in other words, the candidates migrate to the middle. When candidates migrate to the middle, citizens do not feel that there is a dimes-worth-of difference between the candidates, and they are less motivated to gather political information.
Another way in which plurality voting systems discourage the gathering of political information is by rejecting substantive, issue-oriented campaigns:
Ideally election campaigns should be opportunities for the voters to learn about the candidates’ policy positions and the social and economic theories that underlie them…But these are hardly the campaigns we get today, when issues and policies rarely play a central role in political campaigns (Amy 1993, 70).
Instead of campaigning on issues and substance, candidates invoke all style and no content advertisements. Benjamin Page (1978) describes the campaigning of modern candidates as “vague.” “The typical campaign speech says virtually nothing specific about policy alternatives; discussions of the issues are hidden away in little-publicized statements and position papers…In short, policy stands are infrequent, inconspicuous, and unspecific…Candidates are skilled at appearing to say much while actually saying very little” (153).
The vagueness described by Page is due to the risks that invoking “issue” speech conjures. Under plurality voting rules, initiating issue talk is potentially dangerous because in order to capture a majority, candidates have to please as many of their constituents as possible; they cannot do this if they take strong positions that alienate a large proportion of the voters (Amy 1993, 64). By focusing on his or her character and relying on his or her personality, candidates are able to avoid issue-talk.
The negative affects of candidates emphasizing their character and personality is that it makes issue-education almost unnecessary. If the candidates focus on their days as a football player, voters judge the candidates based on athleticism. In this way candidates “frame” the debate to highlight their personal appeal, at the expense of addressing the real issues. In contrast to the plurality system, a proportional representation system motivates individuals to be more political informed. The PR system elects multiple parties to government, enlists candidates with very different policy positions to run for office, and invokes issue-substantive campaigns, peaking citizen interest in a way that is unattainable in the U.S. (Amy 2002).
In a PR system, seats are awarded proportionally—in other words, the number of seats a party is issued corresponds with the percentage of the votes they received. If a party wins 40% of the vote in a district with 10 seats, that party is awarded 4 seats. In a plurality system, that same party would have been awarded zero seats if another party won more than 40% of the vote. By awarding seats in this matter, minority parties become more viable and increasingly likely to be represented in government. In such a situation, citizens become more engaged and excited.
In addition to awarding numerous parties seats in government, PR systems encourage descriptively different candidates to run for office. Amy (2002) notes: “Evidence clearly shows that countries with proportional representation consistently nominate and elect much higher numbers of women candidates.” The same is true for racial minorities. With higher numbers of women and racial minorities as candidates and representatives, previously marginalized groups now have a louder voice. What more, when citizens feel represented they are more inclined to be political informed.
Also, candidates running for office in a PR system do not have to shy away from the issues. Because they are less concerned with capturing a majority of the votes, candidates can take “principled stands,” enlivening the political debate, without fear of losing any chance of election. With an enlivened debate on the issues in the public discourse, citizens are motivated to gather information, engage in deliberation with friends, family and co-workers, and develop personal opinions and positions on specific issues. Characteristics such as these are largely unheard of in the U.S. The PR system can return such an electoral shift.
Heuristic and systematic processing models almost conclusively find that when given the option of processing a message heuristically or systematically, heuristic processing wins out (Torodov, Chaiken & Henderson 2002). This is due to the ease of processing messages heuristically. Yet I have shown that reliance on heuristics is problematic for two reasons: it encourages irrelevant evaluations and allows politicians to use “crafted talk.” Thus, in order to move away from heuristics an environment that encourages systematic processing needs to be cultivated. This analysis has shined light on the ways in which a proportional representation electoral system heightens individuals’ motivation to gather political information, and encourages scenarios and situations that invoke systematic processing of messages.
Thursday, October 11, 2007
Bartels (1996) Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections
THESIS STATEMENT: My aim is to use the observed relationship betwen information and voting behavior in recent elections to simulate the behavior of a hypothetical "fully informed" electorate, and to compare actual voting behavior at both the individual and aggregate levesl to this hypthetical baseline. My aim in this report is to proide concrete, quantitative estimates of the effects of informationin recent US presidential elections (203).
Measures: interviewer assigned level of informed: from high to low (5 point scale). WHAT KIND OF MEASURE IS THIS?
how much influence can cues, information shortcuts and polls have on a voter's tendency to be fully informed?
many critics agree, political awareness is essential to democracy (Kinder and Palfrey 1993), where as others are content with supplying that poorly informed voters can make use of cues etc in order to participate in democracy (McKelvey & Odershoot 1985; Page & Shapiro 1992; Popkin 1991). yet no one has invested the time to come up with empirical support for either.
Understand: there is a difference between information levels, and information processing (Sniderman (1993) went as far as to say that the public is not necessarily uninformed, but instead has a thin grasp of it, rather than a thick knowledge of it, which allows for minimal coherence and reasonablyness in their thinking...but not necessarily minimal levels of information and attention).
This study rejects the theory that cues are an appropriate replacement of actual political knowledge.
Bartels creates a hypothetical “fully informed” electorate. “How might the preferences of this hypothetical “fully informed” electorate differ from the preferences of the actual electorate? One possibility is to assume that increasing information reduces the variability of voters’ choice without altering the central tendency of their underlying preferences. Alternatively, we might suppose that more informed voters are more likely across the board to prefer Republicans (or Democrats), controlling for other relevant factors. Both of these assumptions seems unduly restrictive, however, in that they require information to have essentially similar effects on all voters regardless of their circumstances. In seems much more plausible to suppose that increasing information—by giving voters a better sense of their credibility and likely consequences of some voters systematically more Republican in their preferences but at the same time make others systematically more Democratic” (205).
H: Uninformed voters successfully use cues and information shortcuts to behave as if they were fully informed. Failing that, individual deviations from fully informed voting cancels out in a mass electorate, producing the same aggregate election outcomes as if voters were fully informed.
Results: hypothesis is disconfirmed; at the individual level, the average deviation of actual vote probabilies from hypothetical “fully informed” vote probabilities was about ten percentage points. In the electorate as a whole, these deviations were significantly deluted by aggregation, but by no means eliminated: incumbent presidents did almost five percentage points btter, and democratic candidates did almost two percentage points better, than they would have if voters had in fact been “fully informed.
“Given the variety of demonstrable differences between well-informed and less well-informed citiens in sensitivity to external stimuli, diversity and precision of political perceptions, information-processing strategies, access to shared understandings of politics, and integrative ability, it hardly seems outlandish to entertain the possibility that disparities in political information lead to systematically different vote choices by citizens in otherwise similar political circumstances, despite—or perhaps even, in part because of—the availability of cues and information short-cuts…” (202).
Methods: generate “fully informed” electorate (204).
Measurement; level of political sophistication:
Interviewer assessed: .95, .8, .5, .2, .05. corresponding to very high…very low.
Findings: “relatively uninformed voters are more likely, other things being equal, to support incumbents and democrats” (218). …suggesting that political ignorance has systematic and significant political consequences (220).
With full information voters become more liberal in policy choice and more republican in vote choice.
Measures: interviewer assigned level of informed: from high to low (5 point scale). WHAT KIND OF MEASURE IS THIS?
how much influence can cues, information shortcuts and polls have on a voter's tendency to be fully informed?
many critics agree, political awareness is essential to democracy (Kinder and Palfrey 1993), where as others are content with supplying that poorly informed voters can make use of cues etc in order to participate in democracy (McKelvey & Odershoot 1985; Page & Shapiro 1992; Popkin 1991). yet no one has invested the time to come up with empirical support for either.
Understand: there is a difference between information levels, and information processing (Sniderman (1993) went as far as to say that the public is not necessarily uninformed, but instead has a thin grasp of it, rather than a thick knowledge of it, which allows for minimal coherence and reasonablyness in their thinking...but not necessarily minimal levels of information and attention).
This study rejects the theory that cues are an appropriate replacement of actual political knowledge.
Bartels creates a hypothetical “fully informed” electorate. “How might the preferences of this hypothetical “fully informed” electorate differ from the preferences of the actual electorate? One possibility is to assume that increasing information reduces the variability of voters’ choice without altering the central tendency of their underlying preferences. Alternatively, we might suppose that more informed voters are more likely across the board to prefer Republicans (or Democrats), controlling for other relevant factors. Both of these assumptions seems unduly restrictive, however, in that they require information to have essentially similar effects on all voters regardless of their circumstances. In seems much more plausible to suppose that increasing information—by giving voters a better sense of their credibility and likely consequences of some voters systematically more Republican in their preferences but at the same time make others systematically more Democratic” (205).
H: Uninformed voters successfully use cues and information shortcuts to behave as if they were fully informed. Failing that, individual deviations from fully informed voting cancels out in a mass electorate, producing the same aggregate election outcomes as if voters were fully informed.
Results: hypothesis is disconfirmed; at the individual level, the average deviation of actual vote probabilies from hypothetical “fully informed” vote probabilities was about ten percentage points. In the electorate as a whole, these deviations were significantly deluted by aggregation, but by no means eliminated: incumbent presidents did almost five percentage points btter, and democratic candidates did almost two percentage points better, than they would have if voters had in fact been “fully informed.
“Given the variety of demonstrable differences between well-informed and less well-informed citiens in sensitivity to external stimuli, diversity and precision of political perceptions, information-processing strategies, access to shared understandings of politics, and integrative ability, it hardly seems outlandish to entertain the possibility that disparities in political information lead to systematically different vote choices by citizens in otherwise similar political circumstances, despite—or perhaps even, in part because of—the availability of cues and information short-cuts…” (202).
Methods: generate “fully informed” electorate (204).
Measurement; level of political sophistication:
Interviewer assessed: .95, .8, .5, .2, .05. corresponding to very high…very low.
Findings: “relatively uninformed voters are more likely, other things being equal, to support incumbents and democrats” (218). …suggesting that political ignorance has systematic and significant political consequences (220).
With full information voters become more liberal in policy choice and more republican in vote choice.
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