sarah's notes:
How contextual forces (elite competition and deliberation) and individual attributes affect success of framing. When do rationality assumptions apply?
(equivalency) Framing: “different but logically equivalent phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences.” Ie positive or negative framing of an issue. Not in reference to issue framing where issues are framed in the context of different values, these are not logically equivalent.
Rat choice: people have preferences that are used to base decisions on
-violated with equivalency framing effects, but not issue framing effects
framing manipulates the salience of diff. aspects of the information (gains versus losses) and triggers diff mental associations (good v. bad)
-with internal deliberation of possible alternate frames, the effect is washed out.
-competing frames reduce the effect of each singularly
H1: people exposed to counter-framing will be less susceptible to framing effects
H2: people who participate in a heterogeneous (w/people with different frames) discussion will be less susceptible to framing effects than those without conversation (no prediction about homogeneous conversation)
H3: “experts” less susceptible than “non-experts”
-expert defined as a combination of need for cognition and training
method
experiment: random assignment to 8 groups on two dimensions (see table 1 for more details)
1. positive or negative framing
2. context: control, counterframing, heterogeneous discussion, homogeneous discussion
Results
Frames (without taking account of conditions) had a significant effect on preference.
Context variables had a significant moderating effect of framing
Control had significant framing effects
Counterframe groups (given both positive and negative frames, altering which came first) had no effect of framing
Group conditions reduced, but did not eliminate framing effect. Heterogeneous discussion reduced effect more
Individual variables had no effect (expert or student/not student)
In homogeneous discussion groups, non-experts more affected by framing—effect of expertise depends on context
Confidence: those who express preference in the direction of the frame did so with greater confidence (evidence for incoherent preferences). Homogeneous discussion increases this confidence. – overconfidence bias of framing
Conclusion: more research needs to focus on context. Previous research that does not take context into account should be questioned for problems of external validity and generalizability.
My notes:
Framing effects: your preferences are changed by the “frame.” This is why we are concerned about the media’s role; how much power do they have?
After deliberation, people are less effected by the frames. W00t.
Hetero discussion—most change.
Homo discussion—still change from condition form when there was no discussion.
No discussion-least amount of change.
Counter-frame: CNN and Fox
What happens when you are exposed to both frames? i.e. CNN and Fox. Decrease framing effects. And you end up with “authentic” opinion, which is consistent with your values (liberalism/conservatism).
Neutrality = no counter-frame. What happens here?
Monday, March 24, 2008
Jacoby (2000) Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending
Effect of issue framing on opinion of government spending. Different frames evoke different influences on attitudes.
Republican and democrat appeals about spending differ in level of specificity (rep.s more broad, restrictive view vs. dem.s specific appeals for certain important programs.) relative framing changes opinion of issue
Issue framing as a political tool: framing effects are used to shift support in the favor of the one putting out the frame “one of the most important “tools” political elites have at their disposal”
General issue frames: general statements about issue areas “government should protect the environment” focus on feeling toward the government, which is more negative, leading to negative opinions of the statements
Specific issue frame: gives specific targets for policy, beneficiaries and costs of policy “government should protect environment to reduce pollution and protect people threatened by toxic waste dumps.” Emphasis on who benefits (the needy or me) leading to positive opinion of issue
1992 election: Bush used general frame for (reduced) govt. spending, Clinton used specific framing for increases
-issue is central to politics, ideological positions,
Data/Methods
Based on 1992 NES survey questions
-continuum of general cut spending vs. increase spending
-additive scale of seven questions about various welfare spending programs (specific framing, mentioning group that benefits)
responses to the two types of framing are highly correlated, evidence that they are about the same issue.
Results
Distribution of responses
- for general spending is unimodal and symmetrical.
- for specific spending is unimodal but skewed toward greater spending
-greater average support for specific spending
-reactions to general questions reflect feelings about government, specific frames reflect feelings about subject of spending
-individual and aggregate level effects of framing
Part 2 Individual level correlates to spending opinions
IVs:
a. Thermometer feeling about government, evaluation of the economy,
b. Feelings about recipients: symbolic racism, feelings about welfare and toward the poor,
c. demos: income, race, gender, age, employment status
d. party id, liberal-conservative rating
DV: reaction to general and specific spending questions
Results
IVs in sections a and b (feelings about government and recipients) had predicted effects on attitudes about spending.
Democrats favored increased spending in both cases- ideology mediates framing effects
People are reacting in ways consistent with the feelings that are evoked with different frames. People act in ways that support their general feelings about the government when that is the only cue, but use other cues also when given the prompting to do so. Issue framing effects are actually not inconsistent, irrational.
Framing can be used by elites that can control the frame to convince people to support their preferred side of an issue. Framing, nonetheless, is inevitable.
Republican and democrat appeals about spending differ in level of specificity (rep.s more broad, restrictive view vs. dem.s specific appeals for certain important programs.) relative framing changes opinion of issue
Issue framing as a political tool: framing effects are used to shift support in the favor of the one putting out the frame “one of the most important “tools” political elites have at their disposal”
General issue frames: general statements about issue areas “government should protect the environment” focus on feeling toward the government, which is more negative, leading to negative opinions of the statements
Specific issue frame: gives specific targets for policy, beneficiaries and costs of policy “government should protect environment to reduce pollution and protect people threatened by toxic waste dumps.” Emphasis on who benefits (the needy or me) leading to positive opinion of issue
1992 election: Bush used general frame for (reduced) govt. spending, Clinton used specific framing for increases
-issue is central to politics, ideological positions,
Data/Methods
Based on 1992 NES survey questions
-continuum of general cut spending vs. increase spending
-additive scale of seven questions about various welfare spending programs (specific framing, mentioning group that benefits)
responses to the two types of framing are highly correlated, evidence that they are about the same issue.
Results
Distribution of responses
- for general spending is unimodal and symmetrical.
- for specific spending is unimodal but skewed toward greater spending
-greater average support for specific spending
-reactions to general questions reflect feelings about government, specific frames reflect feelings about subject of spending
-individual and aggregate level effects of framing
Part 2 Individual level correlates to spending opinions
IVs:
a. Thermometer feeling about government, evaluation of the economy,
b. Feelings about recipients: symbolic racism, feelings about welfare and toward the poor,
c. demos: income, race, gender, age, employment status
d. party id, liberal-conservative rating
DV: reaction to general and specific spending questions
Results
IVs in sections a and b (feelings about government and recipients) had predicted effects on attitudes about spending.
Democrats favored increased spending in both cases- ideology mediates framing effects
People are reacting in ways consistent with the feelings that are evoked with different frames. People act in ways that support their general feelings about the government when that is the only cue, but use other cues also when given the prompting to do so. Issue framing effects are actually not inconsistent, irrational.
Framing can be used by elites that can control the frame to convince people to support their preferred side of an issue. Framing, nonetheless, is inevitable.
Tuesday, January 1, 2008
Althaus, S.L. (2003) Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics.
Althaus (2003) Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics
This book examines the quality of political representation provided by surveys; thus conceptualizing public opinion research in the “classic tradition” (Lazarsfeld 1957), using empirical methods to pursue and refine the foundational questions about popular sovereignty raised by political theorists. “It does so through a statistically analysis of representation in surveys where quality is analyzed from the standpoint of two foundational concepts in democratic theory: the degree to which surveys regard and promote the political equality of all individuals in a population and the likelihood that surveys represent the political interests of all individuals in a population” (9).
Introduction
What is public opinion? In what form ought it be recognized?
What is its nature? What characteristics should it possess?
What kind of political power does it have? What kind of power should it be given?
These should/ought questions are more normative, than empirical, but still very important to ask.
Opinion surveys:
Relevant? Since the 1930s there has been a growing acceptance to use polls as proxy for peoples’ voice. Sample surveys allow scholars to look beyond one’s vote as a signal of needs and wants—its more a more expansive and comprehensive measure of preferences than a vote.
Advocates: Useful for mass democracies because they can reveal what the people are thinking (Verba 1996) (2). Page & Shapiro (1992) and Converse (1990) also find surveys to be laudable, and “conclude that the traditional understanding of public opinion as volatile and capricious is incorrect” (2). –this idea of a RATIONAL public. Also supported by Jacobs & Shapiro (2000). Yet these authors are all empiricists. (not all empiricists applaud polling results; many recognize that what individuals say in polls is shallow, vacillating, illogical, and coarse) (7). In contrast to these scholars, few political philosophers would aver that polling/samples offer a justification for democratic rule. Scholars are suspicious of aggregate preference to reveal the common good (Arendt 1958; Barber 1984; Habermas 1989, 1996).
Polling criticisms:
sampling error
question wording
draw attention away from “real” concerns (Ginsberg 1986)
construe a fictitious public mind (Bourdieu 1979)
Thus we still have to call into question “whether opinion surveys can tell us reliably what the people really want” (3).
This book calls into question two (2) major concerns:
(1) Do citizens have enough knowledge about the political world to regularly formulate policy preference that are consistent with their needs, wants, and values?
(2) Is the quality of political representation provided by opinion surveys adequate for the uses to which they are put in democratic politics?
Overall, political knowledge among citizens is low and thus not to be trusted (Almond 1950; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Patterson 1980).
I. But some scholars contend that aggregation of the informed and uninformed balance each other out (Converse 1990; Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 1992; Miller 1996; Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). “When aggregated, the argument goes, the more or less random responses from ill-informed or unopinionated respondents should tend to cancel each other out” (12). Page and Shapiro say that informed opinions persist because uninformed opinion cancel out (why would they err in the same direction?)
Althaus argues there is NOT a balance/canceling out. Uninformed people do not give randomly balanced responses. They are influenced by the information environment… the uninformed are making the decisions, because the INFORMED are canceling one another out. And that uniformed opinions drive the collective choice. Althaus says the uninformed GROUP on the same answers (framing effects). Informed people group around the poles, and thus cancel each other out. The uninformed choose the middle, the more accessible frame, and… etc. etc. especially try in a 2 party system. Especially true in surveys that give a 7 point scale (uniformed choose 3—the middle).
** (informed, canceled out)
XXXXXXXXXXX (uniformed, mean)
** (informed, canceled out)
II. Others argue citizens—though low on political ken —use heuristic shortcuts “interpretive schema or cues from political elites” (13)—in place of factual knowledge (Popkin 1991, 1993; Kuklinski & Quirk 2000; Iyengar 1990).
But, Althaus finds both to lack adequate empirical support (14) and states: “both revisionist perspectives tend to overlook an important fact: low information levels are only half the problem. Just as important is the observation that some kinds of people tend to be better informed than others” (14).
What other way could we measure the “skewed noise.”
Political Knowledge:
Low levels and uneven social distribution of political knowledge affect the quality of representation afforded by collective preferences. Much of the variation in knowledge levels is due to individual differences in (1) motivation, (2) ability and (3) opportunity.
(1) Motivation: influenced by a person’s interest in politics, civic duty, and anxiety about the future (I would also argue social acceptance, given one’s social circle—in some, albeit small, pockets, its cool to know this stuff).
(2) Ability: influenced by education. It is the ability to process the info.
(3) Opportunity: mobilization efforts; exposure to media markets, thus geographical component here, as well.
Who are the politically savvy? They share characteristics (other than information advantages)
- groups with distinctive and competitive interests
- white, middle class, male, middle-aged, married
- college grads
- affluent
Consequences?
(1) people who are knowledgeable tend to give opinions more often
(2) people who are well informed are better able to form opinions consistent with political predispositions (Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996).
Consequences of the consequences?
Information effects: “a bias in the shape of collective opinion caused by the low levels and uneven social distribution of political knowledge in a population.”
Collective opinion: any aggregation of individual preferences.
Bias: a distortion away from what collective opinion might look like if all relevant groups in a population were equally and optimally well informed about politics.
Thus majority opinions are driven by a SMALL NUMBER of respondents who have an intense and unified view. People from higher SES groups tend to dominate the public opinion channels—contacting officials, volunteering for campaigns, contributing money.
Thus, conventional wisdom might lead one to recognize that the special value of a sample survey is that it is more representative. Yet Althus argues it may not be as representative as commonly thought, and we need to reconsider how we use opinion surveys in the political process.
Chapter 2
Putting the power of aggregation to the test; an assessment of the information-pooling properties of collective opinion (aggregation and Philip Converse).
Althus argues that collective rationality models (Converse 1990; Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 1992; Miller 1996; Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996) suffer from several conceptual problems; using a computer simulation of 28,000 opinion distributions, Althus finds…
Chapter 3
Examines whether the opinions expressed in sample surveys possess the critical characteristics necessary for collective rationality to work.
Less-informed are more likely to respond “don’t know” or “no opinion.” This hints at a political knowledge issue, which I cover in detail, above. But indeed, opinions expressed in sample surveys are not expressive of the collective rationality—overresponse rate by well-informed; ill-informed are all like-minded in responses (whether purposively or not).
Chapter 4
Tests the impact of information effects (see definition above) on collective preferences.
Data: 1988, 1992, 1996 ANES survey.
Model: what collective prefs might look like if all respondents were as well informed about politics as most knowledgeable ones.
The model shows what Althus predicts in chapter 3—the mass public’s low levels of pol info cause surveys to misrepresent views. Other findings: collective opinions appear more progressive on some issues and more conservative on others than they would if fully informed; “After controlling for info effects, collective opinion tends to become less approving of presidents and Congress, more dovish and interventionist on foreign policy, less conservative of social, enviro, and equal rights issues, and more conservative on morality issues and questions about the proper limits of gov activity.”
Chapter 5
This chapter looks at when and why information effects are highest.
When questions are more cognitively demanding there are greater disparities in informed responses between the well and ill-informed. Differences also arise from the social and psychological factors that “influence how people establish and update their political prefs.”
Chapter 6
This chapter assesses information effects, over time (time series data from 1980-1998). Findings: “information effects tend to grow smaller when the political environment motivates citizens to process information systematically, although many of these changes turn out to be short-lived.”
This chapter also talks about the “simulated measures of fully informed opinion.” I am still confused as to how they “simulate” such a measure, but when it is done it is accurate in predicting collective policy prefs. But the author does note that although statistical simulations are spot-on they don’t represent the latent interests of the population (is this bc the latent interests are not expressed? Im still a bit confused, and REALLY am not motivated to answer my own question. Although im confuse, I am not interested )
Chapter 7
This chapter looks at how information effects complicate the use of opinion surveys in political decision making. Ive already touched upon many of the problems (misrep, overrep etc). This chapter addresses these problems in more depth, but also suggests two conditions that would help overcome representation issues (information effects):
(1) ensure the sample has the same demographic characteristics of the population they are suppose to represent.
(2) When the number of well-informed give the same number of mixed opinions as the less informed
But concludes “the absence of info effects should not be taken as a sign of enlightened prefs. Instead, the absence of info effects confirms only that a collective pref provides good info about what the people want, rightly or wrongly.”
Chapter 8
Information effects can influence the usefulness of survey results; surveys can be problematic, but also have potential. If the suggestions in chapter 7 are met then public opinion surveys have a place in directing democratic politics.
Conclusion:
The primary culprit is not any inherent shortcoming in the methods of survey research. Rather, it is the limited degree of knowledge held by ordinary citizens about public affairs and the tendency for some kinds of people to be better informed than others” (10).
Class notes:
Collective choice with more information doesn’t change at the aggregate.
General knowledge vs. specific issue
ISSUE KNOWLEDGE inconsistent with schematic network?
Aggregation on a particular point (i.e. blacks and affirmative action) even though in general, might be characterized as uninformed. Thus familiarity with an issue makes a BIG difference. The question being asked matters.
When people are not “activated” they can still make the policy decision? (not if public opinion doesn’t drive policy!).
Even without an authentic opinion, you can drive a policy.
Dispersion v. Consistency of opinions
Convergence hypothesis:
Althaus finds that it holds
If this is the case then info effects in the collective… there is not a converging in the middle. Increasing information effects. More people are not settled in the middle, but off to the sides, creating a divergence in expectation and what results.
Depletion hypothesis: information effect (the difference between opinion that you get at time one from simulated opinion—fully informed). people who give the DK answers have less knowledge, but demographically the same (151). The DKs are female; men guess (Luskin).
Not much of an impact. (is it because white men v. women is trying to explain the difference?)
If its not the depletion effect, what is it?
(1) Survey method (framing—is the way we are asking the question forcing people to answer questions a way in which they otherwise would not).
(2) 2
(3) social distribution of policy specific knowledge. Are you able to tap into policy specific ken instead of general?
(4) Relative salience of political ken; do we see that the info effects decreases in presidential elections because the information matters (socially/self-monitoring).
The purpose of these test and setting up infor effects:
Are we using polls to set up policy? Is policy not reflecting the people bc of information effects? If yes, we need to improve surveys; limit the availability of a middle answer, framing, etc. By knowing the general ways frames etc. influence info effects we can distinguish between good surveys and bad surveys (straw polls). Concludes: surveys are problematic. Duh.
Take home effects:
Value issues more vulnerable to change? Value issues that we thinking we know, and we more info we change them! Collective value opinion is more vulnerable to change than policy info; policy info is actually more authentic. (127)
THERE ARE INFORMATION EFFECTS—there are consistent differences. And they are LARGE. (1/5 TO 1/3 of collective prefs will change with more information. Milner links to institutions.
This book examines the quality of political representation provided by surveys; thus conceptualizing public opinion research in the “classic tradition” (Lazarsfeld 1957), using empirical methods to pursue and refine the foundational questions about popular sovereignty raised by political theorists. “It does so through a statistically analysis of representation in surveys where quality is analyzed from the standpoint of two foundational concepts in democratic theory: the degree to which surveys regard and promote the political equality of all individuals in a population and the likelihood that surveys represent the political interests of all individuals in a population” (9).
Introduction
What is public opinion? In what form ought it be recognized?
What is its nature? What characteristics should it possess?
What kind of political power does it have? What kind of power should it be given?
These should/ought questions are more normative, than empirical, but still very important to ask.
Opinion surveys:
Relevant? Since the 1930s there has been a growing acceptance to use polls as proxy for peoples’ voice. Sample surveys allow scholars to look beyond one’s vote as a signal of needs and wants—its more a more expansive and comprehensive measure of preferences than a vote.
Advocates: Useful for mass democracies because they can reveal what the people are thinking (Verba 1996) (2). Page & Shapiro (1992) and Converse (1990) also find surveys to be laudable, and “conclude that the traditional understanding of public opinion as volatile and capricious is incorrect” (2). –this idea of a RATIONAL public. Also supported by Jacobs & Shapiro (2000). Yet these authors are all empiricists. (not all empiricists applaud polling results; many recognize that what individuals say in polls is shallow, vacillating, illogical, and coarse) (7). In contrast to these scholars, few political philosophers would aver that polling/samples offer a justification for democratic rule. Scholars are suspicious of aggregate preference to reveal the common good (Arendt 1958; Barber 1984; Habermas 1989, 1996).
Polling criticisms:
sampling error
question wording
draw attention away from “real” concerns (Ginsberg 1986)
construe a fictitious public mind (Bourdieu 1979)
Thus we still have to call into question “whether opinion surveys can tell us reliably what the people really want” (3).
This book calls into question two (2) major concerns:
(1) Do citizens have enough knowledge about the political world to regularly formulate policy preference that are consistent with their needs, wants, and values?
(2) Is the quality of political representation provided by opinion surveys adequate for the uses to which they are put in democratic politics?
Overall, political knowledge among citizens is low and thus not to be trusted (Almond 1950; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Patterson 1980).
I. But some scholars contend that aggregation of the informed and uninformed balance each other out (Converse 1990; Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 1992; Miller 1996; Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). “When aggregated, the argument goes, the more or less random responses from ill-informed or unopinionated respondents should tend to cancel each other out” (12). Page and Shapiro say that informed opinions persist because uninformed opinion cancel out (why would they err in the same direction?)
Althaus argues there is NOT a balance/canceling out. Uninformed people do not give randomly balanced responses. They are influenced by the information environment… the uninformed are making the decisions, because the INFORMED are canceling one another out. And that uniformed opinions drive the collective choice. Althaus says the uninformed GROUP on the same answers (framing effects). Informed people group around the poles, and thus cancel each other out. The uninformed choose the middle, the more accessible frame, and… etc. etc. especially try in a 2 party system. Especially true in surveys that give a 7 point scale (uniformed choose 3—the middle).
** (informed, canceled out)
XXXXXXXXXXX (uniformed, mean)
** (informed, canceled out)
II. Others argue citizens—though low on political ken —use heuristic shortcuts “interpretive schema or cues from political elites” (13)—in place of factual knowledge (Popkin 1991, 1993; Kuklinski & Quirk 2000; Iyengar 1990).
But, Althaus finds both to lack adequate empirical support (14) and states: “both revisionist perspectives tend to overlook an important fact: low information levels are only half the problem. Just as important is the observation that some kinds of people tend to be better informed than others” (14).
What other way could we measure the “skewed noise.”
Political Knowledge:
Low levels and uneven social distribution of political knowledge affect the quality of representation afforded by collective preferences. Much of the variation in knowledge levels is due to individual differences in (1) motivation, (2) ability and (3) opportunity.
(1) Motivation: influenced by a person’s interest in politics, civic duty, and anxiety about the future (I would also argue social acceptance, given one’s social circle—in some, albeit small, pockets, its cool to know this stuff).
(2) Ability: influenced by education. It is the ability to process the info.
(3) Opportunity: mobilization efforts; exposure to media markets, thus geographical component here, as well.
Who are the politically savvy? They share characteristics (other than information advantages)
- groups with distinctive and competitive interests
- white, middle class, male, middle-aged, married
- college grads
- affluent
Consequences?
(1) people who are knowledgeable tend to give opinions more often
(2) people who are well informed are better able to form opinions consistent with political predispositions (Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996).
Consequences of the consequences?
Information effects: “a bias in the shape of collective opinion caused by the low levels and uneven social distribution of political knowledge in a population.”
Collective opinion: any aggregation of individual preferences.
Bias: a distortion away from what collective opinion might look like if all relevant groups in a population were equally and optimally well informed about politics.
Thus majority opinions are driven by a SMALL NUMBER of respondents who have an intense and unified view. People from higher SES groups tend to dominate the public opinion channels—contacting officials, volunteering for campaigns, contributing money.
Thus, conventional wisdom might lead one to recognize that the special value of a sample survey is that it is more representative. Yet Althus argues it may not be as representative as commonly thought, and we need to reconsider how we use opinion surveys in the political process.
Chapter 2
Putting the power of aggregation to the test; an assessment of the information-pooling properties of collective opinion (aggregation and Philip Converse).
Althus argues that collective rationality models (Converse 1990; Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 1992; Miller 1996; Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996) suffer from several conceptual problems; using a computer simulation of 28,000 opinion distributions, Althus finds…
Chapter 3
Examines whether the opinions expressed in sample surveys possess the critical characteristics necessary for collective rationality to work.
Less-informed are more likely to respond “don’t know” or “no opinion.” This hints at a political knowledge issue, which I cover in detail, above. But indeed, opinions expressed in sample surveys are not expressive of the collective rationality—overresponse rate by well-informed; ill-informed are all like-minded in responses (whether purposively or not).
Chapter 4
Tests the impact of information effects (see definition above) on collective preferences.
Data: 1988, 1992, 1996 ANES survey.
Model: what collective prefs might look like if all respondents were as well informed about politics as most knowledgeable ones.
The model shows what Althus predicts in chapter 3—the mass public’s low levels of pol info cause surveys to misrepresent views. Other findings: collective opinions appear more progressive on some issues and more conservative on others than they would if fully informed; “After controlling for info effects, collective opinion tends to become less approving of presidents and Congress, more dovish and interventionist on foreign policy, less conservative of social, enviro, and equal rights issues, and more conservative on morality issues and questions about the proper limits of gov activity.”
Chapter 5
This chapter looks at when and why information effects are highest.
When questions are more cognitively demanding there are greater disparities in informed responses between the well and ill-informed. Differences also arise from the social and psychological factors that “influence how people establish and update their political prefs.”
Chapter 6
This chapter assesses information effects, over time (time series data from 1980-1998). Findings: “information effects tend to grow smaller when the political environment motivates citizens to process information systematically, although many of these changes turn out to be short-lived.”
This chapter also talks about the “simulated measures of fully informed opinion.” I am still confused as to how they “simulate” such a measure, but when it is done it is accurate in predicting collective policy prefs. But the author does note that although statistical simulations are spot-on they don’t represent the latent interests of the population (is this bc the latent interests are not expressed? Im still a bit confused, and REALLY am not motivated to answer my own question. Although im confuse, I am not interested )
Chapter 7
This chapter looks at how information effects complicate the use of opinion surveys in political decision making. Ive already touched upon many of the problems (misrep, overrep etc). This chapter addresses these problems in more depth, but also suggests two conditions that would help overcome representation issues (information effects):
(1) ensure the sample has the same demographic characteristics of the population they are suppose to represent.
(2) When the number of well-informed give the same number of mixed opinions as the less informed
But concludes “the absence of info effects should not be taken as a sign of enlightened prefs. Instead, the absence of info effects confirms only that a collective pref provides good info about what the people want, rightly or wrongly.”
Chapter 8
Information effects can influence the usefulness of survey results; surveys can be problematic, but also have potential. If the suggestions in chapter 7 are met then public opinion surveys have a place in directing democratic politics.
Conclusion:
The primary culprit is not any inherent shortcoming in the methods of survey research. Rather, it is the limited degree of knowledge held by ordinary citizens about public affairs and the tendency for some kinds of people to be better informed than others” (10).
Class notes:
Collective choice with more information doesn’t change at the aggregate.
General knowledge vs. specific issue
ISSUE KNOWLEDGE inconsistent with schematic network?
Aggregation on a particular point (i.e. blacks and affirmative action) even though in general, might be characterized as uninformed. Thus familiarity with an issue makes a BIG difference. The question being asked matters.
When people are not “activated” they can still make the policy decision? (not if public opinion doesn’t drive policy!).
Even without an authentic opinion, you can drive a policy.
Dispersion v. Consistency of opinions
Convergence hypothesis:
Althaus finds that it holds
If this is the case then info effects in the collective… there is not a converging in the middle. Increasing information effects. More people are not settled in the middle, but off to the sides, creating a divergence in expectation and what results.
Depletion hypothesis: information effect (the difference between opinion that you get at time one from simulated opinion—fully informed). people who give the DK answers have less knowledge, but demographically the same (151). The DKs are female; men guess (Luskin).
Not much of an impact. (is it because white men v. women is trying to explain the difference?)
If its not the depletion effect, what is it?
(1) Survey method (framing—is the way we are asking the question forcing people to answer questions a way in which they otherwise would not).
(2) 2
(3) social distribution of policy specific knowledge. Are you able to tap into policy specific ken instead of general?
(4) Relative salience of political ken; do we see that the info effects decreases in presidential elections because the information matters (socially/self-monitoring).
The purpose of these test and setting up infor effects:
Are we using polls to set up policy? Is policy not reflecting the people bc of information effects? If yes, we need to improve surveys; limit the availability of a middle answer, framing, etc. By knowing the general ways frames etc. influence info effects we can distinguish between good surveys and bad surveys (straw polls). Concludes: surveys are problematic. Duh.
Take home effects:
Value issues more vulnerable to change? Value issues that we thinking we know, and we more info we change them! Collective value opinion is more vulnerable to change than policy info; policy info is actually more authentic. (127)
THERE ARE INFORMATION EFFECTS—there are consistent differences. And they are LARGE. (1/5 TO 1/3 of collective prefs will change with more information. Milner links to institutions.
Milner, H. (2002) Civic Literac
Why do PR systems have distributive income systems? Looks at as a function of Civic Literacy.
Theme: the causes and consequences of differences in political knowledge and what makes social-democratic welfare states sustainable
I. Civic Engagement and Social Capital develop skills that matter (Putnam says we get these from group associations; the no. leads to our S.C. stock).
Social Capital (as conceptualized by Putnam) measured as:
1. Trust (horizontal= interpersonal trust; vertical = trust in government)
2. associational density
definition of social capital: a public good; public trust, interpersonal and in government; community organization; voluntary associations.
Findings: Democratic institutions that equally distribute intellectial resources also more equally distribute material resources (high C.L. societies). AND Democratic institutions that more equally distribute intellectual resources attain higher levels of political parties.
Civic Engagement:
Organizational membership > ^trust in government > Civic engagement (voting)
II. Civic Literacy
Measured as:
1. willingness (the vote; @ the local level)
2. ability (knowledge-supply (media) and demand (people need)+ factual and cognitive)
- supply: “The nature and intensity of such efforts are seen to be a function of institutionalized incentives; in other words, political institutions matter when it comes to the accessibility and intelligibility of political information” (6).
III. Political ken
1. Individual Factors: education, age, income
2. Institutional Factors: electoral system; electoral system influences access, usefulness, and intelligibility.
IV. Sources of Civic Literacy
Measuring C.L.:
Civil: turning out to vote in local elections—more valid measure because they require more information; anyone can vote for a president. It takes more effort to vote in a local election.
Literacy: knowledge of U.N.
V. Political Parties and Political Institutions
-“The extent to which voters are informed on matters relevant to the decision to vote is in fact closely linked to the political institutions in which elections take place” (66).
Political Institutions > Political Ken > Political Participation
Electoral systems and Turnout
PR 71%
Maj 50%
VI. Political Institutions (78)
“each system has its own district long-term representational logic and it is via this logic that the citizens makes sense of the political choices available. Candidates in majoritarian systems are primarily oriented toward the median voter in the electorate, while those under PR systems are more oriented toward the median voter of their party (Wessels 1996)” (80). In FPTP political actors tend to misrepresent.
Consensus democracy: PR > ^ C.L. > ^ Voter Turnout
FPTP (first past the post) PR (proportional representation)
Ambiguity of leaders Less ambiguity
Zero Sum Better at supply side of ken
Mandates Visible compromises
SM cater to narrow interests Coalitions
Clear political map and more political information***
VII. C.L. and the Media
VIII. C.L. and Institutions
IX. Adult Education
Formal education and creating habits of civic literacy; as assessment of more deliberative democracy. Are people prone to change their minds when they have more information?
X. Case Study: New Zealand
Economy driven by a strong public sector; classic Westminster model. Milner has a negative evaluation of changes in New Zealand. Participation gone down following changes made by the state
XI. Economic Outcomes
XII. Case: Sweden
Universalism; decommodify labor (Epsing-Anderson conception). Excellent public health care, public transportation and education levels.
High levels of civic literacy; potential to also be economically successful (even though socialist). Taxation in Sweden is regressive (not redistributive). Is Milner making incorrect assumptions about Sweden?
What has been the impact of the war (immigrants/refuges) on the state of Sweden? They are taking in the most downtrodden and hopeless. The Swedish population is having a hard time adjusting to the influx; immigrants are having trouble assimilating. Milner is an institutionalist; he argues that the Scandinavian egalitarian culture was created by their institutions. But is the egalitarian culture changing? Outside of the immigrant communities you have a very knowledgeable, articulate population. Yet because immigrants are not acclimating, are the Sweds’ egalitarian virtues going the way of the buffalo? Taxes in Sweden are really high; immigrants are not contributing equally. This also upsets the more educated, homogenous native Sweds.
XIII. The Welfare State
Milner finds that economic performance is not connected to the welfare state; Asian tigers vs socialist democrats.
XIV. Conclusions on the Welfare State
How/why does Civic Literacy matter? What do high levels of civic literacy mean? Policy? Economy? Highly levels of DL make better decision and institute better institutions. Reinforcing, then. Since institutions make a difference toward the fostering of CL.
Milner class notes: Nordic countries vs market media
In PR systems, people vote more: vote is not wasted.
Milner argues that PR makes every single race competitive—and provide more information to the public in the pursuit of the seat; here are no safe seats, so parties compete in all districts.
2nd argument: if you are more informed you will vote for more welfare-oriented parties (leans to the left). 75% of the governments in PR system are left, or center left. 74% of majoritarian districts are right or center-right (personalized campaigns = lean right).
This is why information matters; people CHOOSE DIFFERENTLY when they have more information. What is the minimum level? Making accurate choices. At some point you will come to an equalibrium (no more impact on the collective decision). Once that is the same, we can compare apples to apples. According to Milner, there is more sophistication in Sweden.
There is a larger middle class in more equal societies, than in industrialized countries.
Now must look at where the rubber hits the road: What is the impact on POLICY?
I.e. If we were COMPLETELY informed about what led up to 9/11 (i.e. if we knew there were no WMDs or Iraqis on the plane, initially.
The dots start with the electoral system.
Theme: the causes and consequences of differences in political knowledge and what makes social-democratic welfare states sustainable
I. Civic Engagement and Social Capital develop skills that matter (Putnam says we get these from group associations; the no. leads to our S.C. stock).
Social Capital (as conceptualized by Putnam) measured as:
1. Trust (horizontal= interpersonal trust; vertical = trust in government)
2. associational density
definition of social capital: a public good; public trust, interpersonal and in government; community organization; voluntary associations.
Findings: Democratic institutions that equally distribute intellectial resources also more equally distribute material resources (high C.L. societies). AND Democratic institutions that more equally distribute intellectual resources attain higher levels of political parties.
Civic Engagement:
Organizational membership > ^trust in government > Civic engagement (voting)
II. Civic Literacy
Measured as:
1. willingness (the vote; @ the local level)
2. ability (knowledge-supply (media) and demand (people need)+ factual and cognitive)
- supply: “The nature and intensity of such efforts are seen to be a function of institutionalized incentives; in other words, political institutions matter when it comes to the accessibility and intelligibility of political information” (6).
III. Political ken
1. Individual Factors: education, age, income
2. Institutional Factors: electoral system; electoral system influences access, usefulness, and intelligibility.
IV. Sources of Civic Literacy
Measuring C.L.:
Civil: turning out to vote in local elections—more valid measure because they require more information; anyone can vote for a president. It takes more effort to vote in a local election.
Literacy: knowledge of U.N.
V. Political Parties and Political Institutions
-“The extent to which voters are informed on matters relevant to the decision to vote is in fact closely linked to the political institutions in which elections take place” (66).
Political Institutions > Political Ken > Political Participation
Electoral systems and Turnout
PR 71%
Maj 50%
VI. Political Institutions (78)
“each system has its own district long-term representational logic and it is via this logic that the citizens makes sense of the political choices available. Candidates in majoritarian systems are primarily oriented toward the median voter in the electorate, while those under PR systems are more oriented toward the median voter of their party (Wessels 1996)” (80). In FPTP political actors tend to misrepresent.
Consensus democracy: PR > ^ C.L. > ^ Voter Turnout
FPTP (first past the post) PR (proportional representation)
Ambiguity of leaders Less ambiguity
Zero Sum Better at supply side of ken
Mandates Visible compromises
SM cater to narrow interests Coalitions
Clear political map and more political information***
VII. C.L. and the Media
VIII. C.L. and Institutions
IX. Adult Education
Formal education and creating habits of civic literacy; as assessment of more deliberative democracy. Are people prone to change their minds when they have more information?
X. Case Study: New Zealand
Economy driven by a strong public sector; classic Westminster model. Milner has a negative evaluation of changes in New Zealand. Participation gone down following changes made by the state
XI. Economic Outcomes
XII. Case: Sweden
Universalism; decommodify labor (Epsing-Anderson conception). Excellent public health care, public transportation and education levels.
High levels of civic literacy; potential to also be economically successful (even though socialist). Taxation in Sweden is regressive (not redistributive). Is Milner making incorrect assumptions about Sweden?
What has been the impact of the war (immigrants/refuges) on the state of Sweden? They are taking in the most downtrodden and hopeless. The Swedish population is having a hard time adjusting to the influx; immigrants are having trouble assimilating. Milner is an institutionalist; he argues that the Scandinavian egalitarian culture was created by their institutions. But is the egalitarian culture changing? Outside of the immigrant communities you have a very knowledgeable, articulate population. Yet because immigrants are not acclimating, are the Sweds’ egalitarian virtues going the way of the buffalo? Taxes in Sweden are really high; immigrants are not contributing equally. This also upsets the more educated, homogenous native Sweds.
XIII. The Welfare State
Milner finds that economic performance is not connected to the welfare state; Asian tigers vs socialist democrats.
XIV. Conclusions on the Welfare State
How/why does Civic Literacy matter? What do high levels of civic literacy mean? Policy? Economy? Highly levels of DL make better decision and institute better institutions. Reinforcing, then. Since institutions make a difference toward the fostering of CL.
Milner class notes: Nordic countries vs market media
In PR systems, people vote more: vote is not wasted.
Milner argues that PR makes every single race competitive—and provide more information to the public in the pursuit of the seat; here are no safe seats, so parties compete in all districts.
2nd argument: if you are more informed you will vote for more welfare-oriented parties (leans to the left). 75% of the governments in PR system are left, or center left. 74% of majoritarian districts are right or center-right (personalized campaigns = lean right).
This is why information matters; people CHOOSE DIFFERENTLY when they have more information. What is the minimum level? Making accurate choices. At some point you will come to an equalibrium (no more impact on the collective decision). Once that is the same, we can compare apples to apples. According to Milner, there is more sophistication in Sweden.
There is a larger middle class in more equal societies, than in industrialized countries.
Now must look at where the rubber hits the road: What is the impact on POLICY?
I.e. If we were COMPLETELY informed about what led up to 9/11 (i.e. if we knew there were no WMDs or Iraqis on the plane, initially.
The dots start with the electoral system.
Norris. (2000) Virtuous Circle.
Part I News Media and Civic Malaise
Media potential role: (1) Watch Dog (2) Civic Forum (3) Mobilizing Agent
Part II Trends in PolComm
Newspapers: sales are still relatively high; the concentration of news ownership does not effect the coverage or freedom of the press; whether or not there has been a ‘tabloidization’ of newspapers is still understudied.
TV: There has been an increase in entertainment coverage
Internet: Mobilization Theory vs. Reinforcement Theory (does the Internet bring more people into the political discussion, or merely reinforce the digital gap theory. Is Norris’s analysis dated? She does not consider the recent boom in Internet use, especially among younger people and people of lower socioeconomic status. When she wrote her book about 20% of the population was connected.
Part III The Impact on Democracy
In conclusion, Norris associates high levels of news consumption with higher levels of efficacy, higher levels of political participation and low levels of government cynicism.
Chapter 10 Knows Little? Information and Choice
Three perspectives are common in the literature to establish political knowledge benchmarks:
(1) Civics approach assumes narrow type of ideal info about gov and public policy that all citizens need to know
(2) Relativist stances acknowledges that people have a limited reservoir of political information but suggests that it is sufficient to cast a vote.
(3) Practical Knowledge: citizens need enough knowledge to help them connect their political and social prefs to the available options.
Pg 214: 5 questions that measure political knowledge.
General class discussion: What is the difference between civic and practical knowledge, and which is more important for informing citizens?
-Civic knowledge would be knowledge of Supreme Court Justices, etc.
-Practical knowledge would be a knowledge of which political party is likely to support privatized health care, etc. Which type of knowledge is more important to measures of sophistication? Which type of knowledge does Norris capture in her surveys?
Media potential role: (1) Watch Dog (2) Civic Forum (3) Mobilizing Agent
Part II Trends in PolComm
Newspapers: sales are still relatively high; the concentration of news ownership does not effect the coverage or freedom of the press; whether or not there has been a ‘tabloidization’ of newspapers is still understudied.
TV: There has been an increase in entertainment coverage
Internet: Mobilization Theory vs. Reinforcement Theory (does the Internet bring more people into the political discussion, or merely reinforce the digital gap theory. Is Norris’s analysis dated? She does not consider the recent boom in Internet use, especially among younger people and people of lower socioeconomic status. When she wrote her book about 20% of the population was connected.
Part III The Impact on Democracy
In conclusion, Norris associates high levels of news consumption with higher levels of efficacy, higher levels of political participation and low levels of government cynicism.
Chapter 10 Knows Little? Information and Choice
Three perspectives are common in the literature to establish political knowledge benchmarks:
(1) Civics approach assumes narrow type of ideal info about gov and public policy that all citizens need to know
(2) Relativist stances acknowledges that people have a limited reservoir of political information but suggests that it is sufficient to cast a vote.
(3) Practical Knowledge: citizens need enough knowledge to help them connect their political and social prefs to the available options.
Pg 214: 5 questions that measure political knowledge.
General class discussion: What is the difference between civic and practical knowledge, and which is more important for informing citizens?
-Civic knowledge would be knowledge of Supreme Court Justices, etc.
-Practical knowledge would be a knowledge of which political party is likely to support privatized health care, etc. Which type of knowledge is more important to measures of sophistication? Which type of knowledge does Norris capture in her surveys?
Dalton, RJ. (2002) Citizens Politics.
Chapter 5 Values in Change
Values define the essence of our lives. “We study values because they provide the standards that guide the attitudes and behavior of the public” (82). “People develop a general framework for making these decisions by arranging values in terms of their importance of their importance to the individual” (82).
Inglehart (1977): describes value change as due to a combination of the scarcity hypotheses (we value that which are relatively short in supply), and the socialization hypotheses (our values reflect conditions that prevailed during our preadult years). “once value priorities develop, they tend to endure…” (83). [formative conditions]
Clarke & Nitish (1991) link our values to the ebb and flow of economic conditions. [present circumstances]
Potential values:
Economic growth
A stable economy
More say in work/community
Fight against crime
Protect free speech
Strong defense
Measuring values (86)
“Public values are changing” (96). And there are a diversity. “the mix of values makes it difficult for journalists to discern the public’s priorities” (96).
Chapter 6 Issues and Ideological Orientations
“Issues are the everyday currency of politics. Issue opinions identify the public’s preferences for government action and their expectations for the political process. Political parties are largely defined by their issue positions, and elections provide a means for the public to select between the competing issue programs they offer” (100).
“Issue opinions also represent the translation of broad value orientations into specific political concerns. Issues are partially determined by the values examined in the last chapter, as well as by other factors: cues from political elites, the flow of political events, and the contexts of specific situations. For example a persn may favor the principle of equal rights for all citizens; but attitudes towards voting rights, job discrimination, school busing, and open housing, and other civil rights legislation represents different mixes of values and practical concerns. Consequently, issue opinions are more changeable and valued than broad value orientations” (100).
“Issue opinions are a dynamic aspect of politics, and the theme of changing popular values can be carried over to the study of issues” (100).
“People are changing their opinions on many issues. Attitudes on equality issues display a dramatic shift over the past generation…” toward a more liberal orientation. (119).
Public Opinion and Political Change (121)
Issue interest has expanded (environmental issues. Etc). “The expansion of the boundaries of politics to include these new issues has several implications for the nature of contemporary politics. Governments have increased the scope of their activity: now they must worry not only about economic policy but also whether the environment is clean and whether personal life choices are tolerated… The proliferation of issue publics also changes the structure of political representation and decision making. Issue publics focus their effort to maximize representation on their issue, but the proliferation of such interests probably increases the complexity of the governing process…Policymakers thus see conflicting signals emanating from the public, without a method (or perhaps motivation) to resolve these conflicts systematically…One of the challenges facing contemporary government is how to adapt the democratic process to this different pattern of interest representation” (122).
VOTING
“The new style of citizen politics therefore should include a more fluid and volatile pattern of party alignments. Political coalitions and voting patterns will lack the permanence of past class and religious cleavages. Whithou clear social cues, voting decisions will become a more demanding task for voters—more dependent on the individual beliefs and values and citizens” (175).
PARTISANSHIP
“Each election presents voters with a choices over polici proposals and candidates for office. While social characteristics and group cues may be a basis for making decisions, citizens also hold a variety of political beliefs and values that affect their electoral calculus. Often, these considerations go beyond group ties or the perceptions derived from group cues. Consequently, contemporary electoral research emphasizes the attitudes and values of voters as key factors in understanding electoral choice…Citizens make judgments about which party best represents their interests, and these perceptions guide voting behavior. Attitudes toward the issues and candidates of an election are thus a necessary outcome in any realistic model of voting. Attitudes are also changeable, and their incorporation into a voting model helps explain variation in arty results across elections” (177).
The sociopsychological model of voting (178-ish)
Partisan attachments + specific issue opinions
Partisan attitudes:
Partisan loyalties serve as a cue (179). …a low cost cue (187). They make politics “user-friendly” (185). “The cue-giving function of partisanship is clearly sees for voting behavior. Partisanship means that voters enter an election with a predisposition to support their preferred party. Philip Converse (1966) described partisanship as the basis for a “normal vote”—the vote expected when other factors in the election are evenly balanced. If other factors come into play, such as issue positions or candidate images, their influence can be measured by their ability to cause defections from standing partisan commitments” (187).
But in the US there are a vast collection of partisan candidates to choose from. “Thus the separation between attitudes and behavior is most noticeable in American elections…” (187)… “In highly visible and politicized presidential elections, candidate images and issue appeals have the potential to counteract partisan preferences, and thus party defections are common in these elections” (187).
Party bonds are strongest among older voters. Partisans tend to be more politically active (186).
Party dealignment (188)
Consequences (191)
-weakening partisan-centered voting choice
-increase in fluidity of voting patterns
-decline in participation
-rise in issue concerns and candidates (their party-cue is GONE)
Structural Causes (193-194)
Cognitive Mobilization Theory Typology (195)
Some voters remain oriented to politics based on their partisan attachments (cognitive partisans, ritual partisans) whereas other voters remain oriented to politics on their own (apartisans, cognitive partisans).
TWO MOBILIZING DIMENSIONS: PARTISANSHIP, COGNITIVE
1.Apoliticals-unmobilized
2.Ritual Partisans-PARTISAN mobilized
3.Cognitive Partisans-highly ranked on both mobilizing dimensions.
4.Apartisans-cognitively mobilized
chapter 10; ATTITUDES AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR (201)
“Issues and candidates give political meaning to the partisan attachements and social divisions we have discussed in earler chapters” (201)….issue beliefs and candidate images explan the ebbs and flows of voting outcomes over time” (201).
ISSUE VOTING (202):
Framework: performance (candidates’effectiveness) and position (defines the conflict).
CANDIDATE IMAGES (215):
Prototype literature
We are more politically sophisticated, today (220). Consequences (220); i.e. what about people who are not (221).
Chapter 11; political representation (223)
“In the broadest sense of the term, the representativeness of elite attitude is measured by their similarity to the overall attitudes of the public” (224).
Domestic policy options
Socioeconomic issues and the state
Big vs small government: “In comparison to most EUs, America are more reserved in their acceptance of government action” (103).
Race and Equality
Gender Issues (110)
Environmental Protection
Social and Moral Issues (114) “…Americans are more conservative than EUs on social and moral issues. This pattern is likely the result of national differences in religious feelings… The US is among the most religious of Western societies. American chruch attendance and religious feelings are among the highest in the work. A full 96 percent of America considered say they believe in God, compared to 60-70 percent among EUs.
Values define the essence of our lives. “We study values because they provide the standards that guide the attitudes and behavior of the public” (82). “People develop a general framework for making these decisions by arranging values in terms of their importance of their importance to the individual” (82).
Inglehart (1977): describes value change as due to a combination of the scarcity hypotheses (we value that which are relatively short in supply), and the socialization hypotheses (our values reflect conditions that prevailed during our preadult years). “once value priorities develop, they tend to endure…” (83). [formative conditions]
Clarke & Nitish (1991) link our values to the ebb and flow of economic conditions. [present circumstances]
Potential values:
Economic growth
A stable economy
More say in work/community
Fight against crime
Protect free speech
Strong defense
Measuring values (86)
“Public values are changing” (96). And there are a diversity. “the mix of values makes it difficult for journalists to discern the public’s priorities” (96).
Chapter 6 Issues and Ideological Orientations
“Issues are the everyday currency of politics. Issue opinions identify the public’s preferences for government action and their expectations for the political process. Political parties are largely defined by their issue positions, and elections provide a means for the public to select between the competing issue programs they offer” (100).
“Issue opinions also represent the translation of broad value orientations into specific political concerns. Issues are partially determined by the values examined in the last chapter, as well as by other factors: cues from political elites, the flow of political events, and the contexts of specific situations. For example a persn may favor the principle of equal rights for all citizens; but attitudes towards voting rights, job discrimination, school busing, and open housing, and other civil rights legislation represents different mixes of values and practical concerns. Consequently, issue opinions are more changeable and valued than broad value orientations” (100).
“Issue opinions are a dynamic aspect of politics, and the theme of changing popular values can be carried over to the study of issues” (100).
“People are changing their opinions on many issues. Attitudes on equality issues display a dramatic shift over the past generation…” toward a more liberal orientation. (119).
Public Opinion and Political Change (121)
Issue interest has expanded (environmental issues. Etc). “The expansion of the boundaries of politics to include these new issues has several implications for the nature of contemporary politics. Governments have increased the scope of their activity: now they must worry not only about economic policy but also whether the environment is clean and whether personal life choices are tolerated… The proliferation of issue publics also changes the structure of political representation and decision making. Issue publics focus their effort to maximize representation on their issue, but the proliferation of such interests probably increases the complexity of the governing process…Policymakers thus see conflicting signals emanating from the public, without a method (or perhaps motivation) to resolve these conflicts systematically…One of the challenges facing contemporary government is how to adapt the democratic process to this different pattern of interest representation” (122).
VOTING
“The new style of citizen politics therefore should include a more fluid and volatile pattern of party alignments. Political coalitions and voting patterns will lack the permanence of past class and religious cleavages. Whithou clear social cues, voting decisions will become a more demanding task for voters—more dependent on the individual beliefs and values and citizens” (175).
PARTISANSHIP
“Each election presents voters with a choices over polici proposals and candidates for office. While social characteristics and group cues may be a basis for making decisions, citizens also hold a variety of political beliefs and values that affect their electoral calculus. Often, these considerations go beyond group ties or the perceptions derived from group cues. Consequently, contemporary electoral research emphasizes the attitudes and values of voters as key factors in understanding electoral choice…Citizens make judgments about which party best represents their interests, and these perceptions guide voting behavior. Attitudes toward the issues and candidates of an election are thus a necessary outcome in any realistic model of voting. Attitudes are also changeable, and their incorporation into a voting model helps explain variation in arty results across elections” (177).
The sociopsychological model of voting (178-ish)
Partisan attachments + specific issue opinions
Partisan attitudes:
Partisan loyalties serve as a cue (179). …a low cost cue (187). They make politics “user-friendly” (185). “The cue-giving function of partisanship is clearly sees for voting behavior. Partisanship means that voters enter an election with a predisposition to support their preferred party. Philip Converse (1966) described partisanship as the basis for a “normal vote”—the vote expected when other factors in the election are evenly balanced. If other factors come into play, such as issue positions or candidate images, their influence can be measured by their ability to cause defections from standing partisan commitments” (187).
But in the US there are a vast collection of partisan candidates to choose from. “Thus the separation between attitudes and behavior is most noticeable in American elections…” (187)… “In highly visible and politicized presidential elections, candidate images and issue appeals have the potential to counteract partisan preferences, and thus party defections are common in these elections” (187).
Party bonds are strongest among older voters. Partisans tend to be more politically active (186).
Party dealignment (188)
Consequences (191)
-weakening partisan-centered voting choice
-increase in fluidity of voting patterns
-decline in participation
-rise in issue concerns and candidates (their party-cue is GONE)
Structural Causes (193-194)
Cognitive Mobilization Theory Typology (195)
Some voters remain oriented to politics based on their partisan attachments (cognitive partisans, ritual partisans) whereas other voters remain oriented to politics on their own (apartisans, cognitive partisans).
TWO MOBILIZING DIMENSIONS: PARTISANSHIP, COGNITIVE
1.Apoliticals-unmobilized
2.Ritual Partisans-PARTISAN mobilized
3.Cognitive Partisans-highly ranked on both mobilizing dimensions.
4.Apartisans-cognitively mobilized
chapter 10; ATTITUDES AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR (201)
“Issues and candidates give political meaning to the partisan attachements and social divisions we have discussed in earler chapters” (201)….issue beliefs and candidate images explan the ebbs and flows of voting outcomes over time” (201).
ISSUE VOTING (202):
Framework: performance (candidates’effectiveness) and position (defines the conflict).
CANDIDATE IMAGES (215):
Prototype literature
We are more politically sophisticated, today (220). Consequences (220); i.e. what about people who are not (221).
Chapter 11; political representation (223)
“In the broadest sense of the term, the representativeness of elite attitude is measured by their similarity to the overall attitudes of the public” (224).
Domestic policy options
Socioeconomic issues and the state
Big vs small government: “In comparison to most EUs, America are more reserved in their acceptance of government action” (103).
Race and Equality
Gender Issues (110)
Environmental Protection
Social and Moral Issues (114) “…Americans are more conservative than EUs on social and moral issues. This pattern is likely the result of national differences in religious feelings… The US is among the most religious of Western societies. American chruch attendance and religious feelings are among the highest in the work. A full 96 percent of America considered say they believe in God, compared to 60-70 percent among EUs.
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